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Abstract 
 
The price of emission permits is deemed too low to mitigate climate change. In 
three studies, policy approaches to pricing carbon in a market setting are 
examined. First, the emission permit market is analyzed comparatively to how 
the ethanol mandate impacted prices in the corn market. This leads to the 
realization that the marketization of carbon is more like a currency than a 
physical commodity. The next study examines emission permits as a monetary 
policy tool. Emissions correlate GDP output, thus central banks can use emission 
permits as forward guidance, as a means to optimize the price for climate change 
mitigation, and as an alternative to interest rates. Opinions of thought leaders are 
used to question the acceptability of emission permits as a monetary policy tool. 
The final study is an ethical analysis using deontology, utilitarianism and virtue 
ethics within a pragmatic philosophical context, analyzing carbon as a monetary 
policy tool. In order for carbon as a monetary policy tool to be considered 
ethically acceptable, it must satisfy the temporal, spatial and institutional 
dilemmas of climate change articulated in Stephen Gardiner’s Perfect Moral 
Storm. Under this ethical standard, it is found that using carbon as a monetary 
policy tool can help address these concerns, but not solve them alone. This 
research is presented using transdisciplinary methods which provide a unique 
and holistic approach to policy formation not yet presented in the literature. This 
research is relevant to policy makers in central banking, the IMF and World 
Bank. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Give someone a fish, you feed them for a day.  
Teach someone to fish, you destroy another aquatic ecosystem.  
Romer (2011) 
Change the rules, and you change the game. Since the dawn of the 
industrial revolution around 1750, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have 
increased from 280 ppm to an average of 392.67 ppm (Blasing, 2013); a clear 
indicator that we need new rules.  
Climate change threatens hard-won peace, prosperity, and opportunity for 
billions of people. Today we must set the world on a new course. Climate 
change is the defining issue of our age. It is defining our present. Our 
response will define our future. (United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki 
Moon, 2014)  
We need a system where the specific rules in force at any point in time 
evolve to keep up with a rapidly changing world (Romer, 2011). Industrial output, 
a result of current economic design, has created an era where human industrial 
activity impacts the entire globe, an era that some people call the Anthropocene, 
or the era of humans. Climate change is the poster child of the Anthropocene. The 
shear impact of human activity upon the earth is like a parasite destroying its host. 
In accordance with ecological economics, we need a new economy with a scale 
relative to the Earth’s carrying capacity, one that ensures the fair distribution of 
these capacities, and their efficient allocation represent the foci for ethical 
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consideration and acceptability (Brown, 2012). Even though the International 
Panel on Climate Change has been active since 1988, concentrations of CO2 
continue to rise. Efforts to reduce global Greenhouse Gas emissions are a classic 
collective action problem, international cooperation is difficult because nations 
fear “free-riders” (De Canio & Fremstad, 2013; Ostrom, 2009). Free riders are 
nations that benefit from GHG reductions but do not take part in the reduction 
themselves. Although there is more buy in since the 2016 Paris Treaty, binding 
robust commitments are still elusive (Höhne et al., 2017). Philosopher Stephen 
Gardiner warns that intergenerational costs and geographic disparities exist in 
which the people who caused climate change should not be the people to pay for 
its mitigation although they make up the global majority. 
 One of the problems, in the Post Kyoto era, is that according to the Stern 
(2006) report the price of carbon is not high enough to bring about the behavioral 
change necessary to combat climate change. According to a World Bank (2014) 
report, one of the driving concerns of the market strategy to reduce carbon 
emissions is that the low price of credits makes them ineffective. Without the 
demand from EU ETS installations, Kyoto carbon credit prices have reached 
historic lows. This means that payments to the nascent Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation program (REDD+) are likewise very low, 
averaging US$0.51 (€0.37) in 2013, and below one Euro in 2014 (World Bank, 2014).  
As a result, there is little incentive to invest in carbon sinks and producers of stored 
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carbon, mostly low-income people, do not receive adequate payment for the land 
they manage. 
This dissertation focuses on the design of market-based emission reduction 
schemes. The European emission reduction schemes are the markets to leverage 
because they are the largest and dominate the Clean Development mechanism of 
stored carbon credit markets. However, the principle behind the market mandate 
approach to mitigation should work for all carbon markets. Emission reduction 
market based schemes turn GHG pollution into a commodity to make it more 
expensive and hence more costly to pollute. Specifically, I ask the research 
question: is it feasible and acceptable to use a market mechanism to increase the 
price of carbon emission permits? A market mechanism is a specific policy, 
regulation, or rule that changes the market price.  
I go on to explore the institutional design rules that not only raise the price 
of carbon emissions through increasing the demand for emission permits, but also 
the potential of using emissions permits as a monetary policy tool as a new way to 
approach and add to current climate change mitigation strategies and manage the 
economic growth. Invoking the biological metaphor again; shifting humanity’s 
parasitic activity to a more communal relationship, in which one organism does 
not destroy its host, but lives symbiotically without destroying it. For a case study 
I use another commodity market, the commensurable ethanol mandate’s impact 
on the corn market to analyze price increases and the impact of a market mandate 
on an undervalued commodity. In this manner I invoke economic and ethical 
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analysis to determine the impacts of using carbon as a monetary tool within the 
market based approach currently used in multilateral climate change agreements. 
What I propose is a policy alternative not yet considered in the literature on 
climate change mitigation strategies. Using emission permits as a monetary policy 
tool is intended to work alongside other policy approaches such as fiscal carbon 
taxes and collaborative measures like Nationally Determined Commitments.  
The findings of this dissertation are highly relevant to governments seeking 
to mitigate climate change most effectively and efficiently. This research 
demonstrates that carbon is most effectively managed as a currency. As such this 
has policy implications for central banks and for multilateral lending 
organizations like the IMF and World Bank. 
The following figure 1.1 demonstrates the interactions between price 
changes and market behavior.
!
!  
Figure 1.1: C
arbon as a M
onetary Policy Tool in the Em
ission M
arket 
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Figure 1.1 shows that prices have a driving impact on the economy and on 
emissions. The current scenario is one of a low price environment. In this situation 
we witness low trading activity in the Emission Trading Schemes, this reduces the 
need for a secondary market in which emissions are trade over the counter and 
not in an auction setting. This then translates to low prices for stored carbon 
projects in low and middle income countries and no incentive to limit land-use 
changes, which are significant emitters of GHG emissions. Meanwhile end 
consumers in industrial countries do not realize savings on utility bills because 
utility companies factor in higher prices. So in the end consumers do not realize 
savings, but producers of stored carbon do not benefit either. Low emission permit 
prices are a lose-lose scenario for primary producers of sequestered carbon and 
consumers of electricity, the only winners are utility companies. 
If the emission price is too high emission trading will be volatile creating 
uncertainty in the market. In such an environment end consumers are unsure of 
future utility price increases and may become politically unstable. In this scenario 
producers of stored carbon in low income countries may face land speculation 
from profit seeking investors attempting to ride a sequestration super cycle. Utility 
companies also face uncertainty due to permit price inflation. So in this case all 
parties could be harmed.  
This demonstrates the need to find the goldilocks zone for the permit price. 
As will be demonstrated in this dissertation the price of carbon is most efficiently 
managed in a currency environment by a central bank. This is because emission 
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permits have more in common with currencies than with a physical commodity 
like wheat or oil. The supply of permits is set by bureaucrats, not so much by the 
demand from firms seeking the right to pollute. 
The chapters of this dissertation demonstrate the complexity of climate 
change policy making, specifically the difficulty of carbon pricing in a tax revolt 
era. The second chapter reviews the literature associated with carbon pricing, 
while the third explains the methods used to address real-world-policy-problem 
solving.  The fourth chapter asks what can the carbon markets learn from the corn 
market. In 2005 the ethanol mandate, embedded in the Renewable Fuels Standard 
Act, sent demand signals around the world altering the global food supply. This 
poorly understood policy offers imperative information for carbon markets 
regarding the speculation, transparency and supply within a trading market. 
Chapter five is the result of a series of interviews with thought leaders; experts in 
macroeconomic finance and climate change policy. The interviews engaged these 
experts on the market dynamics of the ethanol mandate and the potential for 
carbon market policies. The results of these interviews were surprising, in that the 
experts mistrusted the tradeable permit approach; surprising, because most of 
them were instrumental in designing various emission markets.   
Consequently, the following chapter proposes using a market policy tool 
that addresses many of the concerns that the expert interviews revealed about 
market trading uncertainty. Chapter six develops the feedback from the expert 
interviews into a unique policy alternative, namely using emission permits as a 
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monetary policy tool to help manage inflation. Thus, this quenches the interview 
participants’ concern regarding market volatility and unintended consequences. 
In chapter seven, the concept of using emission permits as a monetary policy tool 
is analyzed from an ethical perspective. This chapter uses a different format; it 
critiques the policy through the methods of applied ethics in light of Stephen 
Gardner’s seminal tri-part ethical framework. Gardner frames climate change as 
being a dilemma between generations, geography and institutional inadequacy. 
Using this framework as an ethical standard is the means for determining the 
acceptability of emissions as a monetary policy tool. 
In scope, this dissertation spans the gap between academic research and the 
messy world of policy making. It is transdisciplinary in that it weaves different 
theories and research methods to address a real-world problem in a meaningful 
way. It draws primarily from policy and economic theory, sociology and ethical 
pragmatism within an environmental context, by using quantitative, qualitative 
and ethical analysis methods. In doing so it aims to bring a holistic collaborative 
approach to tackling the jurisdictional Gordian knot of climate change policy.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Markets as Policy Tools: Commodifying Pollution 
Pollution is a negative externality; an externality is when the action of one 
economic agent, like a consumer or firm, affects another agent, and this effect is 
not included in the market price (Gowdy, 2010, p. 80). The generalized logic of 
welfare economics translated by economist Arthur Pigou gave rise to pollution 
regulation (Lane, 2012). In 1920, Pigou demonstrated that such externalities could 
be accounted for if a tax equal to the social cost were applied to the polluting 
emission, thereby avoiding the negative economic implications that lead to market 
failure (Sinclair-Desgagne, & Nimubona, 2005). Later it was proposed that markets 
in combination with regulatory limits could achieve beneficial environmental 
outcomes. Proposing, “If factors of production [pollution] are thought of as rights, 
it becomes easier to understand that the right to do something which has a harmful 
effect (such as the creation of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of 
production” (Coase, 1960, p. 44). Therefore, if it is part of the production process, 
it is a cost, and since firms try to limit costs, they will attempt to limit pollution. 
This idea turns a non-excludable problem, like pollution, into an excludable 
product, essentially making it possible to purchase the “right” to pollute. 
Essentially, it is harnessing a problem of the commons, by in essence enclosing it 
(Zia, 2013, loc. 3281-3282). Climate change is frequently referred to as a tragedy of 
the commons (Broome, 2012; Brown & Garver, 2009; Downie, 2015; Gardiner, 2011; 
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Jameison, 2014; Ormstead, 2016). Tragedy of the commons refers to Garret 
Hardin’s (1968) classic paper in which a commonly held pasture is destroyed due 
to over grazing. The following table displays the relationship between enclosed - 
private, resources and goods in comparison to resources and goods that are not so 
easily managed. 
Table 2.1  
Economic Resource Matrix 
 
  
Excludable 
 
Non-excludable 
 
Rival 
Privatization, pay for service, 
intellectual property rights: 
controls who has access of use, 
usually through monetary means. 
Pollution when regulated 
 
Tragedy of the Commons. 
Infrastructure: roads the more 
people access them the more 
crowded they become, reducing 
efficiency 
macroeconomic money 
Non-
rival 
Potential for privatization, pricing 
reduces consumption. Ideas, 
technology 
 
Public goods. Lighthouses, 
ecosystem services: photosynthesis 
Adapted from Birner, 2012; Daly & Farley, 2004, p. 160. 
 Pricing carbon is an attempt to privatize pollution by forcing emitters to 
purchase the right to pollute. When a limit is set and the pollution privatized, firms 
can choose whether it is more efficient for them to modernize their production 
methods to be less polluting, or purchase the right to pollute. According to the 
Coase (1960) Theorem, the level of an externality like pollution is independent 
from institutional factors such as the assignment of liability for damages unless 
there are transaction costs applied. In order to apply transactions costs, the 
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externality is treated as a commodity (Hurwicz, 1995). A commodity is a useful 
raw material of value. In our case Green House Gases are commodified making them 
tradeable goods and as a result the useful aspect is to reduce their atmospheric 
concentration. 
Following from Coase’s theory, Thomas Crocker (1966), John Dales (1968), 
and David Montgomery (1972) demonstrated that this “right” could be turned into 
tradable permits that were thought to be more efficient than “command and 
control” policies that regulate polluting emissions through strict regulatory limits. 
This concept became the driving principle that was to become the foundation of 
emission trading schemes (cap and trade) such as the Clean Air Act (1970, 1990), 
the Montreal Protocol (1992) to control ozone depletion and the Kyoto Protocol to 
mitigate climate change (Calel, 2011; Lane, 2012; MacKenzie, 2009).  
U.S. diplomats with the support of the international business community 
pressed international emissions trading into the Kyoto Protocol, which the 
Europeans opposed, preferring the regulatory mechanism. However, despite 
America’s push for the market mechanism, the first international emissions 
trading scheme to get underway would not include the US (Voß, 2007). The 
European Union Emission Trading System began operation in 2005 with the 
market design to price a ton of carbon below €30/tCO2e (US$41/tCO2e)1 (World 
Bank, 2014). The opening price in January, 2005 was €15/tCO2e. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!CO2e refers to carbon dioxide equivalent: a functional measurement for creating a common 
standard for calculating GHG emissions!
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2.2 The Price Problem 
The goal of a carbon market is to bring emissions into economic 
measurement by pricing them. In such a market, emissions have a direct cost 
(because allowances to emit greenhouses gases need to be purchased), or an 
opportunity cost (because allowances that are not used to cover emissions can be 
sold for a profit) (MacKenzie, 2009). The EU-ETS established a European market 
of allowances for 2.2 billion tons of carbon emissions from 11,500 utility firms 
(Sovacool, 2011). In 2006, the daily transaction volume in emission allowances 
reached 60 million Euros (Voß, 2007). 
As such, with a view to the fundamental changes in concepts, institutions 
and practices of environmental policy (as compared to the formerly predominant 
mode of command-and-control regulation), emissions trading appears to not only 
be successful, but also an innovation in governance. As a result, emissions trading 
has become something of a global standard in environmental governance (Voß, 
2007). Or so it seemed in 2007. The appropriate allocation of emission permits, 
which determines the trading price of carbon through the concept of supply and 
demand, has been problematic from the very beginning (Wrake, 2009). In addition, 
confidence in the EU ETS has been hit hard since the design mechanism has been 
unable to cope with the major economic downturn (World Bank, 2014).  
Despite three phases of permit allocation, and although the price of carbon 
flirted briefly with the appropriate price of €30/tCO2 e in 2006 and again in 2008, 
since the economic downturn the price has hovered in the €4/tCO2 e (US$5.5/tCO2 
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e) range, far below the €30/tCO2 e high (Point Carbon, 2013). And nowhere near 
the target price of $85/tCO2 e that economist Sir Nicholas Stern claims is needed 
to create the economic behavior changes necessary to combat climate change 
effectively (2006). However, more recent research indicates that prices need not be 
that high in order to achieve economically significant behavioral change. On the 
positive side, according to the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change 
and the Environment, over-allocation of carbon permits early in the scheme, and 
the global recession more recently, have reduced the direct impact of the EU ETS 
on emissions, but the EU ETS has been effective at getting attention about climate 
change in company boardrooms, which is a prerequisite for change, thus helping 
to deter major carbon intensive investments (Liang et al., 2013.) 
Although this demonstrates that the target carbon price need not be as high 
as Stern anticipated 10 years ago, the mechanism for increasing the price of carbon 
has yet to be realized. The price of carbon credits in the EU ETS is still well below 
€30/tCO2 e, around € 6-8/tCO2 e because the supply of credits exceeds the 
demand. This has resulted in European utility corporations that produce 
electricity to garner windfall profits since they set the consumer price at the policy 
target price of €30/tCO2 e for consumers to purchase electricity, but they pay only 
the depressed market price for carbon credits on the exchange (Lohmann, 2009; 
Savocool, 2011). 
Although problems still exist, the concept of carbon as a privatized 
excludable commodity has been successful, tradable emission permits are 
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increasingly recognized as financial instruments, and according to the World Bank 
(2014), eight new markets opened around the world in 2013. Despite broad unity 
on action for climate change at the COP 21 Paris summit in December 2015, the EU 
ETS price is still below 10 Euros. 
2.3 Carbon Emission Market Policies: Supply and Demand 
The first mandatory emissions market, the European Union Emissions 
Trading System, was started in January of 2005 (MacKenzie, 2009). It captured 
roughly 11,500 factories in the EU requiring them to buy and sell permits. This 
represented about 40% of the EU’s total equivalent carbon dioxide emissions 
(Sovacool, 2011). However, the EU-ETS did not include the aviation and shipping 
industries (Helm, 2010), aviation was included in 2013, increasing coverage to 45% 
of CO2 emissions (World Bank, 2014, p. 50). The allocation of permits is decided 
with each new phase – the EU-ETS is currently in phase 3, which started in January 
2013, and will operate until 2020. This phase primarily allocated permits through 
an auction process rather than gifting them to regulated industries (Santor et al., 
2014). The permit price is still below the target price € 20-30, leading policy makers 
to consider “backloading”, which would mean that fewer permits would be 
released in the future than was initially planned (EcoLogic, 2013). 
Although confidence in the EU-ETS has been damaged due to the global 
recession and misallocation of permits, according to the World Bank there are now 
17 emissions trading schemes around the world that account for 12% of all global 
GHG emissions. Also the largest emitters of CO2, the US and China now have 
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regional emission trading schemes (2014). Because carbon is a base element it has a 
consistent weight independent of geography; a tonne of carbon in Europe is 
therefore equal in substance to a metric ton of carbon on the California exchange 
even though the policy limit of emission allowance may be different and therefore 
the price granting the right to pollute could be different in different regions. When 
carbon is turned into a tradable commodity, its fungiblity (the ability to replace it 
with an item of equal value, like cash) makes it transferable beyond policy borders. 
In this sense carbon is fundamentally different from the commodity corn market, 
which it will be compared to later in this dissertation, because the commodity corn 
market is concentrated in Chicago where the price is set. Carbon markets are 
nascent and as such hold no significant historical reference, which is why one must 
compare it to other markets to examine the potential impacts of mandates on the 
market price. For this reason, in a future section the case study of a market 
mandate’s impact on the commodity corn market and, hence global food prices, 
will be examined. However, for the next step, we will look toward the design of 
pollution markets. 
2.4 Market Design 
The market design for CO2 mitigation is based upon a trading market that 
sets a regulatory cap that limits how much CO2 can be emitted by large 
corporations, such as electricity generators, steel and cement manufacturers. The 
cap thus determines the number of permits that polluters must compete for in the 
market. Firms that are required by law to take part in the market system have 
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flexibility; they can decide to reduce their emissions and sell their permits 
(allowances) to firms that find reducing emissions too expensive. Therefore, the 
easiest emission reductions are made first, even though the permit price may be 
inexpensive. Through tightening the cap (reducing the number of permits 
allocated or auctioned), permits eventually become more expensive, creating an 
incentive to reduce emissions further. A firms’ ability to trade emission permits 
creates a market in which permit price moves towards its highest value of use 
(Stavins, 2009). Companies that can easily make changes to reduce GHG emissions 
do so because it is cheaper for them to change their emissions than it is for them to 
purchase permits. For an exhaustive review of climate policy see: The Economics 
and Politics of Climate Change (Helm & Hepburn, 2010). For an extensive and up 
to date review of the carbon markets see: State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 
(World Bank, 2014). 
In 2005 carbon dioxide emissions represented 85% of all GHG emissions 
that are released from fossil fuel combustion in the US (Stavins, 2009). Other GHGs 
such as methane and HFCs exist and attempts have been made to integrate them 
into the market system through carbon equivalencies. However, attempting to 
make a homogeneous market standard here creates complications of monitoring 
and accounting and therefore the viability of equivalency will need to be 
addressed in future research. 
 In an attempt to create a concise comparative analysis this proposal only 
addresses carbon as a comparison to other commodities since addressing other 
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GHGs, although eventually imperative, excessively complicates the ability of 
traded carbon emission permits or allowances to be fungible assets. Furthermore, 
the key goal of this research is to explore how best to reach and manage the target 
price for carbon emissions, and although capturing other emissions is imperative 
to mitigating climate change, it is tangential to the discussion of price. Before 
addressing the price target specifically, it is important to address the nature of 
what is being traded. 
2.5 Fungible Carbon: From Commodity to Currency 
In turning carbon into a commodity via the process of emission permits and 
the trading of those permits, carbon becomes a fungible good. The concept of a 
fungible good is its equivalency to cash. The literature on carbon as a currency is 
sparse, but the concept has been noted from the onset of mitigating climate change 
through the market mechanism. In 2003, the International Financial Reporting 
Interpretations Committee, a committee of the International Accounting 
Standards Board, stated that an emissions permit is akin to, and should be 
accounted for, monetary currency (Button, 2008).  
In addition, then British Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs, David Miliband said, Imagine a country where carbon becomes a new 
currency. We carry bank-cards that store both pounds and carbon points. When 
we buy electricity, gas and fuel, we use our carbon points as well as pounds. He 
argued that while a carbon tax would hit all consumers, individual carbon caps 
would target only those with a carbon intensive lifestyle, typically high earners. 
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Those on a low income, or who did not own a car or fly regularly, could boost their 
income by selling their carbon allowances (Clover, 2006). In this scenario, carbon 
pricing becomes a politically progressive policy tool because it provides an 
opportunity cost for those choosing to reduce their GHG emissions. Under the EU-
ETS, and RGGI in the North Eastern US, carbon units can be saved, as money is in 
a bank. 
While standard commodities such as wheat and oil have a value due to their 
utility, the carbon permit-credit, like paper money, is essentially made up; its value 
comes from the cap, which limits its supply (Button, 2008). As a result, the policy 
that reduces its supply sets the market scarcity, which in turn determines its value 
(Descheneau, 2012). Hence the emissions market is more similar to trading a 
currency than eliminating a pollutant (Victor & House, 2004). This is because the 
supply of the market is set by policy not by production, as it is in mining and 
agriculture. 
Like currencies, not all emission permits are created equally because a 
government determines the permit supply in the market and it is the government 
that sets the cap (the limit that determines supply). A market that has an excess of 
emission permits for sale will have a lower price than a market in which there are 
few available permits and demand is high.  
Just as monetary policy varies from nation to nation, the value of carbon 
emission credits vary depending upon the supply and demand for credits from a 
particular country. This puts policy makers in a difficult position, especially in 
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uncertain economic times, creating the supply of permits in a market can have 
dramatic impacts on industrial output and so in times of recession it is more likely 
that permits will be over allocated (Sartor, Pallière, & Lecourt, 2014). As such the 
long term policy goal of reducing CO2 comes into conflict with the short term goal 
of stimulating growth in uncertain economic times. This, in short, is an ethical 
dilemma, in which immediate policy alternatives are in conflict with long term 
well-being. Public institutions invariably must negotiate market turbulence with 
social needs (Ventriss, 2013). As we shall see shortly this is similar to the dilemma 
of monetary policy in the political arena. 
In regions where carbon emission markets are determined by political 
immediacy, managing the supply of emission permits is crucial to effective 
mitigation. From an environmental perspective, one concern is that carbon permits 
of a lesser environmental or financial quality will enter a market and drive down 
the price, thus reducing overall GHG mitigation. It is important to remember that 
what is being discussed here is the emission permit market, and not the off-set 
market, where the issue of quality is even more problematic. Different market 
prices give rise to concerns of Leakage, where a firm may move its enterprise to 
avoid the cost of emission permits, or reduce cost by moving production to places 
or markets of lower cost (Sovacool, 2011; Sovacool & Brown, 2009).  
  If emission permits were traded as a currency, non-equivalent units would 
be traded much as nonequivalent currencies like the Euro and the U.S. dollar are 
traded in an international currency market (Button, 2008). This then allows permits 
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to be treated differently without risking “hot air”, leakage transactions. This is 
where permits of a lesser quality and from a different region are traded in a market 
with higher standards. When this happens because the quality of the permit is of 
a lesser significance, mitigation effects are of less benefit. 
Currently emission permits are perceived and traded as a commodity, but 
I will explore if they would be better managed as a currency, as Button (2008) and  
Victor and House (2004) suggest. This would allow them to have different values 
across markets. Given carbon’s monetary characteristics it follows, that if carbon 
can be treated as money, is it feasible to use it as a monetary policy tool? 
2.6 If Emission Permits act like a Currency, Could the Central Bank Use them 
as a Policy Tool? 
In the previous section, carbon emission permits were compared to 
monetary characteristics. As previously mentioned, there are political aspects to 
managing emission permit supply that are akin to the dilemma of monetary 
policy. In this section, carbon emission permits will be analyzed as a monetary 
policy tool within a central bank, using the Federal Reserve as an example. 
The Federal Reserve, commonly called the Fed, is the central bank of the 
US. The Federal Reserve is generally perceived as a “decentralized” central bank 
because of its cooperative relationship amongst its regional private members. 
However, its monetary policy is as centralized as any other nations’. The 
committee that oversees monetary policy is the Federal Open Market Committee, 
while the international reserves are held and transactions performed by the 
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This research focuses only on the monetary 
policy objectives as they might apply to carbon as a monetary policy tool.  
Congress oversees the Fed, but the FOMC is relatively autonomous, under 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Section 2A states the monetary policy objectives: 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of 
the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the 
economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to 
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.2  
Unlike a private bank, central banks are not profit-seeking; their goals are 
to create an environment of stability so that prosperity and long-term investment 
can take place. This is in part why central banks are relatively autonomous from 
political interference.  
Throughout the 1980s many central banks were granted greater 
independence because it was believed that “the government has an incentive to 
inflate the currency in order to impose a tax (my italics) presumably with lower 
political costs than would be associated with other, more direct forms.” It was 
understood that independent central banks were [and are] a useful means for 
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2!12 USC 225a. As added by act of November 16, 1977 (91 Stat. 1387) and amended by acts of 
October 27, 1978 (92 Stat. 1897); Aug. 23, 1988 (102 Stat. 1375); and Dec. 27, 2000 (114 Stat. 3028). 
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maintaining price stability and thus for controlling inflation without political 
fallout (Miller, 1998). In other words, appointed central bank directors do not face 
short-term election cycles. This is the dilemma previously raised in which short 
term goals are in conflict with long term needs. In short, Central Bankers do not 
have to face the electorate every four or five years and therefore can focus more 
on the long term interest of the macro economy. As a result, it is easier for central 
bankers to act in “long-run” economic interest of the nation and thus they are 
buffered from direct public scrutiny. The assets of central banks that are used to 
manage the money supply are more easily preserved with central bank 
independence, since politicians have an incentive to print money to make it appear 
the economy is growing faster than it really is. 
 As a result, monetary policy is seen as a common good that needs to be 
protected from the political electorate. In this way monetary policy is similar to the 
interest of climate change. Monetary policy is seen as too important and too 
delicate to be left to be left to the fickle polis. 
2.7 Linking Climate Change and Monetary Policy 
 This research so far has focused on the human earth relationship; the fact 
that through industrial pollution and land use changes, humanity is altering the 
earth’s atmosphere to the extent that, according to economist Sir Nicholas Stern, 
the largest market failure of all time is being created (2006). In large part carbon 
emissions are the by-product of replacing human and animal labor, which 
underpin the economy at large. Therefore, carbon is an integral part of the modern 
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industrial economy as currently designed. The question is, can society alter this 
economic design in order to avoid the market failure that Stern warns us of? 
In order to stave off Stern’s warning a policy paradigm shift is needed. 
Leverage points are fulcrum points in a system in which small changes can bring 
about systematic over haul (Meadows, 1999). It will be argued here that money is 
the instrument to leverage systematic change. Eventually we will need an 
economy wide approach to climate change (Moniz, 2016). If we are to capture the 
entire economy, then doing so through monetary policy creates that ubiquitous 
mechanism, because money underlies all economic transactions. All relationships 
between people involve exchange, in this way exchange is the most developed 
interaction humans possess. "Every interaction has to be regarded as an 
exchange… Human life is comprised of loss and gain, the diminution of life's 
content” (Simmel & Frisby, 2011, loc 2904-2924). In large part, the concept of 
sacrifice is embedded in the notion of economic values, the ability to exclude a 
resource from a consumer to make it scarce and therefore valuable and more 
profitable.  
In essence, the tragedy of the commons is the inability to prevent use, 
thereby destroying the resource. It is thus the theory that underlies putting a price 
on carbon, thereby making it expensive to pollute and incentivizing cleaner modes 
of production. Stephen Gardner’s Perfect Moral Storm argument states there is a 
moral imperative that the poor do not bear the cost of climate change mitigation 
(2006). That is the spatial dilemma that the poor in developing countries who did 
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not create the pollution that causes climate change be harnessed with the cost of 
remediation. 
As a result, I propose examining the means of targeting monetary policy as 
a mechanism for spreading the cost of climate change mitigation as broadly as 
possible, and in so doing making the tiniest fraction of each dollar linked to carbon. 
In theory, this would aggregate the cost of climate change mitigation; those 
possessing the fewest American dollars would thus pay the least, while those 
holding the most would pay the most.  
 The feasibility of such a scheme involves researching the rules that underlie 
the Federal Reserve central bank, the currency holdings they possess along with 
the cost of linking the dollar to the price of carbon and the risk of doing so. This is 
the cost analysis of linking carbon to monetary policy. It is through addressing the 
rules that we seek to bring about systemic change. 
2.8 Institutional Theory  
We often think about institutions as organized groups, but Institutional 
Theory refers to institutions as the durable manmade rules that govern human 
interactions, essentially the rules of the game by which society plays (Kingston & 
Caballero, 2008; North, 1990). Institutions can have many meanings focusing both 
on the rules used to structure patterns of interaction within and across 
organizations (Kraft & Furlong, 2013; Ostrom, 2007). The “rules” may be formal, 
like purposefully designed laws and constitutions, or informal, such as tacit 
cultural norms and conventions. Institutions include any form of constraint that 
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human beings devise to shape human interaction (North, 1990, p. 4). This thus 
makes institutional theory particularly useful for addressing the value of carbon 
emission permits, a humanly constructed market mechanism for addressing 
climate change mitigation.  
Institutional Theory is a sprawling discourse that in large part integrates 
approaches from sociology, political science and economics (Goodin, 1998). It 
offers the flexibility necessary to encompass complex social problems. Its use in 
economic history, transition economics, and economic development has 
impressed both the importance and complexity of institutional change. However, 
even within this narrower framing, the relevant literature is vast and diffuse, and 
plagued by a profusion of terminology, much of which is used in different ways 
by different authors. This leads to a dilemma since empirical research focusing on 
theory and informed by theory runs the risk of isolation within the discourse. 
Conversely, scholars who take a panoramic approach inevitably face “a mismatch 
in the conceptual tools used and [that] makes it difficult to engage with theory in 
a satisfactory way” (Kingston & Caballero, 2009, p.152). For this reason this 
proposal intends not to be theoretical but rooted in a comparative case study. 
The flexibility of IT is necessary for this comparative analysis since societal 
rules like norms change over time. Take for instance the use of gold. Gold used to 
be the base metal that underpinned nearly all currency. However, gold has gone 
from a “formal rule” (the gold standard) to an “informal rule” (a currency reserve.) 
Although once used as currency, and still entirely fungible (i.e., transferable into 
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cash), gold is used for its cultural value as jewelry, as a hedge against economic 
instability, and in dentistry, but it has few industrial uses. Its value is largely 
symbolic and traditional rather than useful. When Nixon ended the dollar’s 
attachment to gold in 1971, the dollar became a currency governed entirely by fiat. 
Still the U.S. Treasury is the world’s largest holder of gold.  
Furthermore, the price of gold has a tendency to increase when interest 
rates are very low.3 Because of this cultural complexity, and questionable value, 
narrow economic theories are insufficient. I question the value of gold and its 
usefulness in the economy therefore it is necessary to delve philosophically into to 
the meaning of value and not just the evidence of supply and demand. From a 
theoretical perspective, economics does not question the consumer’s preference is 
just that the preference for a product [like gold] exists. (Bromely & Paavola, 2002; 
Broome, 2002). To this day gold is perceived as valuable although it has only a 
tangential link to GDP, whereas GHG emissions tend to increase with economic 
growth because economic output is most commonly tied to energy input in an 
industrial economy. 
2.9 A Question of Value, a Matter of Perception 
The value of gold is a human construct just as carbon emission permits are 
a manmade rule to make CO2 expensive for producers to pollute. It is rational then 
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3! Please see appendix 3 Fig.  Interest Rate Margins and Gold Rates for the empirical data 
demonstrating the link between interest rates and the price of gold. In this way gold still has a 
tangential link to monetary policy.!
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that more expensive means of production (i.e., pollution) that are of equal quality 
are less efficient and of less value. In this analysis value is tied to usefulness, not 
cultural norms.  The assumption that gold is valuable just because its history does 
not serve the purposes of a market based economy that is floundering due to the 
burden of negative externalities.  
Given GHG pollution is so directly linked to industrial output (which has 
been the backbone of the global economy), and given that it has been determined 
that markets are the best way to address the negative externality of GHG pollution, 
then it follows that we should value things that are economically useful.  
Currently we live in a different era, long gone are double-digit interest 
rates, at present zero and negative interest rates are the norm. Without interest 
rates to use as a policy tool, central banks are reduced to providing information 
about economic growth.! As the Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of 
Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University, Alan Binder has stated, 
When interest rates are at zero, conventional monetary policy is out of bullets 
(2010).   
 In our current era of zero interest rates, the Fed uses a term called “forward 
guidance,” which is when the central bank informs investors of their future 
intentions to raise interest rates or not. Hence, this “news” of forward guidance takes 
on the power of an institutional rule; it has the power to move markets. In 2013, 
then Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke sent the markets into turmoil by eluding to the 
end of negative interest rates, or quantitative easing; an incident known as the 
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Taper Tantrum (Giugliano, 2015). This demonstrates the power that perception has 
in a market driven economy that never sleeps and is always available via electronic 
trading. 
2.10 Market Forces 
Electronic trading means that markets never close, but also that they can be 
accessed at any place. One no longer needs a broker attached to a trader in New 
York to place an order to buy or sell on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
This spatial complexity, in which markets can be accessed anywhere in the world, 
combines with technological complexity that allows high frequency trading to 
perform millions of transactions in fractions of seconds to create an opaque and 
tightly coupled system, which sociologist Charles Perrow warns is rife for Normal 
Accidents (1999, p. 385). A Normal Accident is an event of cascading failures when 
the interactions between variables in high-risk technologies interact 
uncontrollably, frequently with catastrophic effects. In 2010, the NYSE depreciated 
over 1000 points in a matter of minutes, erasing billions of dollars from investors’ 
portfolios (Shafer, 2012). Such tight coupling of markets come with risks, violent 
price shifts can represent not just what Bourdieu calls the symbolic violence of 
hegemony (Kerr & Robinson, 2012; Nicolaescu, 2010), but actual violence as the 
global food riots of 2008 showed (Lagi, Bar-Yam, Bertrand, & Bar-Yam,  2011). 
However, if policy is designed with the appropriate buffers and dampening 
negative feed back loops in place, as Meadows (1999) explains, such risks can be 
avoided. For instance, a buffer on markets is the daily trading price limit, which 
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shuts the market down and the price rises or falls more than 60 cents in a day 
(CME, 2011; McGinnis, 2011). When the market shuts down it cools traders off and 
provides the opportunity to examine the market information to see if the 
speculation is warranted or not. In 2008 food prices continued to rise based upon 
imperfect market information due to the opaque Chinese export ban4. Normal 
Accidents that lead to cascading effects can be lessened by creating mechanisms 
of redundancy and transparency (Perrow, 1999). 
The following figure displays Normal Accident theory in relationship to a 
selection of systems. The tighter the coupling of the action, the more likely it is to 
lead to out of control cascading effects. Climate change is complex, but relatively 
loose in interactions because of the long time it has taken to develop. Climate is 
slow, but weather is sudden, and extreme storms can lead to catastrophic events. 
On the other hand, electronic trading is linear, external events and information 
may impact prices adding complications, but the system is linear, but extremely 
fast moving and tightly coupled (Lewis, 2015). 
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Figure 2.1: Interactions & Coupling in Normal Accidents 
Normal Accidents help us to understand the risks associated with a system 
and the likelihood of catastrophe. For policy makers frequently having to write 
rules for unknown circumstances this is insightful. It is not just the information 
that central bankers provide the markets, but the technological design of markets 
that make them opaque complex systems prone to Normal Accidents. However, 
when markets reflect real conditions in the economy, they also become providers 
of information to policy makers about economic conditions. In this way markets 
are economic indicators. When considering linking emission permits to monetary 
rules it is imperative that one perform risk assessment, otherwise the tight 
coupling and speed of present day financial markets will lead to the cascading 
effects of normal accidents. 
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At the same time, markets through price changes can affect economic 
behavior creating dramatic societal change. For instance, the ethanol mandate to 
blend 10% of ethanol into conventional gasoline did more to increase the price of 
corn than 20 years of haggling over agricultural subsidies at the World Trade 
Organization5. According to institutional theory, markets facilitate efficient 
transactions, because transaction costs are reduced.  
Cap and trade markets within which emissions are traded provide systems 
to leverage change to alter societal behavior. In the case of climate change the 
behavior to change is the emission of anthropogenic GHG which typically 
happens through industrial activity and land use changes. Being able to leverage 
the price of carbon effectively is therefore an important goal of policy makers.  
Within climate change governance state negotiators are weak because at the 
global level there is no overarching government authority; the governing 
structure is dependent upon the consensus of representative nations. The 
problem with consensus based decision making is that policy actions that can be 
agreed upon may not be the most innovative and effective policies to implement 
(Coglianse, 1999; Koontz et al., 2004). The cap and trade market offers a rigid 
linear system with which to price carbon, if the supply of permits is appropriate, 
under ideal conditions the demand for emissions should be a valuable indicator 
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to policy makers by reflecting economic growth towards or away from industries 
with intense emissions. 
Using leverage points, present opportunities to bring about systemic 
change in a manner not possible in collaborative policy approaches. Just as a 
properly strung tennis racket has a spot where if the ball hits there its rebound 
potential is magnified, so too do we have a spot within a policy system that has 
exponential potential. Seeking leverage points is about finding openings in a 
system and making them work (Klien, 2001). Within leverage points approach 
there is a hierarchy of places to intervene in a system, the first is the crudest, the 
place of greatest entrenchment. The last is the most subtle place, it is the paradigm 
shift – the place where the smallest of changes can have a dramatic impact on the 
entire system.  
Finidori, 2014 
33!
!
Figure 2.2: Leverage Points 
 
 Within the “Form” section 2 of the above figure, it is evident that leveraging 
rules can bring about system change with less force than other actions in sections 
3 and 4. Acting at the structural level is where the system is altered so that human 
behavior adjusts accordingly (Heberlein, 2012). An example of such a change is 
when hotel rooms’ lights switch on and off automatically when the door is open 
and closed from the outside, thereby automatically relieving hotel guests of 
remembering to turn the lights off before they leave their room. The operating 
rules of the system are changed to bring about energy savings. This is the 
mechanism by which effective policy must engage to bring about societal change 
when faced with a complex problem such as climate change. 
2.11 Wicked Problems 
When a policy issue is said to be “wicked,” it means that it is an issue that 
is inherently complex and difficult to solve. The dilemmas of a wicked issue 
include, but are not limited to, scale, responsibility, uncertainty, time lags and 
compounding effects. Often a wicked societal problem is caught in what Chris 
Koliba (2015) calls a jurisdictional knot in which one must determine who is 
responsible for addressing the cause of the issue. Rittel and Webber (1973) state 
that wicked problems do not have obvious solutions, usually there are many 
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stakeholders engaged who do not agree, or whose interests conflict and that the 
solution requires behavior change. 
Attempting to solve climate change through collaborative measures, what 
Anthony Giddens (2011) refers to as dialogic democracy, in which dialogue 
between opposing sides come to, if not a consensus, at least a way forward, is 
extremely slow. This is evident since climate change negotiations have been 
underway at a global scale since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, despite the urgency 
to act and remain below 1.5 degrees C of warming.  
The scale and complexity of climate change is beyond command and 
control regulation since there is no global authority with power to enforce such a 
concept. For this reason, climate change must be addressed by using policy 
instruments.  Policy instruments, or policy tools, refer to the things that 
government can do to solve problems. This may involve regulation, taxing and 
spending, educating the public, and market mechanisms. Whether any of these 
actions will work to solve a specific issue depends upon the technical feasibility 
and the likely economic impact of a specific instrument and whether, or not it is 
politically acceptable to do so (Kraft & Furlong, 2013). 
A policy tool is an instrument “through which public purposes are pursed”. 
The criteria for determining whether a policy tool is appropriate is whether it is 
likely to be effective, efficient, equitable, manageable, legitimate and politically 
feasible (Salamon, 2002, pp. 22-24). Equity adds a particular wickedness to the 
climate change problem because it must address fairness on a global scale. 
2.12 International Development & Climate Change Mitigation 
35!
!
 In the Paris Agreement (2015) article 6, non-market mechanisms are 
allowed, but the market approach remains the dominate approach to climate 
change mitigation as the more than 20 current national-regional emission trading 
schemes around the world demonstrate (World Bank et al., 2016). The Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows transitional 
and low-income nations (annex B) to sell their off-set low GHG development 
credits to firms and individuals with substantial carbon footprints. The Joint 
Implementation (JI) mechanism is the market which allows these transfers from 
annex B nations to sell their certified off-sets to another annex B nation. The CDM, 
represents the export of capital from high income countries to low income 
countries. The price of carbon is based upon the emission permit price, which sets 
the price for CDM projects. However, with the price of carbon so low, capital 
transfers to low income countries is diminished. In 2016, the CDM transferred €202 
million to low income countries (D’Aprile & Marinella, 2017), however, if the EU-
ETS emission permit price had been at the 2005 when the market was launched, 
this figure would have amounted to €606 million, and if the emission price were 
at its peak it would have transferred more than €20 million to low income 
countries.  
 As such, carbon sequestration could represent a significant amount of 
foreign direct investment to low income countries. Although the CDM offers 
opportunities for sustainable development, it is unclear as yet whether it could 
create a resource curse. If common land is transferred into private management and 
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excludes indigenous people for the sake of carbon sequestration, scarcity 
situations would inevitable arise. While the transfer of earned capital from 
industrial nations to low-income nations represents an opportunity for sustainable 
development, it is not without its risks. The ability to trade offset certificates 
(sequestered carbon) is an efficient means of transferring wealth from one region 
to another. 
 The marketization of carbon is an artifact of the neo-liberal agenda 
embedded in the Washington Consensus ideology of development. While this 
hegemonic approach to development may be chastened in the wake of the 
financial crisis (Birdsall & Fukuyama, 2011), there is also an opportunity to use 
markets to move toward sustainability by pricing the negative externalities 
attributed to climate change. Anthony Giddens has called for a third way Beyond 
Left and Right politics, perhaps by providing a market opportunity to value “those 
relationships to nature and man in which his economic [life] was formerly 
embedded” (Polanyi, 2001, p. 135), is a means to shift towards a more bio-centric 
way of life designed to maximize positive externalities, like beauty and social 
capital and limit negative externalities such as inequality and pollution. Markets 
need not be alienating as Polanyi believed, if they are designed in ways that 
account for negative externalities. 
Summary 
The industrial revolution transformed the agrarian and craft based societies 
of the early 18th century into largely urban economies today. According to Karl 
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Polanyi (2001) this led to a dislocation, economic progress at the expense of the 
social. Markets are powerful policy tools to leverage; the rules that govern them 
are even more powerful. In an attempt to mitigate climate change, policy makers 
have favored a market based approach to limiting GHG emissions. This entails 
putting a price on carbon emissions, limiting the supply of pollution permits and 
allowing the market demand to establish the price in a trade setting. The other 
market mechanism to price carbon is the fiscal measure of applying a carbon tax. 
One strategy does not preclude the other and some jurisdictions use both policies 
side by side. 
 When emission permits are traded, they adopt similar attributes to currency 
markets because their supply, and hence their price, is determined by bureaucrats. 
In this way emission permits have more in common with currencies whose supply 
is managed by central banks, than commodity markets whose supply is 
determined by production and extraction. Because GHG emissions correlate 
economic expansion and recession a higher cost on the right to pollute corresponds 
with a restriction on industrial output. This raises the question of whether 
emission permits might serve as a monetary policy tool. 
 Changing policy rules can have a profound impact on market prices. In the 
next chapter I demonstrate how a rule change, the ethanol mandate, transformed 
the global food supply. This provides lessons for the rules governing carbon 
markets. The fourth chapter examines the feasibility of using carbon as a monetary 
policy tool. The sixth chapter asks what are the ethical implications of using carbon 
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as monetary policy. This research has implications for central banking and 
international development since the IMF and World Bank have central banking 
characteristics.  
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Chapter Three: Methods Section 
3.1 Method of Inquiry 
This dissertation seeks to address three fundamental research questions to 
address the problem of the insufficient price of carbon, which is impeding the 
climate mitigation process and diminishing the funds available to carbon 
sequesters in low-income countries. The over-arching approach is to explore 
whether it is feasible and acceptable to raise the price of carbon emission permits 
by increasing demand in the market of the EU ETS; the largest and most dominant 
of all carbon markets and thus the one that drives the price of the carbon storage 
markets, like the Clean Development Mechanism.  To answer this question, mixed 
methods are used combining quantitative empirical data and qualitative methods 
using survey interviews and finally using critiqued ethical reasoning methods 
including utilitarianism, rights, and virtue ethics; thus providing a holistic, 
transdisciplinary means of policy analysis. The research approach is inductive, 
that is that it began with the observed market phenomena that arose due to the 
ethanol mandate’s impact on the commodity corn market and seeks to establish a 
theory for increasing demand in another commodity market, the emissions trading 
scheme, which is designed to mitigate climate change most efficiently from an 
economic perspective.  
 
 
3.2 Quantitative Methods 
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Carbon is being traded as a physical commodity, as previously mentioned. 
This makes it commensurable in a sense to other commodity markets. I use the 
commodity corn market as a case study comparing the impact of rule changes, or 
mandates, on the price of that commodity. The events that followed the rule 
change, in this case the ethanol mandate within the 2005 Renewable Fuels Act, 
provide the empirical data with which to demonstrate the impacts of creating 
demand in a market. Markets produce data through trading volume and price 
changes. This data provides an objective method with which to analyze the 
impacts of mandates on price changes in commodity markets. 
The use of quantitative data to describe social phenomena dates back to the 
emergence of Auguste Compte’s positivist framework in the mid nineteenth 
century.  Positivism is an attempt to describe society in factual terms rather than 
subjectively determined by social norms. Positivism thus adds a deterministic 
approach to social policy. It may not be entirely possible to prove causality 
through empirical data, but correlations between, let us say, commodity price 
changes and producer investment behavior may offer the best available 
knowledge in the complex messy world of policy making. This is why the field of 
policy administration relies upon the quantifiable methods of cost-benefit analysis 
and risk assessment. 
 
3.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
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 Cost-benefit analysis is the most widely used decision making means both 
in public policy and in daily lives (Stone, 2002). It involves tallying up all the 
positive and costly implications of an action in a form of calculous to determine 
whether the action is worth taking. The action with the most benefit and least cost 
invariably wins, however, social and environmental costs are not always easily 
measured (Birkland, 2016). 
Although climate change is a wicked complex phenomena, the goal here is 
not to do a cost-benefit analysis on climate change, but to perform the analysis on 
what would be the cost of having a central bank purchase emission permits and 
use them as monetary reserve. The appropriate target price for the polluting cost 
of GHGs has already been set, but getting the market to meet that price has not 
happened for some time. According to U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz 
(2016), it will be impossible to create a de-carbonized economy without a lot of 
progress on the demand side [of emission permits]. Although there is no official 
price ceiling on the EU ETS, the price in 2006 exceeded € 32/tCO2e. The 
appropriate price for carbon has already been determined to be €30/tCO2e, or 
£17/tCO2e. Other markets set a price ceiling ranging from $40 in California to $20 
in Australia (Whitmore, 2017). However, the current price is well below this target. 
This means that there needs to be a dramatic increase in the demand of carbon 
emission permits. On the mitigation side, a higher price for polluting emissions 
would increase behavioral change to reduce emissions, and on the sequestration 
side, an investment incentive to finance carbon sinks and green technologies.   
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The supply and demand of emission permits, which sets the price, is 
determined not by consumers and producers, but by bureaucrats who manage the 
“cap,” or the number of tradable permits. When the number of tradable permits 
exceeds the demand in the market, the carbon price will inevitably be low, thus 
reducing the impact on climate change mitigation, and reducing the investment 
value of carbon sinks in the CDM. 
According to Sovacool (2006), utility companies have already passed the 
cost of €30/tCO2e emission permits on to customers. Therefore, consumers are 
already paying the target price. As a result, the cost that needs to be determined is 
the cost of increasing the demand in the market. In this regard, the ethanol 
mandate provided the increased demand necessary to raise the price of corn above 
the cost of production. The cost therefore to be determined is how much it would 
cost to create demand in the market. As proposed in the literature review section, 
I suspect the most efficient and effective way to accomplish this is by managing 
emission permits as a monetary policy tool as opposed to a physical commodity. 
Just as central banks manage the value of money, and hence economic spending 
through purchasing currencies, or increasing the money supply through printing 
money and setting interest rates. Given the correlation of increased emissions to 
industrial output, increasing the price of carbon would be akin to increasing 
interest rates, but would be a more subtle tool, since interest rates hit all consumers 
(especially mortgage holders) whereas increasing the price of emission permits 
would only target polluting industries and polluting consumers.  
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If central banks used emission permits as they manage the money supply 
to curb inflation by making it more expensive to borrow money through interest 
rates, they could in effect increase the cost of industrial production. Using emission 
permits in this way provides central bankers with an addition tool beyond interest 
rates. Interest rates impact all consumers, from home owners, to bankers, farmers, 
to industrialists. Whereas increasing the cost of emissions would only make it 
more expensive for industrial production from which the negative externality of 
pollution arises. Non-polluting information technologies need not be impacted. 
Therefore, the cost to be determined is how much it would cost the central bank to 
tighten the market by taking emission permits out of circulation. Based upon the 
principle of supply and demand this would increase the market demand by 
reducing the supply of available emission permits. 
 This cost benefit analysis is necessary to ensure that the price is high 
enough to be effective as a mitigating tool, but not too high as to strangle the 
economy. Cost-benefit analysis is a weighing of the costs to society in relation to 
the benefits accrued by a policy. It assumes a policy target, in this case the amount 
of GHG emitted into the atmosphere, or the “cap,” in market jargon. The target is 
a pollution abatement level, the analysis seeks to discover the most efficient means 
to manipulate production to meet the target (Bardarch, 2011). In one sense the 
target regarding carbon dioxide is an atmospheric concentration of 350 ppm, in 
terms on market price on the EU-ETS it is €30/tCO2e. However, currently the price 
of carbon hovers around €6.50, in the US$ 12.50 in California & Quebec (a price 
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initially determined through auction,) and in the Northeastern USA RGGI market 
at US$ 5.25. Therefore, the question is, what is the most efficient way to increase 
demand in the emissions market so that the permit price reaches the target 
determined by policy makers? 
3.4 Comparing Commodity Markets 
The commodity case study of the corn market provides the quantitative 
data to make the comparison between carbon and corn markets. Market data 
gathered from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture will show how demand was created in the corn market 
through the implementation of the ethanol mandate within the 2005 Renewable 
Fuels Standard Act. 
Embedded within this concept of increasing market demand, three more 
specific research questions arise. The first question: What market mechanism 
would increase the demand for carbon emission permits? For this, I will use the 
data of the commodity corn market and how it responded to the ethanol mandate, 
in which corn prices rose by 300% in three years. A follow up question: “Is there 
something that the carbon markets can learn from the ethanol mandate?” I 
anticipate that this will demonstrate that a market mechanism could be used to 
create demand in the emission trading market. However, that due to price 
volatility it might be better to view carbon emissions more as a currency rather 
than as a commodity. This leads to the second question: If carbon is treated as a 
currency, is it suitable for a monetary policy tool used by central banks? The third 
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question: What are the ethical implications of using the policy proposal that the 
market price of carbon must be raised and how best to increase its price? It thus 
follows, can higher carbon prices satisfy ethicist Stephen Gardner’s (2006) 
dilemma of the Prefect Moral Storm, in which he describes the ethical dilemma of 
climate change as being a problem of agency, a spatial concern, and a problem of 
institutional inadequacy?  
By combining a triad of quantitative and qualitative methods along with 
ethical analysis this research seeks to address the implications of a carbon price in 
line with policy makers’ intended target price. I will now describe each of the 
methodological approaches in detail. Starting with the quantitative approach, 
which uses quantitative methods to examine the historical empirical data of the 
U.S. policy change that disrupted the entire global food supply between 2007-2008. 
It is this case study that will shed light on the policy implications of a higher carbon 
market price. 
 
 
3.5 What Can the Carbon Market Learn from the Corn Market? 
To begin with I will analyze the secondary data of commodity corn markets 
gathered from the USDA Economic Research Service and CFTC to demonstrate 
how the ethanol mandate created demand in the commodity corn market. Then I 
will ask what the carbon markets can learn from the market mechanism to increase 
the price of a commodity: Is it feasible to use such a market mechanism? 
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Changing the price of emission permits will inevitably have tradeoffs so I 
will use cost-benefit analysis within Institutional Theory incorporating the 
Institutional Analysis Design Framework to determine the key actors and which 
of them bears the costs of price changes. It is intended that this approach will bring 
a rigorous and reasoned critique to policy alternatives to address the strategies 
proposed for climate mitigation.  The second approach involves qualitative 
methods through a survey interview of thought leaders in the market approach to 
climate change mitigation. Lastly, the ethical analysis will rely on risk assessment; 
Can raising the price of carbon satisfy ethicists Stephen Gardner and Andrew 
Light’s concerns that focus on the inability of current methods to address the 
problems of dispersion, agency and institutional inadequacy in climate change 
mitigation strategies? To answer these three questions, it is necessary to use a 
method of analysis that can deliver a broad scope in order to address the 
complexity of market rules and climate change mitigation strategies. By 
approaching climate change as an ethical problem I will analyze the market 
mitigation approach using utilitarian, deontological and a revised method of 
virtue theory to determine the acceptability of market-based strategies. Markets 
are institutional entities that are made up of rules that determine their activity. 
Therefore, the rules become the foci for institutional analysis. 
3.6 Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
The IADs framework provides subtlety of detail to determine the 
vulnerability of actors in the system, beyond the simplistic deterministic approach 
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of paereto efficiency that treats all producers and consumers in the economy as 
having the equal capacity to trade (Daly & Farley, 2004, p. 133; Gaudy, 2010, p. 13). 
Approaching markets through the IADs framework create a more dynamic 
method than merely analyzing prices through supply and demand alone. The 
ethanol mandate that was the initial rule change that increased demand in the corn 
market is an example of how formal rules act as a market mechanism. 
3.7 Using an Institutional Policy Map to Create a Framework of Analysis 
The basic components and networks of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework can be used to demonstrate how rule changes through 
the ethanol mandate interacted with the traditional market dynamics and supply 
chains of the corn industry that resulted in the tripling of the price of corn between 
2005-2008. For example, the corn industry is made up of producers, middlemen, 
processors and consumers, the flows between these network actors are what make 
up the market and their efficiency affects prices. The following chart shows the 
IAD Framework in context. 
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Source: Hoffman & Ireland 2013, adapted from McGinnis (2011); Ostrom (2009)  
Figure 3.1: The Institutional Analysis Development Framework 
 
Using the corn industry within the IAD framework maintains the 
experimental design associated with Ostrom. Placing corn and carbon into the 
IADs framework allows one to determine nodes of weakness, positions of strength 
and leverage points for the economic actors that will be impacted by tightening 
the market, (increasing demand). Actors have a characteristic, which puts them in 
a network position in a place of strength or weakness.  
3.8 IAD & The Federal Reserve 
It may seem incongruous to use the bottom-up IAD framework to an 
obviously top-down strategy such as the Fed purchasing carbon as a currency 
reserve, but I argue that it is precisely the top-heavy position of the Fed that makes 
it suitable because it is an organization that manages another common good, the 
money supply. Central bankers do not act as competitors within a market; they 
are managers and cooperate with other central bankers to maintain stable currency 
values and suitable lending rates relative to the health of the economy (FRB, 2015). 
At the macro-economic level of central banking money is treated as a 
commonly held resource (good) (Birner, 2012), this makes it similar to another 
resource the commons, the atmosphere. The difference is that money is a 
manmade common resource. It faces the same tragedy of the commons scenarios 
in the sense that mismanagement can make it worthless, which is why central 
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bankers fear inflation. Inflation is when overall prices are rising (Daly & Farley, 
2004). This then explains why politicians, not wanting the conflict of interest 
between economic expansion, which tends to correlate with inflation, and the 
political cycle, have granted greater central bank independence since the 1980s 
(Miller, 1998). 
In his article, If Bad Money Is a Collective Bad, Isn’t Good Money a Collective 
Good? Jack Birner demonstrates that at the institutional level of central banking, 
money is a Common Pool Good, we see that at the macro scale money is managed 
in a way similar to a natural resource. However, money is distinct from natural 
common pool resources, where the IAD framework application originated, 
because money is a cultural artifact (a social construction, or an institution) its 
relevance depends upon the “theories” individuals hold about it (Birner, 2012,). 
Framing commodities as CPG within the IAD framework provides a method of 
policy analysis that allows one to expand the complexity of cost benefit analysis 
because one can increase the network of actors associated with economic flows. 
Thus, it becomes possible to separate actors such as producers from middle men; 
we see the entirety of a system with more detail. Typical policy approaches of cost-
benefit and risk assessment, tend to analyze quantitative data to the detriment of 
qualitative analysis. Whereas combining qualitative methods creates a holistic 
ethical critique of carbon as a monetary tool. 
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Within the IADs framework I create a comparative analysis of the 
mechanisms within the carbon market and how the ethanol mandate impacted the 
corn market.  
3.9 Market Mechanism 
During the 1960s a policy theory emerged demonstrating that markets are 
the most efficient means of tackling social and environmental problems (Coase, 
1960; Crocker, 1966; Dales, 1968; Montgomery, 1972). According to the Coase 
Theorum, the level of an externality, like pollution, is independent from 
institutional factors such as the assignment of responsibility for damages, that is 
unless there are transaction costs applied. In order to apply transactions costs, the 
externality is treated as a commodity (Hurwicz, 1995). Transaction costs consist of 
measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs 
associated with protecting and enforcing rights of use (North, 1990). Once a 
pollution limit is set, permits are issued and then competing firms trade the 
permits in order to determine a willingness to pay, thus establishing what is 
believed to be the most efficient price. What was once a common pool problem is 
thus transferred into a tradable commodity. This is the principle upon which cap 
and trade systems are built. 
The driving force behind such markets is the belief that they are more cost-
effective and efficient than alternative forms of command and control regulation 
(Sovacool, 2011). This research does not explore the efficiency of markets as a 
pollution mitigation tool compared to command and control regulations; rather it 
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proposes a way to manage the carbon price through the mechanism of increasing 
demand in the market. By performing a comparative analysis of the market 
mechanism that created demand in the corn market, I present a case study for 
market mechanism use in the emission trading market. Secondary data will be 
collected to demonstrate this demand increase taken from the USDA and corn 
market data from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Using the corn 
market’s performance relative to the ethanol mandate provides the empirical data 
combined with statistical analysis which will demonstrate how prices react to rules 
that increase demand in a market. This strategic approach will then be tested by 
expert opinion in an interview survey. 
 
3.10 Qualitative Methods: Survey of Expert Opinions 
The mixed method approach which combines quantitative and qualitative 
methods allows one to understand a research question more completely (Creswell, 
2003). While the quantitative methods provide statistical analysis with a predictive 
element to the research problem, the qualitative method of a semi-structured 
interview provides contextual depth and generates primary data. In a policy area 
such as climate change mitigation, the policy territory is rapidly changing, the 
primary data reflects recent opinions of how carbon markets are emerging. In an 
area as nascent as carbon markets experienced experts are few and far between, so 
the population of experts is inevitably small. 
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 The interview survey is designed to garner expert opinion of using market 
mechanisms to increase demand in a market. Because this dissertation reflects on 
the meaning of a monetary policy, the experts that are interviewed are from the 
banking industry, or are policy experts in multilateral environmental agreements 
such as the Montreal Protocol, which contained a market mechanism. The 
questions that are asked of the experts refer to the importance of climate change 
mitigation. What they think about leveraging a mandate in a market context, and 
whether it is acceptable for the Federal Reserve to hold carbon credits. The 
interviews are semi structured and the conversation is guided by the instrument 
found in Appendix 2. 
I conducted the interviews via Skype and recorded them. I then held them 
as a secure digital file, until they can were transcribed. Six interviews of expert  
opinion were completed.6  
Experts are identified as thought leaders in the policy of climate change 
arena, banking-finance sector, or both. They are either Canadian or American 
because carbon market design is still under construction in these two countries. It 
is also a way of accessing expert opinion from two countries that were historically 
recalcitrant in the implementation of the multilateral Post-Kyoto climate change 
treaty. The US not being a part of the Kyoto process was a significant limiting 
factor to its success (den Elzen & de Moor, 2002).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6!Please see Appendix 1 to view the research questions and participant list.!
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Most of the interviewees have global scope and experience in negotiating 
international treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, World Trade Organization agreements, or international 
banking. After completing the survey participants are asked if they can 
recommend another appropriate participant, this is the manner in which 
participants are recruited. 
3.11 Method of Survey Analysis 
Sentiment analysis is performed on the transcribed interviews.  Like with 
content analysis, sentiment analysis is a research technique used to make 
replicable and valid inferences by interpreting and coding textual material. By 
systematically evaluating text documents and oral communication, qualitative 
data can be converted into quantitative data (Krippendorff, 1980). This thus melds 
qualitative and quantitative methods. Themes will be coded according to the 
experts’ opinions regarding the “feasibility” of carbon as a currency, and the 
“acceptability” of using a market mechanism to increase the price of carbon. The 
results will be coded and used for statistical analysis of common themes. Although 
the population is too small for conclusive results, it will determine whether future 
policy research in this area is worthwhile. It will also create a picture of what 
experts think about a nascent process. 
The interview method is adapted from the “Off the Record Expert 
Consultation” work pioneered by the New York Quaker United Nations Office 
and further adapted by the Quaker International Affairs Programme in Ottawa, 
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Canada.  These consultation methods are normally conducted in person and as a 
group. It is a method of expert stakeholder engagement, in which participants’ 
views are protected by anonymity, thus allowing them to speak freely. I am 
conducting this research not as a focus group, but as interviews. This method 
allows for greater flexibility in scheduling because gathering many experts to a 
single event is difficult, plus it reduces travelling costs and the GHG emissions 
associated with travel. In this manner although the format is different than the 
previously mentioned QUNO process, the principles are the same.  
Because anonymity of opinion is guaranteed participants can be frank in 
this process since it is ensured that they will not be quoted, or named unless their 
expressed consent is given in the final document, similar to the Chatham House 
rule; this assures participants can be entirely open. The results will be used to 
inform the policy alternatives proposed in the final policy proposal. This approach 
of using expert interview surveys is an additional method to inform the theoretical 
proposal of using carbon as a monetary policy tool. It applies an external critique 
questioning the feasibility of using carbon as a currency and it adds external depth 
to the notion of feasibility and acceptability. 
3.12 The Ethical Critique 
Asking experts in finance and policy their ethical views of a policy is 
obviously superficial without a critique grounded in ethical theory. Ethics are 
considered to be one of the three key aspects of philosophy, namely; ethics, 
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metaphysics and epistemology (Schmidtz & Willott, 2012). I ground my ethical 
approach primarily in the pragmatic philosophy tradition. 
Pragmatism is flexible and its origins are rooted in many different 
disciplines; chemistry, logic and Immanuel Kant (through Pierce), medicine, 
psychology and J.S. Mill (through James), philosophy, education, economics and 
democracy (through Dewey) to name just a few. Pragmatism is anti-metaphysical; 
it is intended to tackle legitimate philosophical problems with an empirical 
method (Haack, 2006). Italian pragmatist Giovanni Papini likened pragmatism to 
a hotel corridor off of which many rooms contained separate philosophers each 
working in their own way, but each having to pass through the same corridor 
(Haack, 2006). Essentially pragmatism is a philosophy of method. 
As Pierce said, “If we find out the right method of thinking and follow it….. 
then truth can be nothing more or less than the last result” (Haack, 2006, p. 26). 
Naturalism, a subset within pragmatism, is concerned only with assertions about 
something that is empirically observable (Hook, 1961). This interpretation is also 
used in virtue ethics where a standard of nature is viewed upon as being “good.” 
Goodness in this case refers to a measure of an inanimate living thing or ecosystem 
doing what it is supposed to do. The rose that does not flower, the tree whose bark 
is cracked is determined a poor specimen (Sandler, 2007). This is a means of 
establishing a pragmatic ethics acceptable for addressing the ethical concerns 
within the context of climate change. Therefore, the empirical facts of climate 
change, the fact that the atmosphere is now polluted with more than 400 ppm of 
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CO2 compared with the preindustrial concentration of about 280 ppm in 1750 is an 
indisputable fact. So too, is the acidification of the oceans. As a result, I do not 
argue from the predictive elements of climate change modeling of what future 
conditions might be like because uncertainty inherently accompanies such models. 
My argument stems from the perspective that the natural abundance and carrying 
capacity of the earth has an intrinsic virtue to it because those conditions allow for 
human flourishing and wellbeing. Therefore, using that abundance beyond a 
certain unsustainable carrying capacity is deemed unethical from a pragmatic 
perspective. 
Using ethical pragmatism avoids many of the contestable arguments that 
complicate ethical discussions, such as nature’s agency, which is a value-
orientated dilemma that can have no empirical conclusion. This then narrows 
considerably the ethical framework with which to address climate change 
mitigation strategies. For instance, I do not address ethical issues such as the 
agency of nature, or the rights of animals, since these are purely normative 
considerations, not lodged in objective fact. 
Ethics, sometimes referred to as ‘moral philosophy’ concerns substantive 
and analytical questions of what is right and wrong, good and bad, with regards 
to character and conduct (Maunter, 1993.) Ethics can be divided into subfields such 
as the study of: normative, rightness and building of theories; descriptive, involving 
what one believes to be right and wrong; and metaethics, seeking to ask what we 
hope to accomplish from those moral theories (Schmidtz & Willott, 2012). While 
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this research focuses on the realm of normative ethics within an economic and 
ecological context, it does so by establishing a positivist approach in a similar way 
to medical bioethics. It deals primarily with rules, expressed as policy, as opposed 
to ethical behavior of individuals who act within the economic and environmental 
sphere. 
 
3.13 Three Ethical Approaches: Virtue, Deontology & Utilitarianism 
Three philosophical theories offer a foundation for this deliberation: 
Historically Virtue ethics are the oldest relying heavily upon Aristotelian 
natural law theory and virtuous conduct. It is the tradition of such documents as 
the Hippocratic Oath (although the Jain tradition of ancient Indian’s concept of 
“do no harm” predates the Greeks). The concept of virtue and natural law is 
frequently associated with Christianity through the writing of Thomas Aquinas. 
An action can be right without being virtuous, but a virtuous act must be 
motivated by the right intent of the actor. This denotes ‘right feeling,’ but we know 
that not all virtues, like discernment and integrity, are motivated by feelings 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1994). Virtue ethics fell out of favor with the emergence 
of deontology and utilitarianism, and did not really re-emerged until the 1980s 
with voices such as Carol Gillian and Nel Noddings who espoused the ethics of 
care in response to the ethic justice perspective laden in human rights (Sander-
Staudt, n.d). Virtue ethics include the ethics of care and social justice since these 
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are both ethical theories that propose a “better” sort of life. Within virtue ethics I 
use the concept of “naturalism” to establish a standard, or principle. Nature as a 
standard is a nascent idea, first put forth by Wendell Berry and Wes Jackson who 
complain that scientific regulatory procedures too often measure based upon 
existing standards and not to the nature of the original thing that it is being 
compared to (Cayley, 2012). For instance, in agriculture genetically modified crops 
are measured against existing chemical laden crops and not compared to either 
the natural ecology of the plant, or its organically produced counterpart.  
“According to this natural goodness approach, scientific naturalism provides a 
distinctive evaluative structure for assessing” ….The rhododendron that never 
blooms despite the right conditions is defective (Sandler, 2007, pp. 52-54). It would 
be wrong to extend this argument too far, without bringing up concerns over 
agency and rights if applied to animals, etc. However, for the purpose of this work 
it is useful; the best available science informs us that when it comes to the 
atmosphere, 350 ppm of CO2 is a safe concentration, even if the natural state is 
closer to 300 ppm. Thus, this standard of between 300-350 ppm CO2 becomes a 
virtuous standard to meet. 
Deontology: Associated primarily with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who is 
considered to be one of the fathers of modern philosophy, it concerns primarily 
the respect for the good (Schmidtz & Willott, 2012); it is the principle of rights. 
Positive rights: the obligations we can expect to be done for us, or that might be 
expected of us. The right to protection under the law, and the duty to pay taxes 
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would be considered positive rights. Conversely, rights also involve freedoms, 
generally called negative rights, the right to be free of coercion (Maunter, 1993.) 
The philosophy underpins human freedom, the concept that moral obligation 
stems not from God, or some external authority, but from rational reason (O’Neill, 
2000.) Central to Kant's ethic is the precept that each person be treated as an end 
in his or herself (Callicott, 2002). 
Utilitarianism emerged shortly after the establishment of rights and 
generally involves the decision making process that leads to the most amount of 
good being produced by a certain action. Utilitarianism tells us that we ought 
always to do whatever has the best consequence (Pettit, 1993.) The maximization 
aspect lends it to the chief decision tool of economics, and is a key approach to 
policy through cost benefit analysis (Kraft & Furlong, 2013.) Measurement is key 
to determining utilitarian action; however, unless the action interferes with 
individual or collective rights, the value of that action tends to lead toward liberty. 
These are the three ethical theories which will form the basis of the ethical 
critique. However, these theories are still too broad even within the pragmatic 
tradition and so the context of analysis is further refined by lodging it in the recent 
emergence of environmental pragmatism. 
3.14 Environmental Pragmatism 
Environmental pragmatism emerged as a subfield of ethical theory because 
a number of theorists before the new millennium thought it was difficult to see 
what practical effect the field of ethical theory had had on forming environmental 
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policy (Light & Katz, 1996). Although Baird Callicott (2002) refutes this, pointing 
to the Earth Charter. It is obvious that environmental ethics has not reached the 
same degree of prominence as medical ethics or business ethics (Schmidtz & 
Willott, 2012).  
The new attention to applied ethics (particularly medical ethics) has 
done much to dispel the miasma of subjectivity that was cast around 
ethics as a result of its association with anthropology and 
psychology. At least within broad limits, an ethics of “need” and 
“interests” is objective and generalizable in a way that an ethics of 
“wishes” and “attitudes” cannot be. (Toulmin, 1982) 
 Just as medical ethics became an established discipline through the 1970s and 
1980s, I propose that implementing quantitative and qualitative methods allows 
me to use ethics in a rigorous manner to address a policy “need” such as climate 
change mitigation.  
One problem that arises in addressing this need is the dilemma between 
economic growth and GHG reduction, because GHG are correlate closely with 
industrial growth and trend with economic growth. According to the Stern Report, 
mitigating climate change would cost just one% of GDP, but even this is proving 
a political obstacle. To overcome this Dieter Helm suggests that  we need to 
persuade people of climate change ethics, although he admits the time scale and 
likelihood are “remote” (2009). Changing peoples’ values is not like introducing a 
new technology. In his theory of environmental attitudes Thomas Heberlein (2012) 
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argues that the technological fix is easy because it does not require humans to 
change behavior, but not all environmental problems have easy technological 
answers. The cognitive fix in which people change their attitudes (values) takes a 
long time. Whereas, the structural fix changes the social environment that 
influences what people do; this is where policy alters the way people behave; 
people change their behavior in reaction to a policy change. This is paradigmatic 
leverage point in which a small change can have a big impact.  
Policy and rule changes provide the framework for societal change. 
Changing a rule can leverage human behavior and bring about a structural fix 
which creates new normative standards. Progress then, in the broadest sense, is a 
function not just in the development of new technologies, but also the 
development of rules that make sure that we design a better way of life (Romer, 
2012). I propose, that by changing the rules of what a central bank, in this case the 
Federal Reserve uses as a monetary policy tool might have significant societal 
changes toward mitigating climate change. Therefore, in the environmental 
pragmatist tradition, the goal is agreement on action, not on values (Briser, 2012). 
Changing the rules by invoking a market mechanism is a fulcrum point. 
The ethanol mandate’s impact on the corn market demonstrates dramatic change 
through creating market demand.  
There is no point raising the price of a commodity unless it addresses the 
intended mitigation strategies. Whether this institutional change is ethically 
acceptable will be critiqued in terms of Stephen Gardiner’s (2006) article: A Perfect 
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Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Corruption in 
which he argues that ethics must address:  
• Dispersion of Causes and Effects- the spatial problem 
• Fragmentation of Agency- the intergenerational problem 
• Institutional Inadequacy- the negotiation problem (p. 399) 
This is the standard to which the institutional rule change of using carbon as a 
monetary reserve must answer. 
By using the ethanol mandate’s impact on the corn market as a case study 
we provide empirical evidence of a reaction to a market mechanism rule change. 
Institutional Theory, specifically the Institutional Analysis Development 
framework, allows me to delve deeply into the potential impacts of using a market 
mechanism to increase the price of carbon to make it a more effective climate 
change mitigation tool. I analyze the ethical implications of a higher carbon price 
addressing the dispersion of cause and effects, fragmentation of agency between 
different generations and the institutional inadequacy of current approaches to 
climate change negotiation. It is hoped that this transdisciplinary approach, using 
ethical analysis combined with empirical economic evidence and expert interview 
surveys will contribute to the discourse of climate change mitigation strategies. 
It is not enough to ask is it feasible, “can,” the Federal Reserve purchase 
carbon as a monetary reserve in order to mitigate climate change more effectively? 
One must go further to ask “what are the implications of doing so?” The 
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implications of higher carbon prices will no doubt have effects that mean tradeoffs 
between populations, but are these tradeoffs acceptable, and to whom? 
In attempting to answer the question is it ethical for the Fed to purchase 
emission permits, the rule proposed must demonstrate, at least in theory, a degree 
of efficacy. Already philosopher Stephen Gardiner (2006, 2014) has proposed that 
current strategies do not address the dispersion of cause and effects, fragmentation 
of agency between different generations and institutional inadequacy. Therefore, 
I will examine whether using carbon as a monetary policy tool can address these 
moral dilemmas of climate change. 
In doing so I am essentially performing risk assessment based upon the pre-
cautionary principle. The precautionary principle aims at least for a “risk neutral” 
outcome, the action in question should not increase environmental and public 
risks. In situations of choice the precautionary principle would favor the option 
with the lowest degree of risk (Goklany, 2002). The Precautionary Principle has 
been particularly influential amongst policy makers concerned about the 
possibility of major human impacts on the global environment (Gardiner, 2006b). 
I will utilize the “maxim” application of the precautionary principle to avoid the 
criticism that in application it is used in ways that make it too weak or too strong.  
Some have argued that how regulators choose to weight different risk factors 
make the precaution principle meaningless. On the other hand, an overly strong 
application of the precautionary principle prioritizes nature to such an extent that 
it rules out all other possible benefits (Soule, 2000).  
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The maxim approach invokes Rawls by creating a weighted scale of least-
worst possible outcomes. Essentially one maximizes the minimum by focusing on 
the worst possible outcome of each course of action and choosing that action which 
has the least bad worst outcome (Gardiner, 2006b).  
I use this approach to analyze how using carbon as a monetary policy tool 
might address the moral spatial dilemma of climate change: those people furthest 
away from the industrial economies that create climate change will bear the brunt 
of its negative impacts. The second dilemma to be addressed is intergenerational 
agency: due to long term persistency of CO2 the effects of climate change will be 
felt by future generations, thus our current actions put a burden on those not yet 
born. The third and final dilemma to be addressed is the institutional inadequacy 
that despite multilateral agendas to mitigate climate change dating back to 1988, 
GHG emissions continue to rise. 
I expect that using carbon emissions as a monetary policy tool will at least 
make an impact on each of these fore mentioned dilemmas because this policy 
leverages the U.S. dollar, which is the global reserve currency, and, as previously 
mentioned, 60% of all U.S. dollars are held outside the US. As a result of its 
widespread global use, this ties emissions to the global economy via the U.S. dollar 
(it may also capture global shipping). I hope to show that by leveraging the U.S. 
dollar, this approach captures international trade addressing in part the spatial 
dilemma by applying a transaction cost to all trade in dollars.  If this is indeed the 
case, and if this market mechanism can be shown to not impress undue hardship 
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on the poor by increasing end consumer prices too much, then it follows, does the 
Fed have a moral obligation to purchase emission permits?  
Summary 
Climate Change is a collective action problem because it affects everyone 
on the planet, albeit some to a lesser extent than others. Negotiations on climate 
change have not reduced CO2 output. In this dissertation proposal, I intend to 
research a policy alternative that may be able to improve the effectiveness of the 
carbon emission market.  
 This research so far has focused on the human earth relationship; the fact 
that through industrial pollution and land use changes humanity is altering the 
earth’s atmosphere to the extent that, according to economist Sir Nicholas Stern 
(2006), the largest market failure of all time is being created. In large part carbon 
emissions are the by-product of replacing human and animal labor, which 
underpin the economy at large. Therefore, carbon is an integral part of the modern 
industrial economy as currently designed. The question is, can society alter this 
economic design in order to avoid the market failure that Stern warns us of? 
We have previously described leverage points as fulcrum points in a system 
in which small changes can bring about systematic over haul (Meadows, 1999). It 
will be argued here that money is instrumental to leverage systematic change. 
Eventually we will need an economy wide approach to climate change 
(Moniz, 2016). If we are to capture the entire economy, then doing so through 
monetary policy creates that ubiquitous mechanism since money underlies all 
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economic transactions. All relationships between people involve exchange, in this 
way exchange is the most developed interaction humans’ possess. "Every 
interaction has to be regarded as an exchange… Human life is comprised of loss 
and gain, the demunition of life's content (Simmel & Frisby, 2011, loc 2904-2924). 
In large part, the concept of sacrifice is embedded in the notion of economic values, 
the ability to exclude a resource from a consumer to make it scarce and therefore 
valuable and more profitable.  
In essence, the tragedy of the commons is the inability to prevent use, 
thereby destroying the resource. It is thus the theory that underlies putting a price 
on carbon, thereby making it expensive to pollute and incentivizing cleaner modes 
of production. Unfortunately, as Gardner’s A Perfect Moral Storm states, there is a 
moral imperative that the poor do not bear the cost of climate change mitigation. 
That is the spatial dilemma that the poor in developing countries who did not 
create the pollution that causes climate change be harnessed with the cost of 
remediation. 
As a result, I will examine the means of targeting monetary policy as a 
mechanism for spreading the cost of climate change mitigation as broadly as 
possible, and in so doing making the tiniest fraction of each dollar linked to carbon. 
In theory, this would aggregate the cost of climate change mitigation; those 
possessing the fewest American dollars would pay the least, while those holding 
the most would pay the most.  
67!
!
 The feasibility of such a scheme involves researching the powers of the 
Federal Reserve central bank, the currency holdings they possess along with the 
cost of linking the dollar to the price of carbon and the risk of doing so. The 
research completed leads me to think that monetary policy is a leverage point at 
scale of paradigm, which Meadows (1999) argues is at the root of revolutionary 
change. Simmel and Frisby (2011) argue monetary transactions underpin the 
relationships within society. While Birner (2012) concludes that at the macro-
economic scale money is part of global commons and is managed by central 
bankers as such. Therefore, since climate change is a problem of global scale, it is 
a collective action problem and must be addressed as such. This puts climate 
change mitigation beyond the simplistic strategy of polluter pays, since such an 
approach would burden the development of the world’s poorest desperately in 
need of economic expansion. 
I suggest that using carbon as a currency reserve, managed by the Federal 
Reserve, might be a market mechanism that improves market effectiveness in 
mitigating climate change. This approach bypasses the political process since 
central banks operate with a degree of independence. In this case, the Federal 
Reserve would purchase carbon emission permits just as it purchases other foreign 
currencies, like the Euro, Pound, Yen, Mexican peso, and Canadian dollar. I 
propose that carbon emission permits once commoditized have similar qualities 
to a currency and I will explore whether as a monetary policy tool they have more 
utility than gold and thereby might make an effective monetary tool. I will use the 
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case study of the ethanol mandate’s impact on the corn market to demonstrate 
how a policy creates demand in a market.    
Although complicated, the price increase in corn had far reaching effects 
impacting the global food system; therefore, it is imperative to explore the ethical 
implications of creating demand in the carbon emissions market. If prices rise too 
quickly, vulnerable populations could be unduly affected. In addition, I will 
address three other ethical concerns associated with climate change those being 
the: spatial dilemma, that the people most vulnerable to climate change are not the 
people responsible for it; intergenerational dilemma, that the inability of present 
generations to reduce CO2 emissions is deleterious to future generations; and 
institutional inadequacy, that the present institutions  achieve meaningful action on 
climate change.  
I will explore to what extent carbon, as a currency reserve, can address these 
three ethical dilemmas that current approaches to climate change mitigation have 
been unable to address. In this manner I aim to add to the discourse on climate 
change mitigation strategies. To try to direct this industrial economy in a more 
sustainable direction within the biophysical limits we must now acknowledge 
exist. Although many have warned of the need to do this, feasible actions are 
wanting. Without meaningful change in the emission permit market there can be 
no change in the carbon credit market of Clean Development Mechanism that 
seeks to deliver income to people producing stored carbon, those that manage the 
positive externalities from which we all benefit. 
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Chapter Four Scholarly Article: Policy Insight: What Can the Carbon Market 
Learn from the Ethanol Mandate’s Impact on the Corn Market? 
Abstract 
The market mechanisms of the Paris Agreement, previously the Kyoto 
Protocol, which are designed to mitigate climate change, are limited in scope due 
to the challenge of managing the supply of emissions permits and sequestration 
credits. At present the excess supply in both market scenarios leads to low prices, 
and as a result, a reduced incentive to mitigate faster. This paper examines the 
market mechanism and the challenges of price optimization is explored. This 
examination uses the ethanol mandate’s impact on the commodity corn market as 
an example of policy intent and market reaction.  
This research reveals that market mechanisms are powerful policy tools. 
Pricing pollution to reduce emissions is an effective strategy under optimal 
conditions. However, designing optimal conditions is difficult. I conclude that 
emissions permits are more like a currency than a physical commodity, and should 
be managed as such to mitigate climate change more effectively. 
Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol was the initial international means to reduce 
Greenhouse Gas emissions in the atmosphere, the current Paris Agreement to 
mitigate climate change is based upon its architecture. In the Kyoto Protocol, 
pricing carbon, the chief mechanism to reduce GHG atmospheric pollution, is 
achieved by nations agreeing to set a limit on GHG production, transferring that 
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supply into emissions permits and then allocating, or auctioning those permits to 
discover the optimal price that will reduce pollution without undue harm to the 
economy. This is the recipe used to price pollution most efficiently. 
Previous pollution reduction schemes that used this approach are the 1980 
and 1990 Clean Air Acts (Schmalensee & Stavins, 2012). It was also one of the 
policy tools used to eliminate ozone depleting CFCs in the Montreal Protocol 
(C2ES, 2015). This policy approach to reduce pollution is based upon the Coase 
(1960) theorem, which states that it is most efficient to trade the right to pollute in 
a market setting. This was believed to be the best way to discover the optimal price 
that would reduce pollution without putting excessive restrictions of economic 
growth. Prohibitive costs would lead to economic decline, which from a welfare 
economic perspective would harm the poor (Pigou, 1951). 
4.3 The Problem 
The concept which underwrote Kyoto was that by pricing emissions it 
would make it more expensive to pollute, thus reducing the GHG which warm the 
atmosphere while incentivizing sequestration projects through the Clean 
Development Mechanism, this allows low and middle income countries to sell 
Certified Emissions Reduction certificates (UNFCCC). The European Emissions 
Trading System, begun in 2005, remains the most prominent of all carbon pricing 
markets. However, after a successful start, the bottom fell out of the market, first 
in 2006 when it emerged that there was an excess supply of permits, then again in 
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2007 with the financial crisis (Hintermann, 2009; Vasa & Michelowa, 2011). Prices 
on the EU ETS are still in the depressed range of US$5-9 (€4-7). 
 Without the demand from the EU ETS market mechanism, the Kyoto credit 
prices hit historic lows in 2013 and 2014, with Certified Emissions Reductions 
(CERs) worth just US$0.51 (€0.37) (World Bank, 2014). Sequestration credits trade 
at a 90% discount to emissions permits suppressing the investment incentive. To 
provide an investment incentive in North America forests the off-set price needs 
to be above $11/Cte (Russell, Keeton, Pontius, & Kerchner, 2014). It is expected 
that prices will fall when a product, or resource is turned into a tradeable 
commodity (Munden, 2011). 
The low-price commodity scenario of emissions permits is comparable to 
another commodity, corn. All agricultural commodities fall under this scenario. 
The ethanol mandate within 2005 Renewable Fuels Act increased demand in the 
corn market making corn more valuable; therefore, it is a useful case study to 
demonstrate how rule changes lead to market responses. 
The ethanol mandate to blend 10% of corn ethanol into the conventional 
gasoline was a part of the 2005 Renewable Fuels Act. The following graph 
demonstrates in metric tons: 
•! The increased demand for ethanol from 2006-2010. 
•! The near tripling price increase as a response to increased demand. 
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•! That production increased at the same time as prices resulting in increased 
supply. 
•! While exports and Surpluses remained within historic trends 
 
USDA (2017) 
Graph 4.1: U.S. Corn Market (million metric tons) 
U.S. corn surpluses declined by 40% from 2004 highs, demonstrating how 
much surplus there was in 2004, rather than how little there was in 2006 when corn 
prices started to climb. 2004 represented an unusually high level of surplus corn 
stocks at 53.69 million metric tons compared with 2006 levels of 32 million metric 
tons as the above graph demonstrates.  This should not be surprising since in 2006, 
3.46 million fewer acres were planted in corn than in 2005. In turn, reduced acreage 
correlates to a low price for corn and long-term lack of profit for framers. This 
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indicates that there was abundant supply to absorb the increased demand of the 
ethanol mandate, still the news of increased demand drove corn’s price upward. 
The following graph shows how farmers in developing countries increased 
production in response to higher prices. Even though U.S. exports fell by 25 
million metric tons in 2010, overall global corn exports increased. 
 
USDA (2017) 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/charts/18556_cornexportersjpg/cornexpo
rters.jpg?v=42780 
 
Graph 4.2: Leading World Exporters of Corn 
In 2016 prices, corn diverted to ethanol represents about 50% of corn 
production and prices have reverted back to historic norms due to oversupply. 
Farm incomes are again threatened. Corn prices have fallen from a high of $7.79 
per bushel in 2008 to around $3.65 per bushel in 2016. 
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USDA (2017) 
Graph 4.3: Cost and Returns per Planted Acre 
 
The above data demonstrates how price impacts behavior. As corn prices 
increased, corn production from outside the U.S. increased and entered the export 
market. Overall global corn output grew from 708 million metric tons (USDA, 
2005) to 869 million metric tons in 2013 (USDA, 2014). The entire global corn export 
trade is now about 150 million metric tons, up 50% since the introduction of 
ethanol (USDA, 2017).  
Although the ethanol mandate is often blamed for the 2008 food crisis, 
prominent scholars know the global situation was more complex than the ethanol 
mandate change. The crisis was driven by many factors including trade bans, poor 
weather, quantitative easing and market speculation (Abbott, 2009; Abbott & 
Battisti, 2009; Abbott, Hurt, & Tyler, 2011; Gilbert, 2010; Headey, 2010; Headey & 
Fan, 2010; Lagi, Bar-Yam, Bertrand, & Bar-Yam, 2011; Mitchell, 2008; Trostle 2008, 
2014). Although the price of corn in Chicago rose over 270% between 2004-2008, it 
is estimated that the ethanol mandate was responsible for 23% of this price 
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increase (Irwin, 2013). What Irwin does not account for in his model is the 
unreported Chinese export ban on corn. This represented a 10% disappearance 
from the export market as Table 4.1 shows. 
Table 4.1   
 
2003-2011 Chinese Corn Production & Exports per 1000 Metric Tons 
 
 2003 2005 2006 2007 2009 2011 
Production  
(1000 MT) 
115830 139365 151600 152300 163974 192780 
Export  
(1000 MT) 
7553 3727 5269 549 151 91 
USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, 2013 
 
Chinese corn production continued to increase, but exports fell in 2007 by 
90%. This resulted in imperfect market information about supply that explains the 
steep price fall in late 2008 when it was realized that China was not importing corn 
either and that there was not a shortfall. Global supply information impacts the 
US commodity corn market, because 75% of global corn contracts are traded in 
Chicago (USDA, 2017). 
The data presented here demonstrates the impact of the ethanol mandate 
on the commodity corn market. By 2006, 40% of U.S. corn production was diverted 
to ethanol, now a quarter of this diverted amount returns to the livestock food-
chain as distillers’ grains. This 40% increase in demand plus the export ban in 
China created the illusion of scarcity. Higher prices led to expansion of production 
overseas, as graph 2 shows. Excess global production has driven down prices in 
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the last two years. It is too early to tell what impact this will have on future 
production. 
This commodity corn data is relevant to ETSs because it indicates how a 
market mandate can increase demand in the market, increasing a commodity’s 
price. It is important to remember that when comparing the ETS market 
mechanism with the corn market that the ETS is a virtual market. The market may 
experience shortages, but not due to the physical delivery of corn stored in 
warehouses. The permit supply in the ETS does not face supply-chain problems, 
its supply is determined politically. 
4.4 Methodology 
In this comparative analysis between the impacts of the market mandate in 
the corn market and the excessive permit supply in the ETS, the Institutional 
Analysis and Development framework is used as a policy analytic tool. The IADs 
framework is unique, it allows for collaborative evolution through mapping 
feedback loops, but maintains the contextual bio-physical restraints that 
collaborative models lack. Collaborative governance models, one could argue, are 
the frameworks utilized at Conference of Parties (COP) summits to address 
climate change; thousands of stakeholders gather annually to seek agreement on 
targets and actions. However, the binding targets of Kyoto expired in 2012, and 
the Paris Agreement (2015) is based upon individual nation commitments 
(UNFCCC, 2015). Collaborative models are not mandates and do not require 
specific actions (Blomgran Bingham, 2009). Since this research focuses specifically 
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on mandates and rule changes, a collaborative policy framework is not the 
appropriate tool for this comparative analysis. 
  Because this research focuses on institutions more than the players who 
make up the institution and the rules by which they operate, it is appropriate to 
use an institutional model. Institutions can have many meanings focusing both on 
the rules used to structure patterns of interaction within and across organizations 
(Kraft & Furlong, 2013; Ostrom, 2007). The “rules” may be formal, like 
purposefully designed laws and constitutions, or informal, such as tacit cultural 
norms and conventions. Institutions include any form of constraint that people use 
to shape human interaction (North, 1990).  
These rules form operation systems, such as markets. Analyzing the 
commodity corn market in the IAD framework simplifies the system complexity. 
Charles Perrow (1999) warned that complex-tightly coupled systems would be 
prone to failure, in this context market crashes. Modern digital markets fit into this 
category of system, due to the speed at which they operate, it is an additional 
characteristic that must be addressed as a risk factor. 
4.5 The IADs Framework in Use 
The basic components and networks of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework can be used to demonstrate how rule changes through 
the ethanol mandate interacted with the traditional market dynamics and supply 
chains of the corn industry that resulted in the near tripling of the price of corn 
between 2005-2008. For example, the corn industry is made up of producers, 
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middlemen, processors and consumers, the flows between these network actors 
are what make up the market and their efficiency affects prices. The following 
chart shows the IAD Framework in context of its network connections and flows. 
 
Source: Hoffman & Ireland 2013, adapted from McGinnis (2011a), Ostrom (2009)  
Figure 4.1: Basic Components of IAD Framework 
 
By placing the commodity corn market into this framework, the complex 
interactions that led to the price increases in the corn market and market tightening 
are simplified and more easily explained.  
4.6 Results: The Corn Market in the IAD Framework 
The next chart maps the impact of the ethanol mandate inside the corn 
market. It demonstrates the importance of information to market behavior. For 
instance, it is the information about the biophysical conditions on farm and in the 
mid-western region which provide information to the traders about the forth 
coming harvest. In turn, the traders determine whether they believe the supply will 
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increase or decrease, which then impacts the price of the commodity. At the end 
of the chart, the policy reaction reflects the result of prices; such as, should subsidies 
be removed or increased, should exports be halted? These reactions provide 
feedback information and influence the supply and demand that then impacts the 
market place. The feedback loops within this system either amplify market volatility 
or dampen it. Volatility can move prices suddenly in either direction. However, 
the corn market is buffered by the daily trading limit; if the price per bushel moves 
more than 30 cents in either direction the market shuts down automatically for the 
day. This daily limit prevents market crashes. In terms of the physical market, if 
prices are high farmers will increase production, if they are low their planting 
decisions will be based upon available subsidies.  
  
 
Figure 4.2: Ethanol’s impact on Corn Market within the IAD Framework 
 
Certainly the 2005 mandate to blend 10% ethanol into conventional gasoline 
created a dramatic increase in the demand for corn. In addition, Midwestern 
spring flooding made traders nervous in 2008. But, it turned out to be a hot dry 
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summer and lower waterways meant that barges transporting corn to 
international markets had to carry lighter loads. Meanwhile, increased trading 
volumes on the corn Commodity Futures markets created an expansion of the 
daily trading limit. This meant that the price of corn could fluctuate by $.30 per 
bushel per day instead of the historic $.20 per bushel (CMEgroup, 2011). This all 
took place in the context of newly emergent high frequency trading. 
Because corn prices climbed, price subsidies to corn farmers were 
eliminated, incentivizing them to plant more corn. Subsidies to ethanol producers 
incentivized expansion in ethanol distilling infrastructure (Wisner, 2006). These 
variables created amplified feedback loops within the corn industry and futures 
markets leading to what is commonly called the 2008 food crisis. News on China’s 
export ban does not exist, only in 2016 did news emerge that China was ending its 
corn Stockpiling program which was implemented in 2007 (Gale et al., 2009; Wu 
& Zhang, 2016,).  
This demonstrates that the illusion of a 10% disappearance due to the 
Chinese export ban was not taken into consideration in analysis of the causes 
behind the 2008 Food Crisis. This is an important distinction in the comparative 
analysis for ETS markets since it will influence the perceived risk of market 
speculation.  
4.7 The ETS in the IAD Framework 
According to Hintermann (2009), market speculation was indeed a concern 
in the EU-ETS in 2006 when the permit price peaked at €32 in April. Then the price 
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dropped sharply when news emerged that there was an excessive supply of 
permits in the market. The price recovered somewhat to range between €15-20, but 
then collapsed to near zero in 2007. The price has since hovered between €4-6 
(Carbon Pulse, 2017). Speculation in a market is difficult to determine 
(Hintermann, 2009; Sanders, Irwin, & Merrin, 2008) because speculation is a 
concern and it will be included in the risk assessment.  
The following chart displays the ETS in the IAD framework which makes it 
possible to do the comparative analysis between the impact of the ethanol mandate 
on the corn market compared with the ETS market design. It must be 
acknowledged that data on the corn market is historical, and the comparison of 
ETS is largely a projection of expectations. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Emissions Trading Scheme in the IAD Framework 
 
The biophysical attributes in the framework refer to the concentration of 
GHGs in the atmosphere. The information about this area is determined by 
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scientists measuring atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. However, since the 
biosphere is a complex system, modeling and predicting in this field is not straight 
forward, it is impossible to calculate exactly how much CO2, for instance, will be 
absorbed by the oceans, or the impact of a volcanic eruption on atmospheric GHG 
concentrations in advance. A volcanic eruption in the short term would reduce 
regional temperatures due increased sulfur release, but in the long term would 
exasperate GHG concentrations (Robock, 2000). 
The social and economic conditions may be no less easy to predict. We can 
assume that demand for emissions permits will be high during industrial 
expansion, and that leakage will occur for corporations seeking to avoid carbon 
pricing by setting up in a nation not captured by carbon pricing. Thus, emissions 
would be reduced regionally, but not globally. Benchmarking within a single 
market region has shown to prevent some leakage in phase 3 of EU-ETS 2013-2020 
(Sartor, Pallière, & Lecourt, 2014). 
Political cooperation is the norm of politics, even though free market 
completion is the driving ideology of proper economics (Stone, 2002). Despite the 
contested opposition parties of 2016, governments have to cooperate in order to 
form a policy agenda. The policy span of phase 3 in EU-ETS is seven years, which 
does not leave an opportunity for changing conditions in the interim. The COPs 
meet annually, but the first stocktaking of the NDCs will take place in 2018 and 
nations will be evaluated every five years after on their committed progress 
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(UNFCCC, 2015). Although this will not impact market design directly, it will no 
doubt impact ETS market prices, as all new information invariably does. 
  Information flows into the action arena where changes in the market place 
happen. Trading creates patterns and produces data from which to learn about the 
system, which in turn establishes the evaluation criteria. In ETS this is the point 
where policy decisions about the system get made. In the EU-ETS this is usually a 
seven-year cycle, whereas, the Air Resources Board, which facilitates the 
California-Quebec cap and trade market, auctions are held quarterly allowing for 
more flexibility (ARB, 2017). 
The evaluation criteria are a critical arena because this is where decisions 
are made. This is the policy area where the initial ethanol mandate was made. It is 
also the location where the Chinese made the policy decision to stop exporting and 
to start stockpiling corn. This is the point where the supply of emissions permits 
was made in 2013 on the EU-ETS and it informs the ARB prior to their quarterly 
auctions in the California Cap and Trade system. 
The allocation of emissions permits in phase 2 on the EU-ETS was made in 
2005, prior to the financial crisis. The allocation was set until 2013 when phase 3 
would allocate and auction a new permit supply. This left an excess supply in the 
market for the next five years. Except due to slow economic growth in Europe, 
when phase 3 was released, policy makers were afraid to reduce supply too much. 
Policy makers must balance whether to set an ambitious cap (reduced permit 
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supply), but not too ambitious, which would lead to price spikes, that could 
threaten the entire scheme (IETA, 2016). 
4.8 Discussion: Getting the Price Right 
Because most carbon pricing markets are so nascent, it is impossible to 
measure their success in reducing GHG emissions. After 12 years only the EU-ETS 
has enough data to provide reasonable measurements. According to Carbon 
Market Forum, the EU-ETS is succeeding in meeting a 21% reduction in GHG 
emissions below 1990 levels. It has done so at a very low market cost, and under 
competitive conditions (Marcu, Elkerbout, & Stoefs, 2016). As of 2015, the EU has 
reduced emissions by 22.3% (Euro Stat, 2016). As more countries adopt carbon 
pricing mechanisms fears of leakage are reduced (Marcu et al., 2016). 
Despite this short-term success, the trajectory to meet the Paris Agreement’s 
intent to limit warming to “well below 2 degrees Celsius of warming” is not 
sufficient. It is assumed that EU GHG reductions of 45-70% by 2050 will meet this 
target, but to stay below the 1.5 Celsius warming level GHG reductions of 70-99% 
are necessary, based upon the CAT global assessment model and modified with 
UN population projections for 2030-2050 (Hare, Roming, Schaeffer, & Schleussner, 
2016). 
The most recent accounting of the social cost for carbon is $31/Cte; however 
it uses a baseline of 2.5 Celsius degrees of warming (Nordhaus, 2017). The Stern 
Review (2006) claims a social cost of the $86/tCO2. Perhaps the exact price is not 
important; the EU has reduced emissions at a cost below either estimate. 
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 However, the low hanging fruit has been picked and this indicates a higher 
price will be needed in the future. A survey from 2013 claimed that a mere 
presence of a carbon price had GHG reductions on corporations’ agendas (Laing, 
Sato, Grubb, & Claudia, 2013). This indicates the power of forward guidance, the 
monetary policy which the Federal Reserve used to encourage investor confidence 
during the Great Recession. Forward Guidance is when a central bank makes a 
statement about the future direction of its monetary policy (FRB, 2015). 
The seven-year cycle, that the permit allocation/auctions are set, is not a 
flexible means to manage the permit supply, as phase 2 indicates in the wake of 
the financial crisis.  
Currently, there is not enough liquidity for the market to function as an 
investment mechanism. Market rules discourage entry into the market; this is, in 
part, due to regulators fearing speculation (Marcu et al., 2016).   
4.9 The Risk of Speculation 
At present the market is too tightly regulated to encourage investments 
opportunities, decreased open interest means reduce liquidity and a perception that 
a good is not going to be more valuable in the future. A little bit of speculation in 
a market is a good thing because it indicates the value of a good is increasing. For 
instance, in the US, the Commodity Futures and Trade Commission, has more 
non-commercial open interest on corn than commercial interest in corn. 
Commercial traders represent farms who deliver physical corn into the market, 
and processors who take delivery of that corn. Non-commercial traders are 
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speculators; they provide the liquidity needed for a market to function in between 
when a crop is planted and when it is harvested. Without a future contract, every 
harvest time prices would crash due to over-supply. 
 The converging effects of the ethanol mandate and bad weather in 2008 
lead traders to speculate that there was a shortage of corn and that because of 
spring flooding there would be a shortage at harvest time. Chinese stockpiling of 
grain had not yet been accounted for and the corn market peaked in the summer 
of 2008, but fell 40% in October when it was realized there was ample supply in 
the market (Kraus, 2008). 
As previously mentioned, it is difficult to determine a bubble, and this 
example demonstrates the grey area between information about a market and the 
supply within a market. If all the news points to a shortfall, then commercial 
traders like processors and livestock producers will scramble to store corn before 
the prices increase. This is business, not speculation. This degree of price increase 
would not be possible in the in the EU-ETS, unless a large institutional investor 
took a position to speculate that they could be a price maker. The following graph 
uses FCM data to demonstrate. 
 
87!
!
 
FCM data, 2002-2011  
 
 
Graph 4.4: Selected Commercial vs Non-Commercial Capital on CBOT 
 
On the Chicago Board of Trade in 2002, Archer Daniel Midlands Co.’s 
(ADM) account contained $70 million, compared to Goldman Sachs’ investment 
account which contained $3.8 billion. By September of 2008, ADM’s account was 
worth $162 million, whereas Goldman had reached $11 billion. ADM is primarily 
a commercial trader, although it does have the ability to trade contracts without 
taking delivery. Whereas, Goldman never takes delivery of an agricultural 
commodity contract. The following table provides an insight to capital leverage 
available in agricultural commodity markets.  
Table 4.2  
 
Exchange Traded Commodity Funds 
 
Symbol Index Traded Fund Worth Agricultural 
Weight 
Grain Recent 
DBC Powershares DB 
Commodity Index ETF  
$4.4 billion  unknown 15%  
DJP iPath Dow Jones-UBS 
Commodity Index   
$2.0 billion 36% 21%  
0
2,000,000,000
4,000,000,000
6,000,000,000
8,000,000,000
10,000,000,000
12,000,000,000
14,000,000,000
16,000,000,000
20
02
IM
ay
20
03
IM
ay
20
04
IM
ay
20
05
IM
ay
20
06
IM
ay
20
07
IM
ay
20
08
IM
ay
20
09
IM
ay
20
10
IM
ay
M
ay
I1
1
ADM!INVESTOR!SERVICES!
INC
GOLDMAN!SACHS!&!CO
88!
!
GSG iShares S&P GSCI 
Commodity Index ETF  
$1.5 billion 19% 10%  
RJI ELEMENTS Rogers 
International 
Commodity ETN  
$450 
million 
unknown 17%  
GCC GreenHaven 
Continuous 
Commodity Index  
$280 
million 
59% 19%  
UCI UBS E-TRACS CMCI 
TR ETN  
$84million 
  
$4.9billion*  
 
33% 15% (2005) 
 
 
 
 
17.04% 
corn * 
DJP iPath® Bloomberg 
Commodity Index 
9 billion* 
 
  5.81%* 
 
Sources: Ackworth (2005), Barchart (2010), Cole Asset Mgt (2005), iPath (2017)* 
The market leverage capacity of investment funds under current market 
conditions is beyond imagination. Based upon investment flows into the corn 
market from 2006-2008, I estimate that it would take $150-200 million dollars to 
create investment demand in the EU-ETS, which would send market investment 
signals to other investors. This could lead a hostile investment, as Sumitomo Corp 
and Winchester Commodities positioned themselves in the copper market in the 
1990s (Murphy, 2014), in which a single transaction produced profits of $100 
million for Winchester (Cicutti et al., 1996). Or, a price maker might be altruistic; 
climate activist and former hedge fund manager Tom Steyer reportedly worth 
more than $1.6 billion would be in a financial position to move the permit price 
upward trying to encourage faster mitigation. Without policy buffers the carbon 
markets are vulnerable to speculation, which would threaten the entire 
marketplace. 
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However, it is important to remember that the corn market is a physical 
commodity governed by supply and demand, compared with the ETS whose 
supply is determined by policy makers. While standard commodities such as 
wheat and oil have a value due to their utility, the carbon permit-credit, like paper 
money, is essentially made up; its value comes from the cap, which limits its 
supply (Button, 2008). In 2003, the International Financial Reporting 
Interpretations Committee, a committee of the International Accounting 
Standards Board, stated that an emissions permit is akin to, and should be 
accounted for as monetary currency (Button, 2008). Hence the emissions market is 
more like trading a currency than eliminating a pollutant (Victor & House, 2004). 
This is because the supply of the market is set by policy, not by production, as it is 
in mining and agriculture. 
4.10 Summary 
The evidence presented here demonstrates that there was always enough 
corn production in the corn market to absorb the ethanol mandate. Even so, the 
price jumped more than 270%. Yes, the commodity was undervalued before, but 
U.S. carryover stocks (surplus) never fell below 30 million metric tons, one third 
of the entire annual global corn trade. Even though the news reported surpluses 
declining by 40%, there was never a shortage. Still it would be wrong to say that 
the market was speculative, because it was trading on the best available 
knowledge at the time, it was only in hindsight that the supply was determined to 
be adequate. 
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Policy makers fear price spikes, and especially in the emissions market 
which is so closely linked to industrial output. As the first emissions market, the 
EU-ETS has been successful reducing GHG emissions, by 2015 emissions were 
down 23%, five years ahead of the 2020 schedule. However, going forward, further 
reductions will likely mean a stronger stick, i.e., higher prices, because the low 
hanging fruit has been picked.  
As inevitable demand is anticipated, and given the tight coupling of market 
transactions, there is a significant risk that a highly capitalized price-maker could 
move the market upward. At present, the loss of liquidity and low volume within 
the market make it comparable to the corn market prior to 2006. It is unclear if 
governance within the EU-ETS would have the policy tools to manage a significant 
price spike without destroying the market entirely. It is clear that the permit 
system is not a physical commodity, the fungiblity of permit assets are more like 
a currency. Therefore, emissions permits should be managed as such and a permit 
reserve should be established so that the supply within the market can be managed 
on an ad hoc basis, not once every seven years. 
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Chapter 5: Policy Inquiry: Seeking Expert Opinion of  
Carbon as Currency Standard 
5.1 Abstract 
Pricing carbon using market mechanisms through carbon taxes, or 
tradeable permits, are the dominant mitigation means of the Paris Accord to fight 
global climate change. Pricing carbon in the tradeable marketplace turns 
Greenhouse Gas emission permits into a fungible asset by purchasing the right to 
pollute. Some argue that bureaucratically determining the emission permit supply 
makes such emission trading schemes like the money supply. Therefore, they 
argue, it is more like a currency than a physical commodity. Some scholars argue 
that carbon could be used like the gold standard once was, turning carbon into the 
currency reserve standard by which the money supply is determined.  This idea is 
tested using a small but in depth interview survey of experts in climate change, 
market design and macroeconomics. It is found that a carbon tax is the preferred 
policy instrument. The idea of carbon as a currency standard is unrealistic because 
the gold standard was fraught with problems. The experts interviewed fear that if 
the money supply is tied to carbon, flexible monetary policies would be lost. 
However, there is uncertainty among the experts whether engaging central banks 
to mitigate climate change is feasible. While these experts favor a carbon tax over 
the tradeable permit approach to climate change mitigation, they do not offer 
strategies to implement a carbon tax from a political perspective. This poses a 
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problem; governments are reluctant to impose new taxes on the polis. As a result, 
politically feasible strategies to price carbon effectively still need to be found. 
5.2 Introduction: Policy Approaches to Pricing Carbon 
Pricing carbon is deemed imperative in reducing Greenhouse Gas 
emissions. There are two ways to price carbon, one is to apply a direct tax, which 
is a fiscal instrument that determines a fixed price for emitting GHGs. To introduce 
such a tax, it must be politically acceptable and once it is in place the tax is 
inflexible due to the political process needed to alter it. The revenue garnered from 
the tax therefore depends upon economic conditions, but without specific 
mechanisms, the tax does not vary with the economy. For instance, British 
Columbia, Canada became the first North American jurisdiction to implement a 
carbon tax in 2008. The tax was politically feasible because it is revenue neutral; 
that is that for every increase in carbon tax, it is offset by decreasing another tax. 
While this approach makes a carbon tax politically palatable, the problem is that 
it does not generate revenue with which to invest in climate change adaptation 
(Ragan, 2016). 
The fixed price of a carbon tax poses a problem if the economy falls into 
crisis, if the price is too high it will become politically vulnerable to repeal (IETA, 
2016). However, if the price is too low, mitigating firm behavior away from GHG 
intensive activities is reduced. In British Columbia the carbon tax, set at $30 
CND/Cte, is now set to rise because it is not deemed expensive enough by the 
relatively new Trudeau government. The new NDP provincial government has 
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proposed schemes to increase the tax by $5/Cte per year to meet proposed federal 
standards (Keller, 2017). Potentially this increase was only politically possible 
because of new federal policies. 
5.3 Cap and Trade Approach 
The second approach to price carbon is the tradeable market mechanism, 
commonly called Cap and Trade. The carbon price is set by ‘the cap’ – the supply 
of emission permits and then the price is derived in the marketplace by firms 
competing to purchase permits. This approach creates a variable price based upon 
emission permit demand, making it reactive to immediate economic conditions. In 
times of high demand the supply of available permits shrinks and the price 
increases. 
However the supply is managed, in a tight market, with too little supply, 
the permit price will be too high and pose an excessive price on energy costs. 
Conversely, if the supply is too large, the emission permit price will be too low to 
incentivize firms to reduce emissions quickly enough to mitigate climate change 
effectively. One policy approach does not exclude the other. In Europe some 
nations use both carbon taxes and market mechanisms as policy tools (EU, 2017).  
Commonly called Emission Trading Systems, the price of emission permits 
is determined by the supply and demand in the market. The EU-ETS has been in 
place since 2005, it is the most mature and largest of global ETSs (EU, 2017).  
The EU-ETS has demonstrated successful GHG reductions at relatively low 
cost and has already met the 21% reduction target of 2020 (Euro Stat, 2016; Marcu, 
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Elkerbout, & Stoefs, 2016). While the low cost of achieving this reduction despite 
the depressed price in emissions has been efficient for the European economy, the 
low permit price translates to lower sequestration prices, which means developing 
nations in the stored carbon sector don’t realize optimal profit on the offset 
markets. 
5.4 Offset Markets 
 Tangential to the emission markets, the offset markets are designed to pay 
firms to either sequester CO2, or to avoid producing it through generating non-
carbon energy production. The low permit price on the EU ETS market means that 
Kyoto credit prices hit historic lows in 2013 and 2014, with Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs) worth just US$0.51 (€0.37) (World Bank, 2014). This trend has 
continued, current emission permits trade for US$5-9 (€4-7), while the average 
price for CER sequestration credits $3.3/Cte (Hamrick & Goldstein, 2016), a 50% 
or greater discount from the emission permit price. While a ton of carbon emission, 
and its GHG equivalent, is standardized at a regional market price, offset prices 
vary depending upon the quality and sustainability of the sequestration-
avoidance project.  
Decarbonizing the economy will require strong incentives to invest in green 
technologies and sequestration projects (Campiglio, 2016; Ceres, 2014; McCollum 
et al., 2014). The low price means a reduced capacity to finance projects 
(Campiglio, 2016).The emission permit price, which drives the price of off-set 
credits (CERs), has been in a slump since 2007 (Euro Stat, 2016; Hintermann, 2009). 
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In a weak investment environment (World Bank, 2017), this does not bode well for 
stored carbon projects and investment flows to low income countries where most 
of the sequestration projects are located7. The problem is that policy makers fear 
reducing the supply of permits, which would increase the price, because the risk 
of getting the supply wrong could dismantle the entire ETS market if it were to 
cripple the economy (IETA, 2016a). Because energy consumption is closely tied to 
economic growth, it is possible to measure the increase in atmospheric CO2 with 
an expansion of GDP.  When the economy goes into recession, CO2 concentrations 
decline (York, 2012). The question then is, given the close correlation between 
economic output and energy consumption, what is the most effective strategy to 
combat climate change?  
5.5 The Cost Dilemma to Mitigate Climate Change 
The correlation between energy consumption and economic growth 
presents a policy problem. As former president George W. Bush famously said as 
he refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol, "I will not accept a plan that will harm our 
economy and hurt our workers” (CNN, 2001). Even though today job growth in 
the “green” economy far exceeds that of the fossil fuel industry. According to the 
U.S. Department of Energy (2017), the renewable and energy efficiency sector now 
employs five times more people than the fossil fuel sector, climate change 
mitigation is still associated with economic harm rather than economic growth as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Industrial nations do not receive payment for offsets under the Kyoto Protocol. 
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the 2016 U.S. presidential election discourse demonstrated (Ettenson, 2017). 
The Stern Review (2006) reported that the negative externalities of climate 
change will impose a social cost of at least 5% of Global GDP and as much as 20%. 
The report argues that the price of carbon would need to be at least €128/T ($170 
US) to affect the behavioral change necessary to combat climate change in the long 
run (Heffernan, 2008; Stern, 2006). More recently, Hsaing et al. (2017) claim that 
each degree increase of warming will reduce GDP by 1.2% in the US. Following 
this logic, under the current conditions which NASA calculates as 0.8°C. of 
warming roughly 1% of 18. 87 US GDP amounts to $188 billon. This has led Sir 
Nicholas Stern to call climate change the largest of all market failures. 
Geoff Garver of McGill University has suggested that the best way to 
combat climate change and environmental degradation is to link the money 
supply to the Earth’s carrying capacity (2009). Some have gone further to propose 
carbon as a currency standard as gold once was (International Institute of 
Monetary Transformation, 2012; Porter & Wratten, 2014; Porter, Howden, Smith 
& Schiller, 2017). Building upon these novel ideas, this research survey asks 
experts in climate change and macroeconomics to deliberate on the idea of a carbon 
standard along with whether they believe tradeable permit approach or fiscal tax 
approach to climate change mitigation is best.   
When the interview survey was begun, both Canada and the US had 
stepped away from the Kyoto Protocol because of the burden it would place on 
the economy. Since that time regional carbon pricing strategies have emerged. A 
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carbon tax has been implemented in British Columbia and Alberta, while Quebec 
and California have established a joint carbon market of tradeable permits, and 
nine Northeast States use auctioned permits under the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI). Because Mexico has instituted a limited carbon tax, this means 
that nearly 30% of the North American economy is operating under carbon pricing 
schemes. 
5.6 Problem Statement 
Although some regional carbon pricing schemes have been established, less 
than half of the economy pays the negative externalities of GHG pollution. Two 
main market mitigation policies exist – a fiscal carbon tax and the tradeable permit 
scheme commonly called Cap and Trade.  Given public and political opposition to 
new fees, which policy approach do experts prefer? What is the expert response to 
the concept of carbon as a monetary standard to better mitigate climate change? Is 
there a consensus about utilizing the nonpolitical institution of the central bank as 
a means to overcome political impasse on climate change? 
 
5.7 Seeking Expert Opinion on a Radical Proposal 
 Anthony Giddens (2011) claims that “radical policy making” will be 
required to address the dilemma of climate change (p. 74). Although far-right 
conservatives oppose any new economic costs, the majority of the electorate 
recognize the need to fight climate change (the popular vote went to Clinton). 
However, politically the structure of Congress makes action on climate change 
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nearly impossible. Thus, radical policy making, beyond left and right ideologies, 
might offer the best hope for effective policy strategies. To discern policy 
alternatives a series of interviews were conducted with thought leaders 
representing experts associated with climate change, macroeconomic policy and 
market design. Participants were asked to respond to the fiscal and market based 
approaches to climate change mitigation, and their reflections helped guide this 
research going forward. 
5.8 Methodology: Interview Survey 
 Participants in this survey were made up of elite thought leaders, including 
academics, a retired politician and non-governmental organization researchers. 
The survey respondents were identified by their activist publications in the media, 
then using the snowballing method to identify other respondents. Snowballing 
entails identifying a suitable candidate to interview, then asking the interviewee 
at the end of the interview if they can recommend another potential interviewee. 
The limitation of the snowballing method is that the interviewee may identify only 
like minded additional people to interview. My attempt to control for this bias was 
to identify people from both left and right wing political persuasions. Participants 
were determined to be left or right based upon informal content analysis of their 
published work. Right or left wing opinions were determined based upon the use 
of adverbs, because adverbs frequently present bias in scientific writing 
(Krippendorff, personal communication). For example, the participant’s 
publication refers favorably to market-traded strategies. Market strategies are 
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deemed to be a rightwing strategy and since this approach was initially supported 
by Republican George H. Bush it is deemed a politically right-wing strategy. 
Snowballing, or chain referral sampling, is a method used in sociological 
qualitative research where the population is identified as difficult to reach, either 
because they are deprived, socially stigmatized, or elite (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). 
The population of this study are difficult to reach because they are elite and few in 
number. Climate change may be a vast field of study, however, the population that 
is deeply involved with climate change mitigation policy combined with macro-
economics and central banking is very few. The snowballing sampling method 
yields a sample population from people who share particular knowledge and who 
know others who possess these characteristics particular to the research topic 
(Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981).  
The criteria for respondents was that they had to believe that climate change 
is an urgent policy issue. They had to either have connections to central banking, 
or to emission market development, for example the Montreal or Kyoto protocol. 
All the participants were either from the US or Canada because at the start of this 
research both these countries had stepped away from the Kyoto Protocol. At the 
time, the US and Canada were seen as free-riders on the international community’s 
attempts to mitigate climate change. Part of the initial goal of this research was to 
determine potential strategies through rule changes to bring these free-riding 
nations back into the fold of climate mitigation strategies assuming political 
recalcitrance. 
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Seeking elite opinion may be viewed as an anti-pluralistic method, however 
climate change is a policy problem tailored to elites. First, the issue is complex and 
this complexity makes specific outcomes uncertain and unpredictable. For 
instance, the rate at which the oceans absorbed CO2 was underestimated in some 
previous climate models, which led to a slower than expected atmospheric 
warming, leading some sceptics to question warming altogether. Although the 
climate hiatus has been scientifically explained, the damage to public opinion was 
already done (Sanders, 2017). Therefore, education level and understanding is key 
to participate in climate change mitigation policy formation.  Second, climate 
change is a remote, abstract construct and is not experienced as weather is 
experienced. As a result, a plebiscite on climate change would likely not result in 
an effective policy outcome. This may lead some to declare that mitigation policy 
formation is anti-democratic; that elites are the domain of special interests 
(Birkland, 2016). Democracy though is a national construct; the tyranny of the 
majority in the US may trump most of the global population who bear the brunt 
of extreme weather associated with climate change. Consequently, this research 
approach is unapologetically elitist from a North American perspective; collective 
common-good ethics necessarily must prevail in this circumstance. It only 
examines North American opinion of those thought leaders battling climate 
change. It does not engage with leaders who think climate change is not an urgent 
issue. It attempts to go very deeply in the policy topic in order to seek the best 
opportunities for achieving meaningful, effective and pragmatic policy options for 
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combatting climate change. The sheer magnitude and complexity of climate 
change as a policy issue make expert opinion vital to effective policy formation. 
5.9 Interview Style Background 
The elite interview approach used was developed by the Quaker United 
Nations Office, it is a process of high-level consultations and off-record dialogues. 
This method is designed to use “quiet diplomacy” working with elite knowledge 
sources with an aim to help build communication and understanding by 
providing a safe, off-the- record space where participants can listen, explore issues 
and exchange ideas on how to move forward (QUNO, 2016).  
It also invokes the Quaker method of scrupling as a means of deepening 
academic scholarship and methodology so that better efforts might be achieved. 
Ursula Franklin (2010) describes the need for scrupling, if you need clarity beyond 
your own private concerns you better scruple, because it is a problem that is bigger 
than all of us. Scrupling is the concept of collectively deepening and sharing the 
understanding of problems. Climate change policy is such a problem and it is a 
collective action problem that involves us all.  
In the QUNO process participants can speak freely, since their quotes will 
not be attributed unless their explicit permission is granted. This quiet deliberative 
method of engagement was the approach used as a framework for the interview 
survey. Respondents were informed of this anonymity protocol in advance and at 
the beginning of the interview. Normally these off the record dialogues are 
conducted face to face and in groups. This was not possible given scheduling and 
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the spatial range of participants, which is why the dialogues were conducted by 
telephone or video conferencing. The research protocol was submitted to The 
University of Vermont Committees on Human Research Protocol Exemption 
Review and Determination (IRB). IRB exempt status was granted by the committee 
on August 15, 2013. The interview questions which helped frame the dialogues is 
included in Appendix I.  
The sample size of experts was six, although this number is extremely small 
and not statistically significant, the length and in depth dialogues still revealed 
interesting and helpful insights that helped guide the research into the future. 
When this survey instrument was created, both Canada and the US had stepped 
away from the Kyoto Protocol. As a result, the idea behind the interviews was to 
ask experts who are experienced with central banking and climate change if it was 
possible to use central bank independence as a means to engage these free-riding 
nations in emission reduction schemes. Therefore, the experts had to be Canadian 
or American and they also had to be expert in two very specialized and arcane 
disciplines. For this reason, the sample size was inevitably very small. As such it 
is the quality of the data produced by this survey method, not the quantity of data 
generated, that makes this methodology useful in forming climate change 
mitigation policy.  
The experts are classified in the table below, sometimes an expert might be 
classified in multiple areas, for instance, a survey participant may have at one time 
been a political leader, or an academic, and later in their career been associated 
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with an NGO, that individual would be classified under more than one type. 
Table 5.1  
Respondents Classified by Background 
Type Number identified with classification 
Academic:  3 
Education: PhD 5 (4 economics) 
NGO  4 
Business Executive 2 
Professed Environmentalist [question not asked] 2 
Former Elected Politian 1 
International Market Design 3 
Central Bank Connections 3 
 
 The participants reflect a broad range of backgrounds and opinions. 
Although all of them are currently tied to North American institutions, by birth 
they represent three continents. Perhaps it is not meaningful, but two participants 
have become sheep farmers in retirement, I disclose this because I too was a 
shepherdess in a former life. 
5.10 Results 
The interviews were conducted from January 2013 through November 2014 
via Skype either by video or audio recording. Attempts to contact additional 
prominent participants were made until February 2017 given the changing 
political and policy environment. However, no new participants responded to 
interview requests. 
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 The completed interviews were recorded and are stored in a password 
protected digital file. In one interview the recording failed and the interview notes 
were used as the source of the dialogue. Six interviews were conducted in total, 
four by telephone, two by video conference. The shortest interview was 24 minutes 
long, the longest interview was 84 minutes long, the average interview time was 
45 min, and the median time was 38:30 minutes.  
The interviews were conversations, pre-formulated questions were used 
only when the conversation stalled (please see appendix for the pre-formulated 
questions). The interviews revealed a pattern of sentiment on a series of topics 
pertaining to addressing climate change mitigation policies, such as carbon taxes, 
tradeable permits, carbon as a currency, carbon as a monetary reserve and as a 
monetary standard. Five key themes emerged from the dialogue process that 
revealed sentiment about policy alternatives to purse research that mitigates 
climate change more effectively. Content analysis was then used to determine how 
participants felt about each policy alternative. 
 
Table 5.2  
 
General Sentiment about Climate Policy Approaches 
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The results in table 5.2 indicate that the participants all favor a carbon tax 
over the cap and trade market approach. This is ironic since the Kyoto Protocol 
focused entirely on the market approach to GHG reductions. I say ironically 
because two participants were instrumental in the design of the Kyoto Protocol 
market approach. An additional two participants were architects of the Montreal 
Protocol, which also had a market approach attached to it.  
The chief reason for favoring the fiscal tax approach over the market 
mandate was design simplicity. This is in opposition to general economic theory, 
which according to Coase (1961) states the most efficient way to reduce social 
harms is through the market mechanism. This was a surprising out come since 
four of the five respondents are PhD economists. 
Three respondents said the tax must not be regressive and hurt low income 
individuals, a tax rebate for those on the margins was stressed. The concept of a 
currency linked to carbon was foreign to all participants, four indicated that it was 
 
Policy Approach 
 
Approve 
 
Disapprove 
 
Skeptical 
Cap and Trade Style 2 4 0 
 
Carbon Tax 6 0 0 
    
Using Carbon as a 
Currency Reserve 
(Carbon Standard) 
0 4 2 
    
Engaging Central Banks 2 2 2 
    
Local/Regional 
Initiatives 
3 N/A N/A 
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a novel idea, but could not see how it could be implemented politically, one 
economist saw that eventually a currency that took into consideration the 
biosphere would be needed, while another economist could not see the benefit of 
linking natural capital to a currency at all. Only two respondents liked the idea of 
a market mechanism in addition to a carbon tax. One, favored markets because it 
was perceived as a means of transferring money to developing countries where so 
many of the carbon sinks are located. 
 Three participants brought up the importance of local and regional 
mitigation initiatives even though this was not a question on the interview survey. 
One economist stressed that regional initiatives were “politically more realistic 
than national and global” protocols. Another mentioned that the local level was 
“where the creativity is located”. Two respondents thought using a central bank 
to mitigate climate change might be a good idea, but they could not envision a 
situation that would make it feasible. One respondent said, “If everyone agreed 
with you about a new idea, someone else would have thought of it, and done it 
already.” This comment provided me with confidence to continue pursuing the 
concept of using central bank independence as an institutional leverage point to 
engage recalcitrant nations in climate change mitigation.  
This single comment of encouragement persuaded me to use the interview 
survey as a guide to further explore the role of central banks and using monetary 
policy as a policy leverage point. It was clear from all the interviews that the 
management of the money supply is an extremely sensitive leverage point. That 
112!
!
freely traded markets are complex and risky, while they offer investment 
opportunity, when things go wrong, they can go very wrong. The concept of 
attempting to use carbon as a currency standard like gold once was, as Porter and 
Wratten (2014), Porter and colleagues (2017), and the International Institute of 
Monetary Transformation have proposed, was thoroughly repudiated and 
rejected. The respondents perceived creating a rigid monetary standard as being 
regressive, that it would reinstitute the boom and bust cycle of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, that fiat monetary policy would lose its flexibility and that 
constraining the money supply to a standard would lead to perverse and 
unintended outcomes. The results will now be further discussed in the following 
section.  
 
5.11 Discussion 
The results of the interviews were surprising since three of the interviewees 
were directly responsible for the architecture of the market based mechanisms in 
the Montreal Protocol to mitigate ozone hole expansion, or the Kyoto Protocol to 
reduce GHG emissions. Thus, one would expect that they would be in favor of cap 
and trade protocols. This turned out not to be the case. Economists are supposed 
to favor the most efficient policy, and economic theory tells us that tradeable 
permits are the most efficient way to reduce negative externalities like pollution 
(Coase, 1960; Crocker, 1966; Dales, 1968; Hurwicz, 1995; Montgomery, 1972). 
Despite the economic theory that taxes are less economically efficient and apply 
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dead weight losses to the economy, most of these economists and finance 
professionals preferred fiscal tax approaches to tradeable permits. 
It was widely thought that the European experience had not achieved the 
intended result (even though evidence now suggests otherwise), only one 
respondent thought at the time of the interviews (2014-2015), “It was too early to 
tell” whether the EU-ETS was successful or not. Since the EU has met its 2020 GHG 
reductions five years ahead of schedule (Europa, 2017), it seems that the expert 
opinion of what was happening in the market in 2015 was normatively driven 
compared with data driven. However, it is important to remember that the early 
mitigation strategies to reduce GHG emissions represent low hanging fruit, and that 
future targets will be harder to meet. 
Despite the overwhelming approval of a carbon tax, two respondents 
specifically referred to the important role tradeable permits have in strengthening 
the CDM which transfers investment to developing nations. They also stressed the 
important investment incentive opportunity that happens when property rights 
are applied to tradeable permits. The power of profit seeking motives is powerful; 
if one equates the increase in demand and price changes that followed the ethanol 
mandate embedded in the 2005 Renewable Fuels Act, this is evident. The ethanol 
mandate was a policy that increased corn production and raised prices out of their 
three decade slump (McCowen, 2017a). The key is balance, how to create increased 
demand and hence higher prices, without encouraging speculation? In 2006, when 
the EU-ETS price exceeded €30 speculation was a driving concern (Hintermann, 
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2009), and it remained a concern of those interviewed. 
There was ubiquitous concern that either a carbon tax or the emission 
permit price not be regressive; that it should not reach an expense that it be 
harmful to people of marginal incomes. The concept of tax rebates to low income 
people was widely put forth as the solution to high carbon prices. Of course, in the 
US, this approach inevitably bumps up against the politically infeasible and 
vulnerable ideology of a government handout.  
Having a constantly increasing carbon tax was put forth as providing the 
correct forward guidance that would incentivize firms to change their operating 
behavior long into the future. Although it was widely acknowledged that making 
a carbon tax politically palatable would be difficult, revenue neutral taxes were 
generally perceived as the only feasible option. The problem with the revenue 
neutral approach8  is that it does not generate new revenue for adaptation and 
sequestration projects (Ragan, 2016).  
The respondents seemed to assume that once a carbon tax was instituted it 
would not be easy for different political parties to revoke it once in power. In the 
current unpredictable climate of the Trump Administration and Brexit votes, I am 
not sure if this is an appropriate assumption. The advantage in a Cap and Trade 
market scenario is that once property rights are attributed through the emission 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8!Revenue Neutral Taxes apply a tax in one area; i.e. pollution, but reduce taxes in another area 
such as income tax reductions so that government revenue does not increase. See British 
Columbia’s carbon tax approach.!
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permits, individuals holding those permits for investment purposes will seek to 
protect the value of those assets. Thus, stressing the importance of market design, 
liquidity and the legal respect for property rights.  
It was felt that a fluctuating market price on emissions would encourage 
firms to pass additional costs on to consumers rather than to change firm behavior 
in the long term. When prices fall there appears to be some evidence for this; in 
Europe utility companies did not reduce electricity prices when the EU-ETS price 
collapsed in 2007 (Dempsey, Bought, & Hough, 2016). Therefore, in my opinion, it 
is likely that utility companies which usually operate as regional oligopolies or 
monopolies will price gauge consumers when prices fall in the absence of further 
government regulation. However, I have found no evidence that firms do not 
change behavior in response to higher fees and that they merely pass these costs 
onto consumers. Though it still remains that policy makers and market designers 
have not solved the problem of price management. 
Price collapse can result from investor confidence or because of government 
action. Just as a fiscal carbon tax is vulnerable to political ideology, a market can 
be undermined by regulatory changes. In 2008, court rulings concluded that 
tightening the SO2 cap and trade market was not legal, the price of SO2 permits fell 
by nearly 60%. The Obama Administration’s 2011 amendment to the Clean Act 
caused a complete failure in the sulfur dioxide market (Schmalense & Stavins, 
2012). The emission permit spot price to pollute to a ton of sulfur dioxide fell from 
an average of $883.10 in 2006 to $0.06 average price in 2017. (EPA, 2017). This is 
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flagrant violation of property rights, since the new rules made the asset value of 
emission permits worthless. This demonstrates that while taxes may be vulnerable 
to political change, markets are vulnerable to regulation changes and court 
decisions. Therefore, neither a carbon tax nor a cap and trade mitigation system is 
entirely impervious to risk so advocates for current fiscal or market policy 
alternatives are both ideologically motivated. Policy resilience is an area in which 
policy makers should focus more attention. 
When asked whether a central bank’s independence could play any role in 
climate change mitigation, one macro economist explained, “You would have to 
demonstrate why it would be in a central bank’s interest to use emission permits 
as a currency reserve.” This response directed me to explore emission permits 
more as a policy tool rather than as a currency the way Button (2008); Dalsgaard 
(2013); Descheneau (2013); Porter et al. (2017); and Victor & House (2004) suggest. 
It was clear from the interviews that the ideal of using carbon as a monetary 
standard was out of the question. However, there was enough uncertainty about 
the role of central banks in climate change mitigation to warrant further 
investigation. Therefore, the role of central banks as institutions for climate change 
mitigation will be explored further in the next chapter. 
5.12 Limitations of the Study 
 The limitations of this study are many. First, the small sample size means 
that the results are not representative. Second, the participants were located either 
in Canada or the US. The reason for this, as previously, stated was because when 
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the study was started both Canada and the US were not signatories to an 
agreement on climate change mitigation. Part of the interview strategy was 
intended to find ways to engage freeriding nations by overcoming political 
recalcitrance using market mandates and carbon taxes.  
 A third limitation to this study is the methodology. Contacting and 
interviewing elite people is problematic due to the time constraints and response 
rates. Twelve elite people were contacted, two died, four did not reply. Even when 
contact was made, for half the respondents it took between three and four months 
to schedule an interview. There also appeared to be a cultural bias, elite 
participants from Canada were far more likely to agree to the interview survey 
than elite Americans. Because American responses were low, it was felt that 
continue obtaining Canadian participants would skew the study. The insights 
gained from the elite interview method into this inductive research were 
enlightening and helped to frame and inform the research going forward, however 
the timeframe, i.e. the time it took to engage participants in the interview is 
perhaps not realistic for future research.  
5.13 Summary 
Pricing carbon through a tax instrument or through tradeable permits 
remains the two top policy mechanisms with which to curb GHG emissions. 
However, these two policies may be difficult to implement for political reasons. 
Both policies have their weaknesses – carbon taxes are politically vulnerable, while 
tradeable permits are subject to speculation and regulatory interventions that can 
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erode their price structure.  
By using an interview survey to seek the sentiment of policy leaders 
experienced in climate change, market design and macroeconomics, this chapter 
sought to discover policy options beyond the tax and trade initiatives. A number 
of scholars have proposed that carbon should be used as a monetary standard, to 
mitigate climate change by tying it to the money supply. This idea was put before 
thought leaders, experts in the policy approaches to climate change and 
macroeconomic policy. It was discovered that they all thought it a terrible idea 
because the flexibility of fiat monetary policy management would be lost. One 
individual saw its potential many years into the future that the economy one day 
would have to consider the earth’s biophysical carrying capacity. 
All survey participants favored a carbon tax as a mechanism to reduce GHG 
emissions. It was thought that this was the most easily managed and orderly 
mechanism to reduce emissions. Generally, all of the participants were wary of 
Cap and Trade markets because it was thought there was no way to control price 
volatility. 
The idea of using central bank independence as a means of obfuscating 
political recalcitrance to carbon pricing was the area with the greatest variation of 
response. This is reasonable because without a concrete policy about what is meant 
by central bank engagement in climate change mitigation the policy alternative is 
abstract. Therefore, the intent of the next chapter will be to determine what this 
central bank role might look like. Whether it is feasible and acceptable for a central 
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bank to act to mitigate climate change. 
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Chapter 6 Policy Reform: Emission Permits as a Monetary Policy Tool 
 
6.1 Abstract 
 
Putting a price on carbon through tradeable permits is the premier 
instrument of Kyoto Protocol to limit climate change. It is therefore the strongest 
instrument of the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Pricing carbon through the 
market mechanism turns emission permits into a fungible asset, like traded 
commodity contracts such as corn and oil. Some scholars argue this politically 
determined supply makes emission permits more like a currency than a physically 
traded commodity. Picking up on this premise, if emission permits are like a 
currency, and given the correlation between economic output and GHG emissions, 
this paper asks whether emission permits may act as a monetary policy tool?  
Monetary policy, through the management of interest rates, is key to 
economic stability by controlling inflation; however, rate increases are blunt 
economic instruments that impact all consumers. This article proposes that a 
central bank can use emission permits as one of the tools to manage inflation. This 
would also manage the price of tradeable emission permits. Cost-benefit analysis 
is used to explore this policy alternative. Using emission permits as a monetary 
policy tool suggests that it is an effective means to manage the carbon price, and a 
low risk way to curb inflation. However, further economic modeling should be 
performed before policy action is taken. 
 
6.2 Introduction: Carbon Tax or Cap & Trade? 
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According to the UNFCCC, pricing carbon is deemed imperative in 
reducing Greenhouse Gas emissions. There are two ways to price carbon, one is to 
apply a direct tax which is a fiscal instrument that determines a determined price, 
commonly called a carbon tax. It is applied to the purchase of products with 
intense carbon footprints. For such a tax to be implanted it must be politically 
acceptable and once it is in place the price, and its rate of change, are inflexible 
without further political intervention. For instance, even if the tax rate is scheduled 
to increase over time, its rate of increase is determined, not by market conditions, 
but by bureaucratic foresight, or political reaction to conditions. This is what is 
meant by an inflexible price structure. Changing the price of this tax is slow due to 
the political process. In booming economic times a carbon tax may be perceived as 
inexpensive, but during economic recessions the tax will inevitably face political 
pressure. Therefore a carbon tax will always be vulnerable to political pressure. 
The carbon tax approach presents a potential problem in economically turbulent 
times, when an additional tax may impede economic growth of certain sectors. 
The revenue garnered from the tax depends upon economic conditions, like a gas 
tax, governments potentially come to rely on its income and therefore this presents 
a potential conflict of interest when it comes to GHG reductions. An example 
would be governments that rely on gas taxes may be hesitant to support lower fuel 
standards. Governments may favor the short-term incentives of tax revenue 
versus the long-term costs associated with disaster associated with climate change. 
This is the concept of discounting the future. 
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The second approach to price carbon is the market mechanism, commonly 
called Cap and Trade. The carbon price is set by ‘the cap’ – the supply of emission 
permits in the market. The price is then derived by firms competing for the right 
to pollute by trading emission permits in a market setting. Unlike the fiscal carbon 
tax method, this approach creates a variable price based upon emission permit 
demand from the market place. This is what makes the price reactive to immediate 
economic conditions. When the demand for permits is low during economic 
downturns, the price will be low, but when demand is high during economic 
expansion, the price will inevitably be high because more firms will be competing 
for the same amount of emission permits. Over time the government retires 
emission permits to encourage firms to increase their GHG reductions. The 
weakness of this approach is that managing the permit supply is not easy. In cycles 
of high demand when prices are high it is not always obvious to know if the supply 
is low because of physical demand, investment demand, or price speculation. 
Markets with low volatility do not offer investment opportunities, generally in 
commodity markets, and only 2% of contracts end in physically delivery 
(Kleinmann, 2005), efficient markets need investors not just producers and 
consumers. 
However the supply is managed, in a tight market, with too little permit 
supply, the permit price will be high and pose an excessive price on energy 
consumption. Under current economic conditions, with economic growth linked 
to energy inputs, this would add an additional cost to production, putting 
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downward pressure on the economy just as an increase in interest rates makes it 
more expensive to service debt. Conversely, if the permit supply is too large, the 
emission permit price will be too low and not incentivize firms to reduce emissions 
quickly enough to mitigate climate change. Under the trading approach to pricing 
carbon, the pricing mechanism is adjustable based upon supply and demand. 
Therefore, the price can fluctuate relative to economic conditions. The carbon tax 
policy approach does not exclude the emission trading strategy. In some European 
countries both carbon taxes and traded permits are used as policy tools (Europa, 
2017). 
The traded permit approach to climate change mitigation was the dominant 
policy instrument of the Kyoto Protocol. Although the US was a driving force 
behind this policy approach, in the end the US never ratified the protocol. 
Likewise, Canada, although a signatory, withdrew from the Kyoto climate accord.  
 Although both fiscal carbon taxes and traded permits are feasible 
mechanisms for reducing GHG emissions, the rest of this article focuses on 
tradeable permits. In previous research, it was noticed that experts in 
macroeconomics and climate change did not favor the uncertainty of the market 
mechanism to climate change mitigation (McCowen, 2017b). Ironically, the Coase 
(1961) theorem dictum professes that the market is the most efficient way to 
control negative externalities like pollution. Furthermore, in the US, due to the 
political Grover Norquist ideology, taxes are viewed as a pariah. In an era in which 
new taxes are difficult to implement, it is imperative to seek alternate means by 
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which to mitigate climate change despite what politicians believe. Current peer 
reviewed scientific research calculates that in the future each degree centigrade of 
atmospheric warming reduces economic growth by 1.2% (Hsiang et al., 2017). 
Since we are already at 0.7 C of atmospheric warming this translates to significant 
economic costs in an economy struggling to meet 2% targeted growth expectations 
of central banks. Climate change mitigation therefore is not just a moral action, it 
is an economic one too. 
The political contention associated with carbon taxes in some jurisdictions 
makes pragmatic climate change action impossible, therefore this paper focuses 
on the traded permit mechanism. In the US 25% of the economy is already under 
regional carbon pricing; RGGI in the North East and the Californian exchange 
capture the two largest state economies, California and New York. However, 
because these exchanges are nascent, we must rely on the older more 
comprehensive European market for evidence of economic effectiveness. In the 
trading approach, commonly called Emission Trading Systems, the price of 
emission permits is determined by the supply and demand in the market. In 
Europe, the EU-ETS has been in place since 2005, it is the most mature and largest 
of global ETSs (EU, 2017).  
6.3 Emission Trading Systems 
 The EU-ETS has demonstrated successful GHG reductions at relatively low 
cost and has already met the 21% reduction before the target date of 2020 (Euro 
Stat, 2016; Marcu, Elkerbout, & Stoefs, 2016). The low cost of achieving these GHG 
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reductions refers to the depressed price in emissions permits. While this low price 
has been efficient for the European economy, the low permit price translates to 
lower sequestration prices. Sequestration refers to the off-set market in which 
transfer payments from industrial countries are made to developing and 
transitional nations for storing carbon in places like forest and for energy projects 
that avoid new emissions. This is the Clean Development Mechanism within the 
Kyoto Protocol, where developing nations are paid to sequester and store carbon 
in forests, oceans, peat bogs and agricultural lands. These transfer payments 
represent important revenues to isolated populations that previously were not 
paid for the sequestration services they provided to the industrial nations 
polluting the atmosphere. 
These reduced payments are due to the excess supply and resulting 
depressed price of emission permits in the EU-ETS market. Consequently this low 
price means that the Kyoto carbon credit prices have hit historic lows.  In 2013 and 
2014, Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) were worth on average just US$0.51 
(€0.37) (World Bank, 2014). This trend has continued, current emission permits 
trade for US$5-9 (€4-7), while CER sequestration credits trade at the discounted 
price of $3.3/Cte (Hamrick & Goldstein, 2016). There is no reason for carbon credits 
to trade at a discount from emission permits since GHG are a pollutant of the 
global commons.  
GHG emissions are not like a physical commodity, where the grain must be 
delivered to a specific place and therefore trades at a discount due to 
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transportation. The aim should be that emission permits and CERs should be 
transferable at equal value. Decarbonizing the economy will require strong 
incentives to invest in green technologies and sequestration projects (Campiglio, 
2016; CERES, 2014; McCollum et al., 2014). The low price for CERs means a 
reduced capacity to finance non-polluting technologies and stored carbon projects 
(Campiglio, 2016). 
The emission permit price, which drives the price of off-set credits (CERs), 
has been in a slump since 2007 (Euro Stat, 2016; Hintermann, 2009). In a weak 
investment environment (World Bank, 2014), this does not bode well for stored 
carbon projects and investment flows to low income countries. The dilemma is that 
policy makers fear reducing the supply of permits, which would increase the price, 
because the risk of getting the supply wrong could dismantle the entire ETS 
market if it were to cripple the economy (IETA, 2016a). 
This article first defines the policy problem behind the low price of carbon. 
Second, it describes the institutional context of central banks and the Federal 
Reserve, in particular. Third, it explores the context of using emission allowances 
aligned with monetary policy. 
6.4 Problem Statement 
The traded emission permit strategy is the policy of choice to achieve an 
appropriate pricing mechanism for GHG emissions of most regions seeking to 
mitigate GHG emissions. Getting the price right though has proven a problem. 
The fiscal approach of using a carbon tax puts the pricing problem in the hands of 
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bureaucrats. The tradeable permit trading system allows the market to decide 
what the price should be, but ultimately bureaucrats are still involved since they 
determine the supply of emission permits in the market place. The supply is set at 
the beginning of each trading phase, and each phase lasts seven years (EU, 2017). 
In general, the emission permit price is determined by the demand in the market 
place. And it is assumed this demand will fluctuate according to industrial 
economic output resulting in a price movements that reflect conventional 
industrial demand.  
The problem is that there is an excess supply of permits in the EU-ETS; thus, 
it is feared the price of emission permits is too low to encourage future reductions 
in GHG emissions. There is no flexible market mechanism that can tighten the 
market when needed that does not pose severe economic risks. To change the 
supply, a bureaucratic process must be launched and bureaucrats fear getting the 
price wrong because of the correlation between economic output and GHG 
emissions. Bureaucrats know the price is too low, but getting the price too high 
would hinder the economy (IETA, 2016a).  
While European emission reduction targets have been met ahead of 
schedule and despite the depressed emission permit price, it is expected that 
further emission reductions will not be met so easily (Europa, 2016). This implies 
that a higher price of emission permits will be needed to achieve the industrial 
behavioral change needed to prevent 2° C of warming.  
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We know that current intended nationally determined commitments to 
reduce emissions are insufficient to prevent 2 degrees of warming, current trends 
estimate 3.7 degrees of atmospheric warming (Climate Scoreboard, 2017). 
Nordhaus argues the current best case scenario under the Paris Climate Accord is 
likely 2.7° C of warming. Therefore, a higher price is assumed necessary to increase 
emission reductions, which in turn is connected to a higher price on GHG 
emissions. Nordhaus (2017) claims currently the social cost of climate change is 
$36 USD and it will need to reach $69 USD by 2050 under an anticipated economic 
growth rate of 2.1%. However, reducing the permit supply to increase the price is 
risky if policy makers get the price wrong because they fear price spikes (IETA, 
2016a). The question then is how best to manage the supply of emission permits 
in an effective manner that allows for optimal price achievement while controlling 
speculative behavior that can lead to price inflation? Is there a market mechanism 
that can achieve this policy? Can using emission permits as a monetary policy tool 
serve this purpose? These are the questions that will be addressed in the following 
section. 
6.5 Issue Context: Emission Permits as Currency 
 Some scholars argue that emission markets, designed on the principles of 
supply and demand are more like currency markets than traditional commodity 
markets like, copper, wheat, or oil (Button, 2008; Descheneau, 2012; McCowen; 
2017a; Victor & House, 2004). Just as the supply of fiat currency is determined by 
central banks, the value of an emission permit is determined by supply and 
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demand in the market place where the supply is determined by bureaucratic 
decision. The U.S. dollar became a fiat currency when Nixon closed the gold 
window in 1971 and the U.S. dollar was no longer convertible to gold (Gowa, 
1983). The dollar is managed by politically independent central bankers utilizing 
interest rates and forward guidance to affect the supply and demand of the dollar 
and hence its value against other currencies. This is how central bankers manage 
price stability and economic expansion. Most modern currencies are fiat based 
currencies. Likewise, the supply, and hence the value, of emission permits is 
determined by a bureaucratic body, except these bureaucrats only make supply 
decisions at the beginning of a new trading auction phase. Similarly, the EU-ETS, 
and the U.S. exchanges have many of the same attributes to central banks; 
bureaucrats do for the emission supply what central bankers do for the money 
supply. 
6.6 The Role of Central Banks 
Central bank board members act as non-partisan bureaucrats, mandated to 
act in the interest of the economy, free from political interference. This 
independence is important because, when a currency is no longer tied to a physical 
entity like gold, (which dictated its value,) politicians must resist the temptation 
to inflate the currency before elections, since in the short-term inflation makes an 
economy appear to be growing.  As prices increase, consumers spend before items 
become more expensive because under inflationary conditions the currency is 
worth less; for example, it takes more money to buy the same good in the future 
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than in the present. For centuries leaders have feared runaway inflation because 
once started it is very difficult to stop. 
To avoid political interference in monetary policy, in the 1980s many central 
banks were granted greater independence because it was believed that “the 
government has an incentive to inflate the currency to impose a tax (my italics,) 
presumably with lower political costs than would be associated with other, more 
direct forms [of taxation].” The general understanding was to use independent 
central bankers to maintain price stability and control inflation (Miller, 1998). 
 In short, appointed central bank directors don’t face short-term election cycles. 
Therefore, the assets of central banks that are used to manage the money supply 
can more easily be preserved with central bank independence, since politicians 
have an incentive to print money to make it appear the economy is growing faster 
than it really is. This is the reason why many democracies granted central banks 
unprecedented power, but with limited mandates, so to maintain price stability 
and full employment. 
6.7 The US Central Bank 
The Federal Reserve, commonly called the Fed, is the central bank of the 
US. The Federal Reserve is generally perceived as a “decentralized” central bank 
because of its cooperative relationship amongst its regional private members. 
However, its monetary policy is as centralized as any other nations’. The 
committee that oversees monetary policy is the Federal Open Market Committee, 
while the international reserves are held and transactions performed by the 
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the System Open Market Account (SOMA) 
holdings (FRB-NY, 2017).  
Congress oversees the Fed, but the FOMC is relatively autonomous, under 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Section 2A states the monetary policy objectives: 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of 
the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the 
economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to 
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.9  
This directive toward maximum employment and price stability is often 
referred to as the dual mandate (FRB, 2017). The Federal Funds Rate, or short-term 
interest rate, is one of two policy tools the Fed uses to fulfill the dual mandate. 
Low interest rates make it cheaper to borrow and thus spur investment, 
development and economic growth. Conversely, a hike in interest rates tightens 
the money supply making it more attractive to save, and costly to borrow. 
 The second policy tool of the Fed is Forward Guidance, a message released 
by the Fed indicating the future path of interest rates to improve economic 
conditions (FRB, 2015). It is associated with a commitment towards very low 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9!12 USC 225a. As added by act of November 16, 1977 (91 Stat. 1387) and amended by acts of 
October 27, 1978 (92 Stat. 1897); Aug. 23, 1988 (102 Stat. 1375); and Dec. 27, 2000 (114 Stat. 3028) 
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interest, or even negative rates, such as quantitative easing. As the Gordon S. 
Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton 
University, Alan Blinder (2010) has stated, when interest rates are at zero 
conventional monetary policy is “out of bullets” (p.466). This demonstrates the 
limit of the Fed’s mandate; it only has two tools, interest rate changes and forward 
guidance. 
The Federal Reserve’s mandate is simple, although its task is complex. 
Small shifts can have dramatic results In 2013, then Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke 
caused the Taper Tantrum, when stock markets went into turmoil because he 
eluded to the end of quantitative easing (Giugliano, 2015). Like the king on a 
chessboard, central bankers are limited in scope but can move in any direction in 
small increments. 
The power of forward guidance as a monetary policy tool demonstrates the 
sensitivity of global markets to Fed decisions and discourse. Announcements from 
the Federal Reserve act as signals to market participants. This is also called a 
“nudge”; nudging is an action that significantly alters human behavior (Thayer & 
Sunstein, 2009, loc. 440). In this case the central bank is nudging the markets up or 
down. For the Federal Reserve these nudges have global reach because the U.S. 
dollar is the reserve global currency; global markets trade with U.S. dollars, 
international debt is set in U.S. dollars, and commodities are priced in U.S. dollars. 
In fact, the dollar is supported by overseas demand; more than 60% of U.S. dollars 
circulate outside the US adding to the demand and hence the value of the U.S. 
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dollar (Blinder, 1996; Goldburg, 2011). Interest rates set in America have 
immediate global impact, by making it more or less expensive to borrow 
development funds, conduct international trade and service international debt. 
Therefore, the Fed holds significant amounts of foreign currency for security, to 
facilitate trade and to assist other nations in these transactions to try to prevent 
international financial crises. These foreign funds are controlled through the 
SOMA at the NY-Fed. 
6.8 System Open Market Account 
International reserves are held and transactions performed by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York through the System Open Market Account (FRB-NY, 
2017). The currencies of 14 major trading partners make up the SOMA holdings to 
protect against “disorderly conditions in foreign exchange markets or to meet 
other needs” (FRB-NY, 2016, p. 9). The following table displays the approximate 
average annual holdings of two major currencies which are currently under 
quantitative easing monetary policies to stimulate their respective economies. The 
following account values fluctuate with currency values and the agreed 
understanding and request of their respective home nations. 
Table 6.1 
Selected SOMA Holdings (in billions) 
Foreign 
Currency 
2012 2013 2014* 2015* 2016* 
European 
Deposits 
$8.9  $ 7.5  $ 6.9  $ 6.2 $ 4.2 
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Japanese 
Deposits 
$ 3.5  $ 2.9  $2.5  $ 2.5  $4.7 
 
Deloitte & Touche Ltd, 2014, KPMG LLP., 2016* 
 
The above table indicates how these foreign reserves fluctuate year after 
year based upon foreign exchange rates and the economic needs necessary to 
facilitate smooth trade. The rules governing these transactions are agreed upon by 
the partner nations to prevent adverse economic events. According to the annual 
audit of the NY-Fed, foreign debt instruments include mortgages and other 
foreign fixed assets (KPMG, 2016). These fluid foreign monetary relations 
demonstrate that there is no reason why emission permits might not be used as a 
similar asset to reduce the excess supply in the EU-ETS. 
6.9 Discussion: Emission Permits as a Monetary Policy Tool 
This article suggests that it is feasible and beneficial for the Fed to purchase 
emission permits on the EU-ETS and to hold them in reserve just as it does other 
currencies. Through SOMA, the Fed already holds fungible assets in foreign 
currency, but also debt instruments, like mortgages. Given the Fed’s power of 
forward guidance to move global markets, using emission permits like a currency 
would prop up the emission price just as housing prices are popped up by the Fed 
holding mortgages on their balance sheet. The SOMA already holds billions of 
dollars in foreign debt instruments, including mortgages (Deloitte & Touche, 2014, 
KPMG, 2016), which are far less fungible than emission permits.  
Exchanging emission permits for currency would be in concord with the 
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European Central Bank’s agenda since it is currently practicing quantitative easing 
at a rate worth €60 ($70.88 USD) billion per month (Jones, 2017). In 2015, it was 
estimated that there was a surplus of 1.78 billion allowances on the EU-ETS. The 
EU-ETS has proposed a reserve mechanism to be established in 2018 and to begin 
in 2019 and has undergone “back-loading” (purchasing back) allowances in the 
short-term (Europa, 2017). The proposed mechanism is called the Market Stability 
Reserve and it is designed to act like a central bank managing a currency. 
However, this is still a slow process; the EU parliament approved the back-loading 
agenda in 2013 and while it is underway significant price changes have yet to occur 
(Europa, 2017). This implies that the value of managing emission permits like a 
currency on the EU-ETS has already been recognized, if not yet implemented. 
What has not been recognized is the role that emission permits can play in 
managing economic inflation managed by a central bank. 
Unlike private banks, central banks are not profit seeking, their goals are to 
create an environment of stability so that prosperity and long-term investment can 
take place (FRB, 2016). Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that a central bank 
would manage the permit supply with the due diligence that they manage the 
money supply. This would not just be a service that the central bank, in this case 
the FED for the ECB, would be providing to the benefit of the EU-ETS. Emission 
permits can act as a means of tightening the industrial economy without 
negatively impacting homeowners’ mortgage costs, and low-middle income 
countries servicing national debt the way increasing interest rates would do. A 
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stronger U.S. dollar along with higher interest rates puts developing nations at risk 
of not being able to service their debt (Donnan, 2017). 
The Fed purchasing emission permits would act as forward guidance for 
the emission trading system; it sends a clear signal of the investment path firms 
should take. The signal is to reduce GHG emissions, that the world has changed, 
and that businesses can no longer operate by not pricing the cost of negative 
externalities, like pollution. It sends the signal that pollution will no longer be paid 
for by the public. This would show a commitment toward pricing negative 
externalities, which harm economic growth in the long run. Recent research 
indicates that for every new degree of atmospheric warming economic output will 
be reduced by 1.2% (Hsaign et al., 2017).  
Central bank purchases are a mandate – in effect forward guidance – and has 
the potential to reshape the entire economic direction away from polluting 
industries to green technologies. According to former U.S. Secretary of Energy 
Ernest Moniz (2016), it will be impossible to create a de-carbonized economy 
without a lot of progress on the demand side [carbon pricing].  And yet, today in 
the US, job growth in the “green” economy far exceeds that of the fossil fuel 
industry. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (2017), the renewable and 
energy efficiency sector now employs five times more people than the fossil fuel 
sector. As Lawrence Tubiana, France’s envoy to the Paris Summit said, “Markets 
will follow the same pathway under the correct signal” (Clark, 2015). Market 
mandates send signals to the investment community and businesses about the 
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direction of future growth. The Federal Reserve purchasing emission permits 
would send such a signal just as the ethanol mandate did in 2005 that the demand 
for corn was about to increase (McCowen, 2017a). It initiates a treasure impulse, the 
initiative to invest (Ali, 2009). 
6.10 Mandates Can Move Markets 
In 2005, then President George W. Bush announced in the State of the Union 
address that support of the renewable fuels mandate, which led to the mandate to 
legislate blending conventional gasoline with 10% ethanol. The three-year price 
range average of corn per bushel varied between $1.94 and $2.42 before Bush’s 
enthusiasm for ethanol. After his 2005 announcement, the price for corn per bushel 
ranged from $1.94 to $7.11(Macrotrends, 2017); clear evidence of forward guidance 
in a physical commodity market (McCowen, 2017a). By 2007, 40% of corn 
production would be diverted to ethanol production (USDA, 2012). Although the 
ethanol mandate was not the only factor that moved the price of corn between 
2005-2008, forward guidance could do for the emissions trading system what the 
ethanol mandate did for the corn price.  
6.11 Curbing Speculative Risk 
However, unlike the corn market there is no risk of price speculation in the 
ETS if an emission reserve is held since the supply is determined by bureaucrats 
and not influenced by weather conditions and poor harvests.10 If the price reaches 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10!For a full explanation of price movements in the corn market see McCowen, 2017a!
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an untenable level the central bank would sell the excess supply back into the 
market, thus dampening the price. This knowledge then, that a central bank held 
in reserve emission permits, would prevent the impetus toward price speculation. 
Speculative investors would know that the permits held in reserve would fill the 
market and dampen the price in the event of a price boom. This demonstrates how 
monetary policy and permit supply policy are the same under market conditions.  
6.12 Emission Permits Are Within the Fed’s Mandate 
It is within the Fed’s mandate to address climate change since the future 
negative cost associated with climate change damage is determined to be 5% of 
global GDP (Stern, 2006), or 1.2% of US GDP for each degree of warming (Hsiagn 
et al., 2017). Meanwhile the cost of mitigating climate change is 1% GDP (Taylor et 
al., 2016). This shows it is within the Fed’s mandate to address climate change 
mitigation since the cost of not doing so would be to act against the long-term 
interest of economic growth and price stability of the country as the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913 states.  
The policy proposal to use emission permits as a monetary policy tool may 
seem radical, but if it can be demonstrated to be a useful mechanism it is within 
the Fed’s mandate to apply it. In the wake of the financial crisis the Fed purchased 
many unorthodox assets to manage the economy (Blinder, 2010, 2013), this would 
not be the first time the Fed has used unconventional assets to address economic 
problems. Except if the Fed were to use EU currency reserves in the SOMA, it 
would not cost the US anything and would add liquidity to the current ECB policy 
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of quantitative easing. Another alternative would be to dip into the Fed’s gold 
reserves that sit stagnant and useless. Many central banks liquidated their gold 
reserves years ago (Regan, 2014). It is beyond the initial scope of this research to 
determine precise costs of how many emission permits should be purchased. This 
research is to determine whether it is feasible and effective for the central bank to 
use emission permits as a currency reserve and hence a monetary policy tool.  
If ETS markets react in a similar way to the corn market’s response to the 
ethanol mandate, which diverted 40% of the corn harvest toward ethanol 
production, we would expect this policy approach to cost around $200 million. 12 
The cost of doing nothing, that is, the cost of increasing interest rates instead of 
using emission permits, is more than $ 70 billion and since in 2017 each 0.25% 
increase in interest rates adds $35 billion worth of annual interest rate payments 
to taxpayers. The national debt currently amounts to $12 trillion. 
ND x .0025 = $35, 000, 000, 000.00 
It therefore puts less of a burden on the tax payer to increase the price of GHG 
emission than it is to increase interest rates.  
Under current conditions if the Fed were to hold emission permits as a 
currency reserve, thereby increasing the price by reducing the market supply, we 
would not expect to see consumer prices change since utility companies in Europe 
have already factored in a higher price for emission permits. Since the EU-ETS cap 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12!Please see McCowen, 2017a, for a complete review of the commodity corn market’s reaction to 
the ethanol mandate.!
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and trade market was established in 2005, electricity prices have risen steadily 
despite the EU-ETS price collapsed in 2007. In 2006, the permit price peaked at €32 
then fell to near zero in 2007 (Hintermann, 2008) however, electricity prices did 
not fall with the emission permit price. While the emission permit price has not 
risen above €7 since, and has averaged €4, electricity prices have only increased 
since 2008 (Dempsey, Bought, & Hough, 2016). This indicates that utility 
companies have factored in a higher price for emission permits, and if they 
threaten to raise prices due to an emission price increase, the governments would 
have grounds for anti-trust legal action. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the EU-ETS emission permit price could quadruple, from €7 to €28, and consumers 
should not experience an increase on utility bills. Using emission permits as a 
monetary policy tool would keep the price in the goldilocks zone, not too hot, not 
too cold.  
From a policy perspective using emission permits as a monetary policy tool 
has two functions, one is to increase the price of emission permits in a manageable 
fashion without applying harmful costs to individuals. This is designed to make 
firms endeavor to make further GHG reductions without passing on the rate 
increase to their customers. The second function is to curb inflation without having 
to rely exclusively on forward guidance and interest rate increases which under 
the current debt load of nations has far reaching consequences. Utilizing central 
banks in managing the price of emission permits is a system changing policy 
instrument; it broadens the authority of managing the emission price. It moves the 
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responsibility of managing the price ceiling, the highest price emission permits 
should reach, and places it in the institutional hands of central banks, which operate 
independently from political interference. Bureaucrats of lesser status than central 
bankers will likely face political manipulation, so it is the leverage that central 
bankers can apply that makes this the appropriate governing level to target. 
Because central bankers deal with vast sums of money, they have the power to 
bring about social change. 
When the current governing institutions, working under existing 
incentives, are unable to produce the necessary regulations that are needed for the 
long-term wellbeing of the US and of the world, system changing policy 
instruments are needed. System changing policy instruments assume that current 
institutions cannot fulfill their purpose with the existing culture or resources, and 
that broadening the responsibility of the policy goals achieves better public value 
(McDonnel & Elmore, 1987).  
Because Congress has been unable to act on climate change mitigation, 
despite Supreme Court rulings and bills proposed for the past 30 years, it has 
proven to be an institution incapable, in this regard, of acting for the public good. 
Already California and New York, the two largest state economies in the country, 
operate under carbon pricing. While the third largest state economy, Texas, 
generates in excess of 8000 MWh of wind energy, more than any other state 
(Ivanova, 2017). Meanwhile seven states generate more than 80% of their energy 
use from renewables (DOE, 2017). The U.S. Energy Information Administration 
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(EIA) expects the renewable energy sector, excluding hydro power to grow 
consistently by 11% into the foreseeable future (EIA, 2017). This growth across 
regions is evidence that despite gridlock in Congress there is broad support for 
reduced GHG energy sources. 
In utilizing a system changing policy instrument the authority of emission 
permit price is transferred out of the political arena to become an economic policy 
tool. This tool is designed to be another means to limit inflation and to provide 
forward guidance for an economy in which negative externalities like pollution 
are priced by those that produce them. The system changing aspect of this policy 
approach broadens the pricing of carbon through the emission standards 
authority. Under this regime, existing policy makers manage the price floor, as they 
currently do, that is the macro supply of permits in the market. However, the 
surplus permits are held in reserve by the central bank, like a currency reserve, to 
maintain the appropriate price ceiling of emission permits. Through this 
arrangement one institution controls the price floor (the lowest price that emission 
permits should trade at), while another institution manages the price ceiling (the 
highest price that emission permits should be), to keep the price in the goldilocks 
zone, where it is effective but not harmful to the economy. 
By spreading the permit supply management across two institutions 
conflict of interest situations are avoided. Conflict of interest is not a necessarily a 
question of wrong doing, but the potential that wrong doing could arise (Caplan, 
2001). Take for instance the central bank’s mandate to maintain price stability and 
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long-term economic growth. If the central bank becomes ideological and perceives 
a very low emission permit price as being advantageous, it may be in the bank’s 
interest to dilute the market with emission permits to drive down the price, to 
discount the future cost of climate change to stimulate economic growth now and 
not pay for the negative externalities caused by climate change. However, if the 
macro supply of the market is managed by policy makers whose interest is to 
manage climate change, then these policy makers need not fear getting the price 
too wrong, because there is another institution that is interested in doing the 
micro-managing of the permit price. It would be the emission market bureaucrats’ 
role to manage the macro supply at the beginning of each phase, while the central 
bank would tweak the price when needed to maintain consistent emission 
reductions and to avoid price spikes. 
6. 13 Limitations and Future Research 
 The limitation to this policy approach to use emission permits as a 
monetary policy tool so that if the market reaches equilibrium quickly then the 
central bank would lose the ability to use the price fluctuation mechanism to 
combat inflation. Because the supply is managed, the ratio between permit price 
and demand may reach a static state without volatility and investment returns. In 
such a situation, speculative investors may not choose to engage in the market, 
and therefore not provide the necessary liquidity that results in market dynamism. 
 In order for this strategy to work, it would be imperative for the Central 
Bank to respect the ETS emission price floor price and not to dilute the market with 
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the surplus reserve and drive down the permit price. It also is necessary for 
government regulators to respect the property rights that each emission permit 
entails. If the government creates new regulations that make the permit price 
valueless, as the Obama Administration’s amendment to the Clean Air Act did in 
the sulfur dioxide market. 
 In addition, this policy instrument is appropriate for current economic 
conditions, in which global economic confidence is low (Harding, 2017), interest 
rates are nearly zero, inflation is uncertain (Garcia, 2017; Komileva, 2017), and the 
economy is growing. Using emission permits as a monetary tool limits the 
industrial production, but it does not constrain financial markets, it is not a silver 
bullet for all types of inflation. Putting a tax on the time an equity is held would 
help address inflation in financial markets, but that is tangential to this discussion.  
It is beyond the scope of this research to speculate how using emission 
permits as a monetary policy tool might function under different socio-economic 
conditions. The time frame of this policy could be short lived, due to the market 
reaching equilibrium. If it becomes ineffective in tightening the market because 
the economy de-carbonizes and GHG emissions no longer correlate economic 
growth, then new instruments will need to be found. However, this would be the 
result of the policy instrument’s efficacy, thus demonstrating the utility of pricing 
negative externalities in a market setting with central bank engagement. 
Finding new monetary policy instruments would entail using new negative 
externalities to leverage through the pricing mechanism. The strategy upon which 
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this research is based upon uses GHG emissions, the greatest of which is carbon 
dioxide, as a leveraged mechanism to manage inflation. Carbon dioxide is a key 
component of the carbon cycle upon which the global biosphere depends. So, in 
essence, pricing the negative externality aspect of carbon dioxide is pricing the 
carbon cycle. Under this scenario carbon dioxide is the polluting by-product of 
industrial economic activity and photosynthesis is the production element of 
stored carbon.  
Industrial activity produces carbon-dioxide through the burning of fossil 
fuels, while photosynthetic plants take up carbon-dioxide and emit oxygen. In the 
process carbon is removed from the atmosphere and stored. This is the key 
component of the Clean Development Mechanism, which is the market that 
incentives stored carbon production. This, therefore, is a means of pricing the 
carbon cycle. The economic intent is to decarbonize the economy. If the strategy 
presented here is successful in nudging investment away from conventional 
industrial output, once the economy is decarbonized, then other negative 
externalities will need to be priced to create the same monetary utility. If 
successful, in the future, I imagine applying a similar approach to nitrous-oxides, 
another potent GHG, thereby pricing the nitrogen cycle.  
Using negative externality pricing in a market setting can be a way of 
shifting how the economy is designed, away from harmful economic output with 
negative side effects (negative externalities) to an economy that incentivizes 
positive externalities like carbon sequestration. Especially in nations where the 
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political is such that it is near impossible to implement certain policies, this 
research claims that the central bank in conjunction with legally governed markets 
has a role to play where the political process fails. 
6.14 Summary 
 From a policy point of view treaty emission permits as a currency is 
pragmatic because the supply of permits in the market is managed by fiat, not by 
production as with physical commodities such as corn, oil and copper. Policy 
makers fear market volatility and price spikes in the emission market because 
energy use correlates with economic output. However, this economic correlation 
must be broken if we are to overcome climate change. Breaking this correlation 
between GHG emissions (from current fossil fuel energy sources) and economic 
growth needs strong policy signals to encourage the shift toward low GHG energy 
production. This way economic growth will not be constrained by the negative 
externalities and market failures associated with climate change in the long-term. 
 While strong market signals are necessary to create the green energy shift, 
price spikes are a threat to economic growth. Maintaining optimal carbon pricing 
values is best managed by using emission permits as a currency reserve. Increasing 
the price of emission permits, in the current low interest rate and carbon intensive 
economy, can act as a monetary policy tool to curb inflation. It does so at less 
overall cost than increasing interest rate increases. This policy instrument targets 
business operations that are carbon intense, but does not punish mortgage holders 
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and developing nations. In this way using emission permits as a monetary policy 
tool acts as forward guidance to a green economy. This system changing policy 
instrument leverages central bank independence to overcome recalcitrant politics 
that is impeding climate change mitigation. Managing the price of emission 
permits is not just a means of mitigating climate change, using emission permits 
as a monetary policy tool gives central bankers a new tool to fight inflation. 
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Chapter Seven: Calming the Storm with a Monetary Policy Tool 
7.1 A Perfect Moral Storm 
Stephen Gardiner (2006) presents climate change as A Perfect Moral Storm, 
that is that despite the facts, society is slow to take effective action to prevent the 
atmosphere from warming far less than 2 degrees centigrade. Although the 2015 
Paris Agreement is evidence that nations are working more cooperatively toward 
combatting climate change than before; the Intended Nationally Determined 
Commitments to reduce Greenhouse Gases are estimated to bring about 3.4 
degrees centigrade of warming by the end of the century (Climate Scorecard, 
2017). So, while national actors are being more cooperative, the effectiveness of 
that cooperation is insufficient to prevent less than 2 degrees of atmospheric 
warming. 
Gardiner’s (2006) claim is that society lacks the virtue to act, virtue he 
defines as the ability to “resist acting badly” (p. 4). He frames the virtue as being 
able to address the spatial, temporal and institutional dilemmas associated with 
climate change. A policy initiative suggests that emission permits, the chief carbon 
pricing mechanism to reduce GHG emissions, could combat insufficient INDCs by 
using emission permits as a monetary policy tool to manage the price most 
effectively (McCowen, 2017). The question thus is can this policy approach satisfy 
Gardiner’s ethical standard? This study asks can using emission permits as a 
monetary policy tool satisfy Gardiner’s tri-part dilemma? This is how it will be 
determined whether the pricing carbon strategy is ethical or not. In this approach, 
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what is ethical is not determined by what is necessarily good, in this case the best 
ethic can be what Michael Ignatieff calls “the lesser evil;” the safety of the polis is 
the primary rule, and in providing safety, some less than ideal actions may take 
place. To island nations climate change due to amplified storm surges is not a 
future problem, it is a current emergency. Therefore, immediate action on climate 
change is necessary and we must seek ways to transfer finance to impacted nations 
that lack the means to adapt quickly. 
7.2 Emission Permits as a Monetary Policy Tool 
It has been argued that emission markets, designed on the principles of 
supply and demand, are more like currency markets than traditional commodity 
markets like, copper, corn, or oil (Button, 2008; Dalsgaard, 2013; Descheneau, 2012; 
McCowen, 2017; Porter et al., 2017, Victor & House, 2004). McCowen claims that 
if emission permits are like a currency, then they could be used as a monetary 
policy tool (2017c). A policy tool is an instrument “through which public purposes 
are pursed” (Salamon, 2002, p. 9). A monetary policy tool is an instrument that 
achieves this end in the arena of monetary policy. Current monetary policy tools 
are limited to central bank asset purchases, interest rate adjustments that impact 
the value of a currency, and forward guidance. Forward guidance is a message the 
central bank sends to commercial banks about future intended actions (FRB, 2016). 
Using these policy tools, central banks stimulate economic growth and curb 
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unwanted inflation which are the foundational measurements of the macro 
economy. 
 Traditionally, since the dawn of the industrial revolution, economic 
growth reflects energy used. Which means that GHG emissions, the result of 
energy spent, trends economic growth. During times of economic expansion 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs increase more rapidly than during economic 
recessions. The following graph compares the concentration of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide, as measured by NOAA at their station in Hawaii compared to U.S. 
Gross Domestic Product changes over a 12-year period. It shows that when GDP 
drops by a certain percentage, CO2 concentrations after a lag time also decline in 
parts per million. The Y-axis in the graph represents percentage of GDP and Parts 
Per Million. When the economy expands again, annual average CO2 
concentrations increase. Since 2000 we have on average added more than two parts 
per million of carbon dioxide each year to the earth’s atmosphere (NOAA, 2017). 
Therefore, the policy goal must be to decouple economic growth from CO2 
output. The pricing of GHG emissions is a policy that attempts this aim by 
charging firms a pollution fee through emission permits. According to Pigovian 
economic theory, social harms can be reduced by making it more expensive to do 
them. The premise is that since GHG emissions trend economic output, increasing 
the price of emission permits would have a similar impact to increasing interest 
rates, thereby curbing inflation. 
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Graph: 7.1: Economic Growth & Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
 
The preceding figure demonstrates how emissions go up when the 
economy expands, but the rate that CO2 concentrations recede during economic 
downturns is slight. This shows the current coupling of the economy and GHG 
emissions (York, 2012). The goal then is to find policy strategies that incentivize 
decoupling GHG emissions from economic growth. 
 Just as an increase in interest rates makes it more expensive to borrow, and 
thus combats inflation, so too would increasing the price of emission permits, 
except that it would make it more expensive for businesses to pollute, but 
mortgage holders would not be directly affected. This approach combats 
inflation without harming home ownership and borrowing rates. Increasing 
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interest rates at the macroeconomic scale also impacts national indebtedness. 
According to The Economist magazine, in 2017 the US is likely to pay $280 billion 
of interest payments on its 14 trillion dollars of debt. This is greater than the 
combined budgets of the Department of Education, the Department of Labor and 
the Commerce Department (The Economist, 2017). Each 0.25% interest rate rise 
adds 35 billion dollars in annual interest payments on the national debt. 
Therefore, even homeowners with fixed rate mortgages would be impacted by 
the tax burden of servicing the increase in national debt. 
By using the central bank to purchase emission permits to decrease the 
permit supply and increase the price of polluting is a means to tackle inflation 
without adding to the national debt. For this policy approach to work, the central 
bank would purchase and hold in reserve emission permits. Based upon the 
economic maxim of supply and demand reducing the supply in the market would 
increase the emission permit price. By increasing the emission price, it becomes 
more expensive to pollute. 
  Under this policy scenario it is imperative that the government respect 
central bank independence to manage the reserve-supply, as they do with the 
money supply11. If governments fiddle with the permit supply, this would be the 
same as undermining the money supply, which would destroy the fiat monetary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12!For a comprehensive study of emission permits as a monetary policy tool see McCowen, 2017b 
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system.12 Currently the “cap,” or supply within the cap & trade emission trading 
system, is determined by bureaucrats either by auction or allowance (gift). 
However, after the auction, or allowance-gift, has taken place there is no sensitive 
way to manage the price. Therefore, if markets are oversold, this will result in a 
depressed price. Increasing the price to pollute reduces GHG emissions, and 
incentivizes firms to operate more efficiently (Calel, 2011; Coase, 1960; Crocker, 
1966; Dales, 1968; Hurwitz, 1973, 1995; Lane, 2012; Montgomery 1968; 
Schmalensee, & Stavins, 2012; Stavins, 2009). 
  Reducing GHG emissions in a market setting is the hallmark to combat 
climate change. Therefore, making it more expensive to produce GHG in the first 
place is a necessary step to alleviating the impacts of climate change, the impacts 
that will harm the poorest people in the world who have the least resources to 
adapt to the change. 
7.3 Gardiner’s Tri-part Dilemma 
 As Gardiner (2011) puts it, at present we have insufficient means to address 
climate change because we are asking poor people, with small GHG footprints, 
who did not cause the problem and lack the resources to adapt, to solve the 
problem. By insisting that poor people, in poor countries not take the development 
path toward economic development is wrong. Increasing the price of carbon 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 It is beyond the scope of this paper, however there is evidence in the SO2 markets in the US 
were destroyed by the 2011 amendments to the Clean Air Act. Emission permits that sold for 
$1600 in 2012, fell to $0.06 by 2016 (EPA, 2016) !!
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emissions for poor people, especially in developing nations with weak 
infrastructure is telling them not to do what industrial nations have done to 
become rich. This is the spatial problem, where people in other places are having 
to bear the brunt of climate change, which they did not cause. For the purpose of 
this paper, I think it is appropriate to refer to this spatial issue as being between 
rich and poor; since poor people tend to have smaller consumption footprints of 
that of wealthy individuals. This acknowledges that there are poor people in 
industrial nations who are vulnerable, just as there are wealthy individuals in non-
industrial and developing nations who are wealthy and can afford a price on 
carbon. Income inequality is a growing problem in many industrialized 
economies, while there are many millionaires and billionaires in middle income 
nations. As such, an effective policy alternative to combat climate change must 
price carbon at a rate high enough to change behavior, but be sensitive to the right 
of low and middle income nations to develop, at the same time as not harming 
poor individuals everywhere. 
 The second aspect of Gardiner’s (2011) ethical conundrum is the 
intergenerational dilemma; that this current generation is willfully and knowingly 
reducing the quality of life for future generations by not taking effective action on 
climate change. The current generation has more power over future generations 
and can determine their future prospect. This is the temporal problem; that the 
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current generation is likely harming and curbing future generations’ ability to 
flourish. 
 Gardiner (2011) argues that the third problem is that we lack proper 
institutions to address climate change effectively. He argues most political 
institutions are shortsighted because of election cycles. It took 21 climate summits 
to reach the Paris Agreement and even this collaboration is uncertain to reduce 
GHG emissions enough to be well below two degrees of warming. This is what he 
calls institutional inadequacy – the inability for institutions to mitigate climate 
change in a timely manner. The longer this institutional inadequacy extends, the 
more expensive it will be to mitigate climate change (Broome, 2008, 2012; Jowit & 
Wintour, 2008; Murray, 2008; Stern, 2006). Therefore, using emission permits as a 
monetary policy tool must be able to at least address, if not solve, the spatial, 
temporal and institutional in adequacy of current climate change mitigation 
policies. The criteria for determining whether this policy tool is appropriate will 
be whether it is likely to be effective, efficient, equitable, manageable, legitimate 
and politically feasible (Salamon, 2002). 
7.4 Spatial Problem 
 Most of the world’s poor live in low and middle income countries; however, 
even in wealthy nations it is not acceptable to put the burden of climate mitigation 
on to low income people. In emitting greenhouse gases the rich [are] perpetrating 
an injustice on the world’s poor (Broome, 2008,). Twenty percent (20%) of the 
world’s richest people consume 86% of the world’s resources, while the bottom 
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20% consume about 1.3% (McMichael, 2012). In pricing carbon it becomes 
imperative not to put an undue burden on the poor. Although climate change 
mitigation is costly it is not acceptable to impose a tax on the poor and on low 
income nations. 
Using emission permits as a monetary policy tool provides central bankers 
with an additional tool instead of increasing interest rates (McCowen, 2017). 
Interest rate increases harm home owners, marginal borrowers and foreign nations 
who service debt in U.S. dollars (Donnan, 2017; Giugliano, 2015).  By purchasing 
emission permits and holding them as a reserve, central banks reduce the supply 
of permits in the market. According to economic theory a reduced supply 
correlates with higher prices, thereby making it more expensive to pollute. This 
satisfies the effectiveness criteria since a higher price on pollution will mitigate 
climate change faster than a low price. 
Combatting inflation through increased production costs is a more subtle 
means to fulfill central bank mandates than increasing interest rates; it constrains 
producers of GHG emissions, but not investors and borrowers. It alleviates the 
need for central banks to fight inflation with interest rates alone. Since low and 
middle income people and nations find it hardest to service their debt, this policy 
mechanism is more just because it puts the greatest cost on those that can most 
afford to pay it – large GHG emitters. This is making the assumption that large 
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emitters are wealthier than low emitters, and therefore have the capacity to alter 
their behavior more readily. 
 When emission permits are held by a central bank they become an asset of 
the bank, just as any other currency reserve or debt instrument is. Currently, the 
Federal Reserve holds more than 10 billion dollars combine worth of Japanese, 
German and French debt instruments (Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2014). The 
European Central Bank even holds auto loans, a depreciating asset on their 
balance sheet (Barkawi, 2016). According to Alexander Barkawi (2006), of the 
Council of Economic Policies, this era of unorthodox monetary policy, offers an 
opportunity to view “green” infrastructure debt differently than debt with large 
carbon foot print.  
Even though emission permits would represent a tiny fraction of currency 
reserves, (i.e., a maximum ratio of a couple hundred million dollars compared 
with the hundreds of billions of dollars of currency reserves and debt), every 
reserve underpins the currency in circulation even if it is very small. Just as the 
gold reserves held by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
reduces the supply of gold available to the global market, making gold more 
expensive, but also providing confidence of the U.S. dollars’ value, so too, would 
emission permits underpin the U.S. dollar. This is the economic principle of 
supply and demand. 
!
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 The broader the base for a given carbon price, the more efficiently it 
operates and the lower the overall cost of managing emissions to the 
economies within which it is operating. (IETA, 2016b, p. 3) 
 Since the U.S. dollar is the global reserve currency this creates a vast base 
for emission permits. The demand for U.S. dollars is higher than any other 
currency because international trade and debt is transacted with dollars; 60% of 
U.S. dollars circulate outside the country (Blinder, 1996; Goldburg, 2011). The 
central bank of China in 2011 held three trillion dollars in reserve (Birner, 2012). 
Therefore, this reduces the cost of carbon pricing because the value underpinning 
emission permits is spread over such a large base. Firms engaged in international 
trade using U.S. dollars are in a small way captured by carbon pricing but at an 
infinitesimally small cost. This then satisfies efficiency criteria because it shows the 
cheapest way to reduce GHG emission. A policy is deemed efficient if it has the 
intended effect and if it is cost effective (Salamon, 2002). 
 This demonstrates how using emission permits as a monetary policy tool 
reduces the cost of carbon pricing. By utilizing the U.S. dollar, the reserve global 
currency, firms engaged in trade contribute to the price of an emission permit, 
even though it is too small to notice, this is the epitome of market efficiency. At the 
same time, it reduces the cost of climate mitigation to poor individuals in middle 
and low income countries because it reduces the need for interest rate hikes and it 
spreads the cost of the permit price across a very large base. Therefore, since most 
of the world’s wealth is concentrated into a small population engaged in 
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international transactions, this strategy provides the most amount of good- climate 
mitigation for the most amount of people. This then satisfies the utilitarian ethic 
of maximizing good and minimizing suffering. It is assumed that firms and 
individuals engaged in international trade can bear the very small extra cost 
attributed to a US dollar underpinned by carbon pricing. 
7.5 The Temporal Problem 
 The temporal problem is the intergenerational fact that every generation 
benefits from the emissions they produce, but project the costs of those emissions 
on to future generations (Jamieson, 2014). What Gardiner refers to as “tyranny of 
the contemporary” (2011, loc. 132). While some may argue that future individuals 
do not have agency because they do not yet exist, and may not ever exist from an 
individual perspective, the fact that we know that there will be future people, and 
that our current GHG emissions will hurt them because some carbon dioxide 
persists in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, means that we have an obligation 
to “preserve a just basic structure” (Meyer, 2016; Rawls, 2001, p. 159). This 
obligation is rooted in a rights based argument. Even in the face of uncertainty 
about future conditions, there is a duty, or obligation, to limit harm for future 
generations. Within this is embedded a sense of justice for future generations, and 
virtue; in the sense that to not act to limit warming to below two degrees would 
be to inhibit the flourishing of future generations. As then President Obama said, 
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“We will respond to the threat of climate change, knowing that the failure to do so 
would betray our children and future generations” (Vig & Kraft, 2016, p. 80).  
The precautionary principle aims at least for a “risk neutral” outcome, that 
the action in question should not increase environmental and public risks. In 
situations of choice, the precautionary principle would favor the option with the 
lowest degree of risk (Goklany, 2002). In the climate change context the acceptable 
risk is below 2 degrees centigrade of warming. The Precautionary Principle has 
been particularly influential amongst policy makers concerned about the 
possibility of major human impacts on the global environment such as climate 
change (Gardiner, 2006b). The concentration of CO2 deemed scientifically safe by 
the UNFCCC is 350 ppm this therefore is the standard to be met, it is a policy target 
just as central banks use an acceptable 2% inflation rate. From an ethics 
perspective, it is an acceptable form of nature, a natural standard that has a lower 
risk of living with than a higher concentration of CO2. Therefore, it is virtuous to 
act in a way that achieves a goal of 350 ppm CO2 than the business as usual 
likelihood of 450 ppm.  
The problem being is that the earth’s atmospheric concentration of CO2 is 
currently over 400 ppm. Furthermore, CO2 breaks down slowly in the atmosphere 
ranging from 39 years to hundreds of years, depending upon conditions. Whereas 
methane, a more potent GHG, breaks down relatively quickly in 12 years (Blasing, 
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2013)13. This stresses the urgent need for behavioral change to restructure and 
redirect the economy if 2 degrees of warming is to be avoided. Even if magically 
all anthropogenic GHG emissions were halted, atmospheric warming would 
continue relative to the chemical persistence of atmospheric gases, this creates time 
lags until chemical decomposition takes place. These are the bio-physical 
conditions that make action on climate change so imperative. Already at 0.85 
degrees centigrade of warming we are witnessing extreme weather patterns which 
threaten arctic communities, island nations and many of the world’s most 
populated cities located in coastal regions, or reliant on glacial water. 
If the conditions are costly at current 0.85 degrees centigrade of warming, 
then it is logical to invoke the precautionary principle to prevent future warming 
with policy urgency based upon any ethical argument be it obligation, justice, 
virtue, or equity. Given the persistence factor of GHG in the atmosphere, and the 
need to allow for a sustainable amount of industrial development in low and 
middle income countries, the energy-economic growth correlation must be 
broken, giving rise to a fundamentally different economic system (Brown & 
Garver, 2009). Situations that present some special danger or crisis call for the 
greatest attention to secure success and avoid disaster (Dewey & Tufts, 1908). “The 
urgency of the environmental crisis forces a need for a new form of metatheoretical 
compatibilism” (Light & Katz, 1996, p. 11), in short society, is facing an existential 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 see Appendix 3: Figure Atmospheric GHG Concentrations degrading rates 
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paradigmatic crisis. Even if immediate action to substantially reduce global GHG 
were possible, the harm to future generations would be inevitable, but the extent 
of that harm is, as yet, unclear. Still, without a doubt, sooner rather than later, is 
the more moral action. 
7.6 The Problem of Institutional Inadequacy 
 However, action on a global scale is dependent upon the order of collective 
behavior. Although action is urgently needed, mitigation has not happened 
collectively. Although the US has had a task force on the concentration of 
atmospheric gases since the 1960s (Jamieson, 2014), and despite James Hansen 
(2015) leading the clarion call to action at the Toronto Conference in 1988 when 
CO2 emissions were 350 ppm (NOAA, 2013), the formation of the UNFCCC at the 
Rio Summit in 1992, the US did not ratify and participate in the Kyoto Protocol to 
reduce GHG. Other countries like Canada and Japan stepped away from the 
agreement. Apart from certain European countries, little action on climate change 
has taken place. Current Co2 levels are above 400 ppm, and climate change kills 
more people than terrorism (Leber, 2015). Gardiner (2011) refers to this inaction as 
institutional inadequacy. It is widely agreed that the appropriate way to resolve a 
tragedy of the commons, like climate change, “for the parties to agree to change 
the existing incentive structure through the introduction of a system of enforceable 
sanctions” (p. 32). Sanctions in this case refer to Nationally Determined 
Commitments to reduce GHG put forth in the Paris Agreement. But Thomas 
Heberlein (2012) warns, “If you are trying to solve environmental problems, you 
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better be afraid of attitudes. Even though they are difficult to pin down and 
perhaps even harder to change, attitudes are fundamental to environmental 
solutions" (p. 5). Since the Paris Agreement of 2015 attitudes towards climate 
change have evolved, but real mitigation action is still elusive and current 
commitment levels are not expected to prevent the atmosphere warming less than 
two degrees centigrade (Climate Scorecard, 2017). So while institutional 
collaboration may have recently improved, the strategies underlying these 
arrangements, and the commitments to prevent less than two degrees of warming 
are still weak. 
Institutional inadequacy refers not just to groups of policy makers but the 
design of rules. From a theoretical perspective institutions are more than 
organizations; they are the durable manmade rules that govern human 
interactions, essentially the rules of the game by which society plays (Kingston & 
Caballero, 2009; North, 1990;). Institutions can have many meanings focusing both 
on the rules used to structure patterns of interaction within and across 
organizations (Kraft & Furlong, 2013; Ostrom, 2007;). The “rules” may be formal, 
like purposefully designed laws and constitutions, or informal, such as tacit 
cultural norms and conventions. Institutions include any form of constraint that 
human beings devise to shape human interaction (North, 1990, p. 4). 
Shaping human interactions is what Thomas Heberlein (2012) calls the 
“structural fix” in which changes in the social environment influence what people 
do; this is where policy alters the way people behave; people change their behavior 
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in reaction to a policy change (p. 164). Instead of trying to persuade people to 
insulate their homes, Heberlein (2012) gives the example: subsidies, tax breaks and 
grants are offered, even free upgrades. Making structural changes to rules of 
engagement are a paradigmatic leverage point in which a small change can have 
a big impact.   
7.7 Leverage Points that Address the Structure of  
Institutional Inadequacy 
 Using emission permits as a monetary policy tool addresses the structural 
approach to climate change mitigation, which is currently reliant on the 
collaboration of nation states’ INDCs to reduce GHG emissions, by leveraging the 
global reserve currency, the U.S. dollar. This is not a collaborative measure, but it 
is a structural change to pricing carbon. Climate change governance is a weak state 
actor because at the global level there is no government authority; the governing 
structure is dependent upon the consensus of representative nations. The problem 
with consensus based decision making is that policy actions that can be agreed 
upon may not be the most innovative and effective policies to implement 
(Coglianse, 1999; Koontz et al., 2004). This is evident in the Paris Agreement as it 
now stands, since that agreed upon GHG reductions are deemed not sufficient to 
prevent two degrees centigrade of warming, and this insufficient standard has 
taken nearly 30 years to achieve. The epitome of too little, too late. Still it is better 
174!
!
than business as usual, and the ability to reach such a global consensus must not 
be under appreciated. 
However, using leverage points as described by Donella Meadows (1999), 
presents opportunities to bring about systemic change in a manner not possible in 
collaborative policy approaches. Just as a properly strung tennis racket has a spot 
where if the ball hits there its rebound potential is magnified, so too do we have a 
spot within a policy system that has exponential potential. Seeking leverage points 
is about finding openings in a system and making them work (Klien, 2001). Within 
leverage points approach there is a hierarchy of places to intervene in a system 
with the first being the crudest, the place of greatest entrenchment. The last is the 
most subtle place, it being the paradigm shift; the place where the smallest of 
changes can have a dramatic impact on the entire system.  
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Finidori (2014) 
Figure 7.2: Leverage Points 
 
Meadows’ (1999) approach to leverage points within the context of the 
climate change and climate change negotiations demonstrates how money as a 
cultural artifact and central banks as institutions occupy the cultural-psychological 
leverage point and the form leverage point respectively. This is one way the above 
figure fits into the context of the concept of climate change and the economic 
system14. 
The concept of various leverage points corresponding to climate change 
policy demonstrates where the most efficient and game changing leverage points 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14!Appendix 4 describes the relationship of Meadows Leverage Points in the context of climate 
change further. 
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are; remembering that policy inevitably deals with biophysical constraints and 
flourishing as well as socio-economic conditions. Meadows’ systematic analysis 
moves from the gross physical attributes to the subtle raison d’etre, literally: reason 
for being. Theoretically then, the closer a policy initiative is to the most subtle 
characteristic of a system, the most impactful that policy will be. 
 Money is unique in its instrumental value as a leverage point. On the one 
hand, at the “micro” individual level, money can be destroyed as a material 
artifact, if one sets fire to a dollar bill that bill is destroyed and the supply is 
reduced. However, it also underpins the entire economy, the rules that govern its 
creation and destruction are intrinsically linked to the economies proper 
functioning. Finally, the desire to acquire more money in order to become wealthy, 
makes it a societal paradigm. 
 Accessing currency as a leverage point is on the subtle scale of leverage 
point, doing so is a paradigm shift in climate mitigation strategies. Viewing 
emission permits like a currency is one sort of paradigm shift, using those permits 
as a monetary policy tool, or currency reserve, is another. All relationships 
between people involve exchange; in this way exchange is the most developed 
interaction humans possess. "Every interaction has to be regarded as an exchange." 
Human life is comprised of loss and gain, "the diminution of life's content." In large 
part, the concept of sacrifice is embedded in the notion of economic values (Simmel 
& Frisby, 2011, p. 86). Money as a means of payment is guaranteed by the collective 
of society. Money is a cultural artifact (a social construction, or an institution) its 
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importance depends upon the “theories” individuals’ hold about it (Birner, 2012). 
Money at the macroeconomic scale is managed by central bankers as a common 
pool resource (non-excludable & rivalrous) to avoid tragedy of the commons 
scenarios like inflation (Birner, 2012). If the resource is not managed properly, i.e., 
too much money is in circulation its value is diminished, it bares the same 
hallmark as over grazing the commons. The relationship between excludable and 
non-excludable goods and resources is way of categorizing many of life’s activities 
in competitive and non-competitive situations. 
Table 7.2  
 
Economic Resource Matrix 
 
! !
Excludable!
!
Non.excludable!
!
Rival!
Privatization,!pay!for!service,!
intellectual!property!rights:!controls!
who!has!access!of!use,!usually!
through!monetary!means.!Pollution!
when!regulated!
!
Tragedy!of!the!Commons.!
Infrastructure:!roads!the!more!people!
access!them!the!more!crowded!they!
become,!reducing!efficiency!
macroeconomic!money!
Non.
rival!
Potential!for!privatization,!pricing!
reduces!consumption.!Ideas,!
technology!
!
Public!goods.!Lighthouses,!ecosystem!
services:!photosynthesis!
Adapted from Birner, 2012; Daly & Farley, 2004, p. 160. 
 
The U.S. dollar, as the reserve global currency, has leverage over nearly all 
international trade and debt. This is what makes it such a powerful point to 
leverage, to bring about meaningful climate change mitigation through the pricing 
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mechanism. Most schemes price carbon emissions either through taxation or 
through a market based cap and trade system. Most jurisdictions choose one 
pricing mechanism or the other; however some jurisdictions adopt both 
mechanisms simultaneously. Side by side policy tools that implement a tax 
alongside a cap and trade market create additional policy options when the 
emission permit is used as a monetary policy tool and managed as a currency 
reserve. 
Adopting both market and tax based policy mechanisms in industrial 
nations allows for maximum policy flexibility15. When governments adopt a tax 
based mechanism as in British Columbia, Canada, which has seen emissions fall 
13% since implementation in 2008 (Sponikin & Kooten, 2010), governments are 
locked into that determined price and price tightening schedule. 
However, if governments adopt both mechanisms side by side, the tax 
supports emission mitigation in the event of a low market price, in weak economic 
times but during strong economic growth, the market can withstand a higher 
price, therefore incentivizing firms toward greater mitigation. In a pure market 
situation, a low market price can lead to price gauging of consumers. For instance, 
the EU-ETS cap and trade market was established in 2005, electricity prices rose 
from 2000-2008, the EU-ETS price collapsed in 2007 from its 2006 peak €32 to near 
zero (Hintermann, 2008). While the emission price has not risen above €7 since, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15!See Appendix 5 
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electricity prices have not fallen since 2008 (Dempsey, Bought, & Hough, 2016). 
This indicates that utility companies have priced in a much higher carbon price 
than actually exists. Therefore, a central bank could purchase emission permits, 
thus tightening the market, without any impact on consumer prices, since utility 
companies have already factored in a higher price. 
This innovative approach is well within the mandates of major central 
banks like the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central 
Bank, who have practiced unorthodox debt asset purchasing schemes in the wake 
of financial crisis, purchasing mortgages and auto loans, automobiles being a 
depreciating asset (Barkawi, 2016). Compared to such fixed assets, emission 
permits are fungible and stable under current market conditions. Some have gone 
further to propose carbon as a currency standard as gold once was (International 
Institute of Monetary Transformation, 2012; Porter & Wratten, 2014; Porter et al., 
2017). Given that the Stern Report (2006) refers to climate change as the greatest 
market failure of all time, embedding carbon mitigation policies into monetary 
policy is within the Federal Reserve’s mandate which refers to the economy’s long-
run potential, and the Bank of England’s mandate which cites the right conditions 
for sustainable growth as mandate objectives (BOE, 2017, ) 
The social cost of the do nothing approach of business-as-usual interferes 
with “the economy’s long-run potential” and does not set “the right conditions for 
sustainable growth” as previously stated in accordance with the Federal Reserve 
Act of 1913. The costs of devastating storms like Katrina and Super Storm Sandy 
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are extreme; by 2007 94.8 billion dollars had been appropriated because of the 2005 
hurricane season, not including a 16 billion dollar decline in tax revenues between 
2006-2015 (CBO, 2007). Hurricane Sandy cost more than 65 billion dollars (HUD, 
2013). The debilitating costs in terms of lost development potential from weather 
related events to low income countries, where 97% of the deaths associated with 
such disasters is difficult to measure. Melting glaciers in South America that 
provide water to over 100 million people are expected to disappear in 20 years 
(McMichael, 2012). Business as usual is not an option from an economic or ethical 
point of view. 
7.8 Development Opportunities in a Constrained World 
 While climate change mitigation demands a restructuring of the industrial 
economy, it provides opportunities for sustainable development in which cost are 
applied to negative externalities of pollution. The Clean Development Mechanism 
includes programs such as REDD+ (Reducing Emissions by Deforestation and 
Degradation), where initiatives are designed as win-win scenarios where 
indigenous people in low and middle income countries are paid for the ecosystem 
service of sequestering CO2 through land management practices. These projects 
are in the nascent stage, and are far from perfect in design since the costs of 
standardization and sequestration verification are downloaded on to the local 
communities (Arora-Jonsson, Pettit, & Temu, 2016). However, I believe they are 
an improvement on the Rostovian colonial concept of technology transfer to 
developing countries. Although design improvements are needed, REDD+ projects 
181!
!
offer a financial transfer for previously unpaid labor that is more dignified than 
foreign aid (Lee, 2014, ) 
As an NGO officer in Tanzania said, "I wish we had more carbon and 
more money—we would get more cash into the villages and they could do what 
they wanted" (Arora-Jonsson et al., 2016, p. 74). This demonstrates the producer 
attitude to maximize production. If the agricultural corn market is compared to 
REDD+ we see that this is a consistent market response. When prices are low 
farmers maximize production, but do not increase investment. When prices are 
high investment increases and new producers enter the market. This was the 
market behavior that was seen in reaction to the ethanol mandate; under a higher 
profit scenario the global corn trade expanded by 50% between 2007-2016, where 
it had remained relatively stable from 1980-2005 (USDA, 2017).  
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Figure 7.3: Global Corn Trade Expands 
 
  
What the above figure indicates is that producers respond to price signals, 
“carbon markets will follow the same pathway under the correct signals,” says 
Lawrence Tubiana, France’s envoy to the Paris Summit (Clark, 2015). However, 
prices tend to decline when a product is launched in a commodity market 
(Munden, 2011). Without the ethanol mandate corn prices would not have 
responded to increased demand because there was already too much corn in the 
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system; it was negative news about ethanol diversion that drove the price changes 
(McCowen, 2017a).  
Thus, to respond to the Tanzanian REDD+ NGO officer, it is higher prices 
that are needed, not (from his perspective) “more carbon” production. Stored 
carbon prices trade at a fraction of emission reduction permits. Emission permits 
have traded as high as €32 in 2006 and have averaged €5 since, however on the 
UN CDM market carbon trades below €1 per ton (D’Aprile & Marinella, 2017). 
This amounts to what Bourdieu (1986) called symbolic violence; when social 
domination is normalized into common practice (Nicolaescu, 2010). In this case in 
a market setting, where the right to pollute carries a greater monetary value than 
the sequestration of an equal amount of CO2. It reeks of a neo-colonialist form, this 
inequality must be rectified, at the International Court if need be. However, in the 
meantime, increasing the of emission permits on EU ETS, or REGGI markets is a 
policy that can be immediately implemented, this higher price would then trickle 
down into the CDM market. It is at least a first step toward a more equitable 
relationship between the low-income and industrial nations of the world. 
7.9 Summary 
Leveraging the price of carbon as a monetary policy tool is not a panacea, 
nor should it be viewed as a magic bullet. It is an imperfect policy tool in the long 
term, but it is one that is immediately available and achievable within the current 
political context. In the current conditions of an expanding U.S. economy in which 
inequality within the consumer demographic is a concern, it makes sense to 
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increase the price of polluting industries that have high social costs compared to 
raising interest rates, which benefit the wealthy but harm borrowers at the 
margins, be they nations, consumers, or small businesses. Using emission permits 
as a monetary policy tool puts an additional tool in the toolbox of central bankers, 
and it adds forward guidance to carbon markets. 
Using emission permits as a monetary policy tool addresses institutional 
inadequacy by engaging new rules in an era of unorthodox monetary policy. 
Emission permits are a more fungible asset than mortgage debt or auto loans, plus 
the emission market corrected in 2006, therefore is has nowhere else to go than up. 
This makes it a prudent low risk investment. Central bank autonomy frees permits 
from becoming a political football kicked between opposing sides. Because of the 
negative externalities attributed to climate change and the market failure potential 
if the situation is allowed to worsen, it is within central banks mandates to 
purchase emission permits to help them manage the economy with a more precise 
tool than interest rates and to prevent future market failures. 
Carbon as a monetary policy tool addresses the intergenerational issue of 
climate change in that it can be implemented immediately and action sooner is 
better than action later. From the spatial perspective, increasing the price of carbon 
may not prevent harm being done to poor people across the globe, but it can help 
to increase the payments of indigenous people in REDD+ programs and other 
carbon sequestration projects. Therefore, using carbon as a monetary policy tool 
addresses Gardiner’s (2011) tri-part dilemma of a Perfect Moral Storm. I suspect it 
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is not a strong enough tool to solve the problem and given the complexity and time 
lags of CO2 sequestration it is reasonable to assume that many policy tools will be 
needed. Going forward, modeling the theory behind this research is the next logic 
step; determining how many emission permits would need to be purchased to 
increase the price to a desirable level. If the carbon markets behave like the Sulfur 
dioxide market of the 1990s, or the corn market of the mid 2000s, it might be quite 
small. Finding the institutional rules to leverage is a practical way of overcoming 
the systematic roadblocks that block sustainability (Beddoe et al., 2009). From a 
pragmatic perspective we are called to solve immediate problems, and an 
approach is determined to be true and right if it succeeds in solving the problems 
in question (Rorty, 1999). Time will tell, but time is running out if we are to achieve 
a just and sustainable socio-economic system that does not destroy the planet. 
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Chapter Eight 
8.1 Conclusion 
We need adaptive institutions that exert pressure favoring rules that nudge 
economic actors to overcome the systematic roadblocks to sustainability that have 
resulted from a carbon energy industrial economy, which over shoots the globe’s 
carrying capacity (Beddoe et al., 2009). Pricing GHG emission permits in a traded 
market allow an immediate way for institutions like central banks to take an 
adaptive measure. Central banks, due to their political independence, represent 
institutions that are mandated to act for the public good. At the macro-economic 
scale, the money supply is managed as a common pool resource, for benefit and 
stability, not for profit maximization.  
Because monetary policy is managed as a public good and as a common 
pool resource, it is advantageous to examine climate policy in a similar way. 
Privatizing pollution through emission permits is a policy approach to combat the 
collective action problem of climate change mitigation. Because the atmosphere 
and oceans are a part of the global commons they cannot be controlled directly 
through containment, and they cannot be enclosed and privatized. However, 
turning the right to pollute into tradeable permits is a means of enclosing the 
negative consequences of burning fossil fuels. Recognizing the similarity between 
common pool resources, such as the money supply and the atmosphere is a means 
of overcoming collective action problems. Central bank mandates require that they 
act for the common good to ensure economic stability and reasonable growth. 
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Climate change threatens economic growth and stability and, therefore, a central 
bank has the responsibility to assist in mitigating climate change. 
This dissertation suggests central banks can assist in climate change 
mitigation by holding a reserve of emission permits to maintain a stable supply in 
the market setting. In this way it becomes the central bank’s responsibility to 
manage the permit price ceiling. If demand in the market place becomes inflated, 
the central bank would reduce the reserve size and increase the supply within the 
market place. Essentially, the central bank would perform the same mandate for 
the emission trading systems as it does for the money markets, free from political 
interference. This entails trust and granting new authority, which is system 
changing from a policy point of view.  However, unlike the money supply, it 
should not be the central bank’s mandate to manage the permit supply since it is 
not the bank’s expertise. The permit supply would still be managed by the existing 
authority in the specific jurisdiction in question. The difference is that the existing 
authority would not be under the same pressure to over supply the market with 
permits because authorizing too few permits could have dire economic 
consequences due to the correlation between industrial output, GHG emissions, 
and economic growth. Therefore, the existing authority would still manage the 
supply which determines the price floor, but the central bank would manage the 
demand side, the price ceiling, which would act to control price speculation.  
The research presented from chapter four demonstrated how a mandate 
operating within a market can have a dramatic effect in a very short time. The 
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ethanol mandate increased demand in the corn market tripling the price. The 
increase in corn prices did more to increase investment in agricultural 
development than 20 years of negotiating at the World Trade Organization, which 
began in 1997. The dark side of increased prices was the price over shoot, which 
lead to the 2008 food crisis. This was explained by the 2006 Chinese export ban on 
corn which resulted in a 10% disappearance from the global corn trade. This thus 
shows that market mandates are powerful tools, but that appropriate buffers are 
needed to prevent price speculation. Using emission permits as a reserve with a 
beneficent and powerful non-political institution, like a central bank, is such a 
buffer mechanism. The total supply of emission permits is still managed by 
national policy makers, thereby determining the price floor of emission permits, 
but the price ceiling, the ability to add supply into the trading system if price 
speculation threatens the economy, is determined by the central bank. This shared 
responsibility increases market stability and reduces conflict of interest between 
policy makers, but also puts another tool in the central bank’s tool-box to manage 
inflation. 
A side benefit to this arrangement of dual authority to maintain a stable 
emission permit price is that a central bank could increase the price of emission 
permits, instead of increasing interest rates that harm mortgage holders, tax payers 
and indebted developing nations whose debt is held in foreign currencies. 
Developing nations face a particular problem under climate change because 
they lack the infrastructure to protect against adverse weather conditions, such as 
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extreme droughts and storms that climate change is already amplifying. 
Developing nations do not have the capital means, the luxury, to pay for 
protection. Increasing the price of emission permits increases the value of stored 
carbon credits in the Clean Development Mechanism, thus transferring currency 
to least developed and transitioning nations. 
Paying people who manage carbon sinks is an important new area of 
international development. The ethical argument for increasing the price of carbon 
by using emission permits as a monetary policy tool was presented as a stable 
means to increase the transfer from the industrial world to least developed and 
transitioning nations. People managing carbon sinks should be paid for the 
ecosystem service of carbon sequestration that they provide. Stored carbon credits 
are one mechanism to pay people for managing the global commons. The ethical 
standard used to determine the risks and benefits of a higher carbon price using 
emission permits in reserve as a monetary policy tool was not a very high bar. It 
was simply asked if using emission permits as a monetary policy tool could 
improve the status quo by satisfying the tri-part dilemma put forth by Stephen 
Gardner (2011).  
It was found that the strategy to engage central banks in holding emission 
permits as a reserve would get around many of the institutional inadequacies that 
have resulted in slow mitigation. Because this policy could be implemented 
immediately, it reduces the intergenerational dilemma since when the longer 
meaningful mitigation is delayed the worse, the outcome will be for future 
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generations. Finally, by increasing the price of certified emission credits, more 
money is transferred to developing countries, this improves upon the current 
situation in which managers of carbon sinks want more carbon; by giving them more 
money for the same carbon, their situation is improved. 
Climate change has been caused by the rules and traditions that define the 
industrial economy. Changing those norms in subtle ways by leveraging the 
institutional potential of central banks is a means to get the “biggest bang for the 
buck.” Especially in the polarized environment of the U.S. Congress, it is 
imperative to take the actions that can bring about the best possible mitigation 
strategies that threaten not only the well-being of the nation, but the well-being of 
the world. 
  
197!
!
Comprehensive Bibliography 
 
 Abbott, P. (2009). Development dimensions of high food prices. Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/41/42972908.pdf 
 
Abbott, P. C., & Battisti, B. d. (2009). Recent global food price shocks: Causes, 
consequences and lessons for African governments and donors. Paper presented 
at the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium Analytic 
Symposium, “Confronting Food Price Inflation: Implications for 
Agricultural Trade and Policies”, Seattle, WA.  Retrieved from 
http://iatrc.software.umn.edu/activities/symposia/2009Seattle/seattleA
bbott.pdf 
 
Abbott, P. C., Hurt, C., & Tyner, W. E. (2009, March Update). What's driving food 
prices? Oak Brook, IL: Farm Foundation. 
 
Abbott, P. C., Hurt, C., & Tyner, W. E. (2011, March Update). What's driving food 
prices? Oak Brook, IL: Farm Foundation.  
 
Acworth, W. (2005 May/June). Going long on commodities: Six ways to invest in 
commodities. Futures Industry, 24-28. 
 
Air Resources Board [ARB]. (2017). Auction information.   Retrieved from 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/auction.htm 
 
Ali, S. H. (2009). Treasures of the Earth: Need, greed & a sustainable future. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Andresen, S., & Gulbrandsen, L. (2003). The role of green NGOs in promoting 
climate compliance. Retrieved from 
http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/rapp0403.pdf 
 
Arora-Jonsson, S. W., Westholm, L., Temu, B. J., & Pettit, A. (2016). Carbon and 
cash in climate assemblages: The making of a new global citizenship. 
Antipode, 48(1), 74-96. doi:10.1111/anti.12170 
 
Asia Pacific Partnership [APP]. (2006-2011). Public-private sector task 
forces.   Retrieved from 
http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/about.aspx 
 
Atkinson, R., & Flint, J. (2001). Accessing hidden and hard-to-reach populations: 
Snowball research strategies. Social Research Update, (33).  
198!
!
 
Axelrod, R., & Vandeveer, S. (2014). The global environment: Institutions, law, and 
policy (4th ed.). (Kindle version). Retrieved from Amazon.com  
 
Bank of England. (2017). Monetary policy framework. London, UK. Retrieved from 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/framework/f
ramework.aspx 
 
Bardarch, E. (2011). Practical guide for policy analysis: The eightfold path to more 
effective problem solving (Kindle version). Retrieved from 
http://amazon.com 
 
Barchart (2010). Retrieved from 
https://www.barchart.com/search#/q=agricultural%20weight 
 
Barkawi, A. (2016). Central banking and the transition to a low-carbon economy. The 
role of monetary policy. Paper presented at the International Center for 
Climate Governance, Go-to-Webinar. Retrieved from 
http://www.iccgov.org/en/event/central-banking-and-the-transition-to-
a-low-carbon-economy-the-role-of-monetary-policy/ 
 
Beach, W. W., Kreutzer, D. W., Lieberman, B., & Loris, N. (2008). The cconomic 
costs of the Lieberman- Warner Climate Change Legislation. Retrieved from 
Washington, DC: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/the-economic-
costs-of-the-lieberman-warner-climate-change-legislation#_ftn3 
 
Beauchamp, T., & Childress, J. (1994). Principles of biomedical ethics (4th ed.). 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Beddoe, R., Costanza, R., Farley, J., Garza, E., Kent, J., Kubiszewski, I., Marinez, 
L., McCowen, T., Murphy, K., Myers N., Ogden, Z., Stapleton, K., 
Woodward, J. (2009). Overcoming systemic roadblocks to sustainability: 
The evolutionary redesign of worldviews, institutions, and technologies. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
106(8), 2483-2489. doi:10.1073/pnas.0812570106 
  
Biernacki, P., & Waldorf, D. (1981). Snowball sampling: Problems and techniques 
of chain referral sampling. Sociological Methods and Research, 10(2), 141-
163.  
 
Birdsall, N., & Fukuyama, F. (2011, March/April). The Post-Washington 
consensus: Development after the crisis. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from 
199!
!
https://www.cgdev.org/publication/post-washington-consensus-
development-after-crisis-working-paper-244 
 
Birkland, T. (2016). An introduction to the policy process (4th ed.). New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
 
Birner, J. (2012). If bad money is a collective bad, isn’t good money a collective 
good? Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, (2), 3-38.  
 
Blasing, T. J. (2013). Recent greenhouse gas concentrations. Retrieved from 
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html 
 
Blinder, A. S. (1996). The role of the dollar as an international currency. Eastern 
Economic Journal, 22(2), 127-136. doi:10.2307/40325698 
 
Blinder, A. S. (2010, Nov/Dec). Quantitative easing: Entrance and exit strategies. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, 465-80.  Retrieved from 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2010/11/01/quanti
tative-easing-entrance-and-exit-strategies/  
 
Blinder, A. S. (2013). Financial crises and central bank independence. Business 
Economics, 48(3), 163+.  
 
Blomgran B. L. (2009). Collaborative governance: Emerging practices and the 
incomplete legal framework for public and stakeholder voice. Journal of 
Dispute Resolution, 2009(2). Retrieved from 
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss2/2   
 
Boulding, K. (2009). The Book of Green Quotations. Mincola, NY: Dover 
Publications. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (Producer). (1986, July 1, 2012). The forms of capital. Handbook of 
Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education Retrieved from 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/bour
dieu-forms-capital.htm 
Bourdieu, P. (2005). The social structures of the economy (C. Turner, Trans.). 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
 
Brister, E. (2012). Distributing epistemic authority: Refining Norton's pragmatist 
approach to environmental decision-making. Contemporary Pragmatism, 
9(1), 185-203.  
 
200!
!
Bromely, D., & Paavola, J. (2002). Economics, ethics, and environmental policy: 
Contested Choices. Oxford, UK: Balckwell. 
 
Broome, J. (2000). Why economics needs ethical theory. In K. Basu and R. Kanbur 
(Eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honour of Amartya Sen, 1, pp. 
7-14). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Broome, J. (2008, June). The ethics of climate change. Scientific American. 
Retrieved from 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0060/pdf/The%20ethics%20of%20climate%2
0change.pdf 
 
Broome, J. (2012). Climate matters: Ethics in a warming world. New York, NY: 
Norton. 
 
Brown, P. (2012, Fall). Ethics and economics in the Anthropocene. Teilhard 
Studies, 65. Retrieved from https://therightsofnature.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdfs/Peter%20Brown%20Ethics%20for%20Economics%
20in%20the%20Anthropocene.pdf 
 
Brown, P., & Garver, G. (2009). Right relationship: Building a whole Earth economy 
(Kindle version). Retrieved from Amazon.com 
 
Bureau of Economic & Analysis. (2014). Section 1. NIPA tables.  Retrieved from 
http://www.bea.gov//national/nipaweb/DownSS2.asp 
 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. (2011). Proposed outer continental shelf oil & 
gas leasing program 2012-2017. Retrieved from 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/Proposed_OCS_Oil_Gas_Lease_P
rogram_2012-2017.pdf. 
 
 
 
Bush, G. W. (2004). State of the Union Address to Congress. The American 
Presidency Project.  Retrieved from 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29646#ixzz2g5lOc
Eyf 
 
Bush, G. W. (2005). State of the Union Address to Congress. The American 
Presidency Project.  Retrieved from 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58746#axzz2g5kjS
zKi 
 
201!
!
Button, J. (2008). Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The case for an international 
carbon market based on the currency model. Harvard Law Review, 32, 572-
581.  
 
C2ES. (2015). Market mechanisms: Understanding the options. Retrieved from 
https://www.c2es.org/publications/market-mechanisms-understanding-
options 
 
Calel, R. (2011). Climate change and carbon markets: a panoramic history. Retrieved 
from http://www.cccep.ac.uk/Publications/Working-papers/Papers/60-
69/WP62_Climate-change-carbon-markets-panoramic-history.pdf 
 
Callicott, J. B. (2002). The pragmatic power and promise of theoretical 
environmental ethics: Forging a new discourse. Environmental Values, 
11(1), 3-25.  
 
Campiglio, E. (2016). Beyond carbon pricing: The role of banking and monetary 
policy in financing the transition to a low-carbon economy. Ecological 
Economics, 121.  
 
Caplan, A. (2001). [In Class]. Center for bioethics, University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
 
Carbon, P. (2013). Point carbon. Retrieved from http://www.pointcarbon.com 
 
Cato, M. S. (2009). Sustainable economics: A new financial architecture based on 
a global carbon standard. In L. Leonard & J. Barry (Eds.), The Transition to 
Sustainable Living and Practice Advance in Ecopolitics, 4, pp. 55-76. 
 
Cayley, D. (Producer). (2012, January 2). How to think about science, Episode 8. 
Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/how-to-think-about-
science-part-1-24-1.2953274 
 
CERES. (2014). Investing in the clean trillion: Closing the Clean Energy Investment 
Gap. Retrieved from Boston: 
https://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/investing-in-the-clean-trillion-
closing-the-clean-energy-investment-gap-executive-summary 
 
CFTC. (2012). Corn open interest.   Retrieved from 
http://www.cftc.gov/OCE/WEB/Report%20Data/futures_Corn.html 
    
Cicutti, P. R., & Parry, R. (1996, June 17). Investigators look at London traders' 
role in copper scam. The Independent. Retrieved from 
202!
!
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/investigators-look-at-
london-traders-role-in-copper-scam-1337661.html 
 
Clark, P. (2015, Nov 12). Companies must lead on Climate Change, video clip. 
Financial Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b2cbCTF1E8Y 
 
Climate Scoreboard. (2017). UN climate pledge analysis. Climate 
Scoreboard.  Retrieved from 
https://www.climateinteractive.org/programs/scoreboard/ 
 
Clover, C. (2006). Miliband backs idea of carbon rationing for all. Telegraph. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1524353/Miliband-backs-
idea-of-carbon-rationing-for-all.html 
 
CME Group. (2011). Corn price limits & margin requirements. Retrieved from 
http://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/ED127_Price-Limits-
FBD_8.5x11.pdf 
 
CNN.com (Producer). (2001). Bush firm over Kyoto stance. Retrieved from 
http://asia.cnn.com/2001/US/03/29/schroeder.bush/ 
 
Coase, R. H. (1960, Oct). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 
3, 1-44.  
 
Coglianse, C. (1999). Limits of consensus. Environment, 41, 28-33.  
 
Congressional Budget Office [CBO]. (2007). The federal government’s spending and 
tax actions in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Retrieved from 
file:///Users/tlmccowen/Desktop/2017%20Dissertation/2007_CBO-
hurricanes_.pdf. 
 
Creswell, J. W. (2003). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed 
methods approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. (Reprinted 
from 2nd ed.). 
 
Crocker, T. D. (1966). The Structuring of atmospheric pollution control systems. New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
D’Aprile, A., & Marinella, D. (2017, January). Carbon markets: December 2016 – 
January 2017. International Climate Policy. 
 
203!
!
Dales, J. H. (1968). Pollution, property and prices: An essay in policy-making and 
economics. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press. 
 
Dalsgaard, S. (2013). The commensurability of carbon: Making value and money 
of climate change. HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 3(1), 80-98. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.uvm.edu/10.14318/hau3.1.005 
 
Daly, H., & Farley, J. (2004). Ecological economics: Principles and application. 
Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 
DeCanio, S. J., & Fremstad, A. (2013). Game theory and climate diplomacy. 
Ecological Economics, 85, 177-187.  
 
Deloitte & Touche LLP. (2014). The Federal Reserve Banks: Combined financial 
statements as of and for the years ended December 31, 2013 and 2012 and 
Independent Auditors' Report. Retrieved from 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/BSTcombinedfinst
mt2013.pdf 
 
Dempsey, N., Bought, C., & Hough, D. (2016). Energy prices. Retrieved from 
www.parliament.uk/commons-library. 
 
den Elzen, M. G. J., & de Moor, A. P. G. (2002). Analyzing the Kyoto Protocol 
under the Marrakesh Accords: Economic efficiency and environmental 
effectiveness. Ecological Economics, 43(2-3), 141-158.  
 
Department of Energy. (2017). Renewable energy production by state. Retrieved 
from https://energy.gov/maps/renewable-energy-production-state. 
 
Descheneau, P. (2012). The currencies of carbon: Carbon money and its social 
meaning. Environmental Politics, 21(4), 604-620. 
doi:10.1080/09644016.2012.688356 
 
Dewey, J. (1984). The construction of good. New York, NY: Prometheus. 
 
Dewey, J., & Tufts, J. (1908). Ethics (Kindle version). Retrieved from Amazon.com 
 
Donnan, S. (2017). Rebound in commodity-exporting nations set to boost global 
growth. Financial Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.ft.com/content/efb59d80-d74a-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e 
 
Downie, D. L. (2015). International environmental regimes and the success of 
global zone policy. In R. S. Axelrod, and S. D. VanDeveer (Eds.), The 
204!
!
global environment: Institutions, law and policy (4th ed.). Washington, 
DC: Sage. 
 
EcoLogic. (2013). EU-ETS – From slumping to jumping? Climate Talk.  Retrieved 
from http://www.ecologic.eu/8297 
 
The Economist, (2001, April 5). Oh no, Kyoto. The Economist. 
 
The Economist, (2013, February 16). Extremely trouble scheme, finance & 
economics. The Economist. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21571940-
crunch-time-worlds-most-important-carbon-market-extremely-troubled-
scheme 
 
The Economist. (2014). What structural reform is and why it is important. The 
Economist.  
 
The Economist, (2015, April 15). After Tambora. The Economist. 
 
EPA. (2012). Renewable fuel standard. Environment and Energy, Development 
Research Group.  Retrieved from 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/index.htm 
 
EPA. (2012). Climate change indicators in the United States. Retrieved from 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/indicators/. 
 
EPA. (2012). U.S. Court of Appeals - D.C. Circuit upholds EPA's actions to reduce 
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. Climate Change.  Retrieved 
from 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/ghgcourtdecision.h
tml 
 
EPA. (2013). Climate change basics. Retrieved from 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basics/. 
 
EPA. (2013). Sulfur dioxide trends.   Retrieved from 
http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/sulfur.html 
 
EPA. (2017). SO2 allowance auction. Clean Air Markets.  Retrieved from 
https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/2006-so2-allowance-auctionEU. (2017). 
Report on the functioning of the European carbon market. Brussels: European 
Commission. Retrieved from 
205!
!
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-
48-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF. 
 
Ettenson, L. (2017). U.S. clean energy jobs surpass fossil fuel 
employment.  Retrieved from https://www.nrdc.org/experts/lara-
ettenson/us-clean-energy-jobs-surpass-fossil-fuel-employment 
 
EU. (2017). Report on the functioning of the European carbon market. Brussels, 
Belgium: European Commission. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-
48-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF. 
 
Euro Stat. (2016). Greenhouse gas emissions index.  Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language
=en&pcode=tsdcc100&plugin=1. 
 
Europa. (2013, March 4, 2017). Commission welcomes EP vote on ETS 
'backloading'. Climate Action.  Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2013070302_en 
 
Europa. (2017). EU: Climate action.   Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en 
 
Europa. (2017). Structural reform of the EU ETS. Climate Action.  Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform_en 
 
European-Parliament. (2008). Addressing the challenges of deforestation and forest 
degradation to tackle climate change and biodiversity loss. Retrieved from 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0645:FIN:EN:P
DF 
 
Federal Reserve Board [FRB]. (2015). What is forward guidance and how is it used in 
the Federal Reserve's monetary policy? Retrieved from 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/what-is-forward-guidance-how-
is-it-used-in-the-federal-reserve-monetary-policy.htm 
 
FRB of Governors. (2016). Current FAQs.   Retrieved from 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12855.htm 
 
FRB-NY. (2017). System open market account holdings.   Retrieved from 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/soma/sysopen_accholdings.htm
l 
206!
!
 
Franklin, U. (2006). The Ursula Franklin Reader Pacifism as a map. Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada: Between the Lines. 
 
Futures Commission Market. [FCM]. (2009). Selected FCM financial data. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@financialdataforfcms/docum
ents/file/fcmdata0209.pdf 
 
Gale, F., Tuan, F., Wang, X., & Cao, Z. (2009). China is using more corn for industrial 
products. Retrieved from Retrieved from 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/fds09k01/9188_fds09
k01.pdf?v=41055 
 
Garcia, C. (2017, Aug 4). Congenitally pessimistic central banks cannot handle 
the good new. Financial Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.ft.com/content/5e6b287a-78e1-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691!
 
Gardiner, S. (2006). A perfect moral storm: Climate change, intergenerational 
ethics and the problem of corruption. Environmental Values, 15, 397-413.  
 
Gardiner, S. (2011). A perfect moral storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc. 
 
Gardiner, S. M. (2006b). A core precautionary principle. The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 14(1), 33-60.  
 
Gardiner, S. M. (2014). A call for a global constitutional convention focused on 
future generations. Retrieved from 
https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2014/a-call-for-a-global-
constitutional-convention-focused-on-future-generations/ 
 
Garver, G. (2009). The Ecor: An international exchange unit for fair allocation of 
ecological capacity. Paper presented at the Amsterdam Conference on the 
Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change. Amsterdam, 
Netherlands.  
 
Giddens, A. (2011). The politics of climate change. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
 
Gilbert, C. (2010). How to understand high food prices. Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 61(2), 392-425. doi:10.1111/j.1477-9552.2010.00248.x 
 
207!
!
Giugliano, F. (2015, May 17). World's central banker braced for big divergence. 
The Financial Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/828a5402-fa4d-11e4-aa42-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3aazdsG6A 
 
Goklany, I. M. (2002). From precautionary principle to risk-risk analysis. Nature 
Biotechnology, 20.  
Gold Standard Act of 1900. (1901). In Encyclopedia Britannica.  Retrieved from 
http://www.historycentral.com/documents/GoldStandard.html 
 
Goldburg, L. (2011). The international role of the dollar: Does it matter if this changes? 
Retrieved from!
https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr522.html 
  
Goldburg, L., Hull, C. E., & Stein, S. (2013). Do industrialized countries hold the 
right foreign exchange reserves? Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 
19(1).  
 
Goodin, R. (1998). Introduction. In R. Goodin (Ed.), The Theory of Institutional 
Design. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Goodin, R. (2000). Utility and the good. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
 
Gowa, J. (1983). Closing the gold window. Ithaca, NY & London, UK: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Gowdy, J. (2010). Microeconomic theory old & new. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Haack, S. (1984). Introduction. In S. Haack (Ed.), Pragmatism, old & new. New 
York, NY: Prometheus. 
 
Hamrick, K., & Goldstein, A., (2016). Raising ambition: State of the voluntary carbon 
markets 2016. Retrieved from 
http://www.foresttrends.org/documents/files/doc_5242.pdf 
 
Hansen, J. (2015). Environment and development challenges. In W. S. Lucas 
Bernard (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of The Macroeconomic of Global Warming 
(pp. 639-646). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hardin, G. (1968, Dec 13). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 166, 1103–1107 
 
208!
!
Harding, R. (2017, Aug 2). Can Japan provide answers to the west’s economic 
problems? Financial Times [subscription only].   
 
Hare, B., Roming, M., Schaeffer, M., & Schleussner, C.-F. (2016). Implication of the 
1.5 C limit in the Paris Agreement for Climate Policy and Decarburization. 
Retrieved from 
file:///Users/tlmccowen/Desktop/2017%20Dissertation/Climate%20An
alytics.pdf 
 
Headey, D. (2010). Rethinking the global food crisis: The role of trade shocks. Retrieved 
from http://www.ifpri.org/publications/results/taxonomy%3A468. 
 
Headey, D., & Fan, S. (2010). Reflections on the global food crisis: How did it happen? 
How has it hurt? and how can we prevent the next one? Retrieved from 
http://www.ifpri.org/publication/reflections-global-food-crisis 
 
Heberlein, T. A. (2012). Navigating environment attitudes. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Heffernan, O. (2008, 21 August). Stern special in climatic change.  Retrieved from 
http://blogs.nature.com/climatefeedback/2008/08/stern_special_in_cli
matic_chan.html 
 
Helm, D. (2009). Climate change policy: Why has so little been achieved. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Helm, D., & Hepburn, C. (2009). Introduction. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Hintermann, B. (2009). Allowance price drivers in the first phase of the EU ETS. 
Retrieved from 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6226975.pdf?repositoryId=153 
 
Hoffman, L. A., & Baker, A. (2011). Estimating the substitution of distillers’ grains for 
corn and soybean meal in the U.S. feed complex.  Retrieved from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/fds-feed-outlook/fds11i01.aspx. 
 
Hoffman, R., & Ireland, D. (2013). Elinor Ostrom, institutions and governance of the 
global commons. Paper presented at the Club of Rome Annual General 
Assembly: Governance of the Commons, Ottawa, Canada. Retrieved from  
http://clubofromeagm2013.com 
 
209!
!
Höhne, N., Kuramochi, T., Warnecke, C., Röser, F., Fekete, H., Hagemann, M., . . . 
Gonzales, S. (2017). The Paris Agreement: Resolving the inconsistency 
between global goals and national contributions. Climate Policy, 17(1), 16-
32. doi:10.1080/14693062.2016.1218320 
 
Hook, S. (2006). Naturalism and first principles. In S. Haack (Ed.), Pragmatism Old 
and New. New York, NY: Prometheus. 
 
Hsiang, S., Kopp, R., Jina, A., Rising, J., Delgado, M., Mohan, S., . . . Houser, T. 
(2017). Estimating economic damage from climate change in the United 
States. Science, 356(6345), 1362-1369. doi:10.1126/science.aal4369 
 
HUD. (2013). Hurricane Sandy rebuilding strategy. Retrieved from 
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=hsrebuildings
trategy.pdf. 
 
Hurwicz, L. (1995). What is the case theorum. Japan and the World Economy, 7, 49-
74.  
 
IETA. (2016). A vision for the market provisions of the Paris Agreement. Retrieved 
from http://www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/Position_Papers/2016/I
ETA_Article_6_Implementation_Paper_May2016.pdf 
 
IETA. (2016a). IETA GHG Market Sentiment Survey. Retrieved from 
http://www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/GHG_Market_Sentiment_Sur
vey/IETA%20GHG%20Sentiment%20Survey%202016.pdf 
 
iPath. (2017). Bloomberg Commodity Index ETN. Exchange Traded 
Notes.  Retrieved from 
http://www.ipathetn.com/US/16/en/static/strategies-commodity.app 
 
International Institute of Monetary Transformation (2012). Our 
mission.  Retrieved from http://www.timun.net/index.php?nID=1 
 
Irwin, S. (2013). Ethanol prices drive corn prices, right? Retrieved from 
http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2013/10/ethanol-prices-drive-corn-
prices.html 
 
Ivanova, I. (2017, July 27). The future of renewable energy is in Texas. Money 
Watch. Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-is-leading-
the-way-in-renewable-energy/ 
 
Jackson, W. (2011). Nature as measure. Berkley, CA: Counterpoint. 
210!
!
 
James, B. (2010). Farming fuel: A literature review of ethanol's impact. (M.Sc.), , 
Boseman, MT: Montana State University.    
 
Jamieson, D. (2014). Reason in a dark time why the struggle against climate change 
failed— and what it means for our future. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Jones, C. (2017). Markets whipsaw after ECB recalibrates message on QE. 
Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/f7a77c44-
5bd3-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220 
 
Jowit, J., & Wintour, P. (2008, 25 June). Cost of tackling global climate change has 
doubled, warns Stern. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jun/26/climatechange.s
cienceofclimatechange 
 
Keller, J. (2017, July 19). NDP Premier John Horgan’s cabinet. Globe & Mail. 
Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-
columbia/bcs-new-ndp-government-takespower-as-horgan-
appointscabinet/article35724661/ 
 
Kerr, R., & Robinson, S. (2012). From symbolic violence to economic violence: 
The globalizing of the Scottish banking elite. Organization Studies, 33(2), 
247-266. doi:10.1177/0170840611430594 
 
Kingston, C., & Caballero, G. (2009). Comparing theories of institutional change. 
Journal of Institutional Economics, 5(2), 151-180. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137409001283 
 
Kleinman, G. (2005). Trading commodities and financial futures (3rd ed.). Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Klien, G. (2001). Sources of power: How people make decisions. Boston, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
Koliba, C. (2015, Sept 18). Community-based adaptation to climate change in Sri 
Lanka. 
 
Komileva, L. (2017, Jul 30). You are too complacent, central bankers warn 
markets. Financial Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.ft.com/content/8908f882-739b-11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9 
 
211!
!
Koontz, T., Steelman, T., Carmin, J., Smith-Korfmacher, K., Mosely, C., & 
Thomas, C. (2004). Collaborative environmental management: What roles for 
government. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
 
KPMG. (2016). Financial statements: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York. As of and 
for the years ended December 31, 2015 and 2014 and Independent Auditors’ 
Report.  Retrieved from 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/newyorkfinstmt2
015_508.pdf. 
 
Kraft, M., & Furlong, S. (2013). Public policy: Politics, analysis and alternatives (4th 
ed.). Los Angeles, CA; London, UK; New Delhi, India; Singapore, SE Asia; 
Washington, DC: Sage CQ Press. 
 
Kraus, C. (2008, Oct 13). Commodity prices tumble. New York Times.  
 
Krippendorff, K. (1980). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology (Vol. 
5). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Lagi, M., Bertrand, K. Z., & Bar-Yam, Y. (2011). The food crises and political 
instability in North Africa and the Middle East. Retrieved from 
http://necsi.edu/research/social/foodcrises.html 
 
Lagi, M., Yavni Bar-Yam, Bertrand, K. Z., & Bar-Yam, Y. (2011). The food crises: A 
quantitative model of food prices including speculators and ethanol conversion. 
Retrieved from http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_prices.pdf 
 
Laing, T., Sato, M., Grubb, M., & Comberti, C. (2013). Assessing the effectiveness of 
the EU emissions trading system. Retrieved 
from http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/WP106-effectiveness-eu-emissions-trading-
system.pdf 
 
Lane, R. (2012). The promiscuous history of market efficiency: The development 
of early emission trading systems. Environmental Politics, 21(4), 583-603.  
 
Leber, R. (2015). Obama Is right: Climate change kills more people than 
terrorism. New Republic. 
 
Lee, J. (2014). To what extent do agricultural carbon projects deliver?: A multi-case 
study of gender, smallholder participation, and livelihood outcomes (Ph.D.), 
University of Vermont, Burlington, VT.    
 
212!
!
Lewis, M. (2015). Flash boys. New York, NY: Norton. 
 
Lieberman, B. (2009). Climate of fraud.   Retrieved from 
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/11/climate-of-
fraud 
 
Light, A. (2010). Methodological pragmatism, pluralism, and environmental 
ethics. In D. Keller (Ed.), Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions (pp. 318-
326). Cambridge MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Light, A. (2011). Climate ethics for climate action. In D. Schmidtz & E. Willott 
(Eds.), Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, What Really Works (2nd 
ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Light, A., & Katz, E. (1996). Environmental pragmatism and environmental ethics as 
contested terrain. Oxford, UK: Routledge. 
 
Light, A., & Taraska, G. (2014). Climate change, adaptation, and climate-ready 
development assistance. Environmental Values, 23(2), 129-147. 
doi:10.3197/096327114x13894344179086 
 
Lohmann, L. (2009, September). When markets are poison: Learning about climate 
policy from the financial crisis. Paper presented at the The Corner House 
Briefing.  
 
Lohmann, L. (2011). Capital and climate change. Development and Change, 42(2), 
649-668. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01700.x 
 
Lovejoy, T. E. (2014). A “Natural” Proposal for Addressing Climate Change. 
Ethics & International Affairs, 28(3), 359-363. 
doi:10.1017/S0892679414000434 
 
MacKenzie, D. (2009). Making things the same: Gases, emission rights and the 
politics of carbon markets. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(3–4), 
440-455. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2008.02.004 
 
Macrotrends, (2017). Corn prices - 45 year historical chart. Retrieved from 
http://www.macrotrends.net/2532/corn-prices-historical-chart-data 
 
Maintenance of long run growth of monetary and credit aggregates, 12 USC 225a. As 
added by act of November 16, 1977 (91 Stat. 1387) and amended by acts of 
October 27, 1978 (92 Stat. 1897); Aug. 23, 1988 (102 Stat. 1375); and Dec. 27, 
2000 (114 Stat. 3028). 
213!
!
 
Marcu, A., Elkerbout, M., & Stoefs, W.(2016). 2016 State of the EU ETs Report. 
Retrieved from http://www.ceps-
ech.eu/sites/default/files/State%20of%20EU%20ETS%20v16_0.pdf 
 
Mautner, T. (Ed.) (1999). Dictionary of Philosophy. London, UK: Penguin. 
 
 
 
 
McCollum, D., Nagai, Y., Riahi, K., Marangoni, G., Calvin, C., Pietzcker, R., van 
Vliet, J., & van der Zwaan, B. (2014). Energy investments under climate 
policy: A comparison of global models. Retrieved from http://www.feem-
project.net/limits/docs/04.%20cce%20limits%20special%20issue_paper3.
pdf 
 
McCowen, T. (2017a). Policy insight: What can the carbon market learn from the 
ethanol mandate’s impact on the corn market? (Ph.D.), University of Vermont, 
Burlington, VT.    
 
McCowen, T. (2017b). Policy reform: Using emission permits as a monetary policy tool. 
(Ph.D.), Dissertation Defense. Rubenstein School of Environment and 
Natural Resources. The Gund Institute for Ecological Economics, 
University of Vermont, Burlington, VT. 
 
McDonnell, L., & Elmore, R. (1987). Getting the job done: Alternative policy 
instruments. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 9(2), 133-152.  
 
McGinnis, M. (Producer). (2011, May 10). CME backs off on 50 [cent] limit. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.agriculture.com/markets/analysis/corn/cme-backs-off-on-
50-cn-limit_9-ar16500 
 
McMichael, P. (2012). Development and social change a global perspective (5th ed.). 
Boston, MA: Sage Publications. 
 
Meadows, D. (1999). Leverage points: Places to intervene in a system.   Retrieved 
from http://www.donellameadows.org/archives/leverage-points-places-
to-intervene-in-a-system/ 
 
Meadows, D. (2012, October, 27). Trading uncertainty: A systems view. Paper 
presented at the 4th Biannual Conference on Biophysical Economics, 
University of Vermont, Burlington, VT. 
214!
!
 
Meyer, L. (2016). Intergeneration justice. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 
 
Miller, G. P. (1998, June). An interest-group theory of central bank independence. 
Journal of Legal Studies, XXVII.  
 
Mitchell, D. (2008). A note on rising food prices. Policy research paper, The World 
Bank. 
 
Moniz, E. (2016, April 20). Beyond COP 21: A conversation with Ernie Moniz, US 
Secretary of Department of Energy/Interviewer: D. Cook. Arizona State 
University sponsor. 
 
Montgomery, W. D. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control 
programs. Journal of Economic Theory, 5(3), 395-418.  
 
Munden. (2011, March 7). REDD and forest carbon: Market-based critique and 
recommendations. The Munden Project.  Retrieved from 
http://www.mundenproject.com/forestcarbonreport2.pdf 
 
Murphy, P. (2014). Figure from LME Sumitomo scandal returns. Financial Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/d7f56b30-5abf-11e4-8625-
00144feab7de 
 
Murray, J. (2008, April 17). Stern admits report "badly under estimated" climate 
change risks. Business Green. 
 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
change. (1998). 
 
Nicolaescu, C. (2010). Bourdieu – habitus, symbolic violence, the gift: “You give 
me / i give you” principle. Euromentor Journal, 4(1).  
 
National Ocean and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA). (2013, February 10). Trends 
in atmospheric carbon dioxide.   Retrieved from 
http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/weekly.html 
 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1974). Resources as a constraint on growth. The American 
Economic Review, 64(2), 22-26. doi:10.2307/1816011 
 
Nordhaus, W. D. (2017). Revisiting the social cost of carbon. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences. doi: doi:10.1073/pnas.1609244114 
215!
!
 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Norton, B. (1996). In A. Light & E. Katz (Eds.), Environmental Pragmatism. 
Abingdon, UK: Routledge.  
 
O'Neill, O. (2000). Kantian ethics. In P. Singer (Ed.), A Companion to Ethics. 
Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
 
Obama, B. (2013). State of the Union Address. Retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-
president-state-union-address. 
 
Ormstead, S. (2016). Applying market principles to environmental policy. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Ostrom, E. (2007). Institutional rational choice: An assessment of the institutional 
analysis and development framework. In P. A. Sabtier (Ed.), Theories of 
Policy Process (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Ostrom, E. (2010). A polycentric approach for coping with climate change. Retrieved 
from http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/pe/2009/04268.pdf 
 
Ostrom, E. (2011). Background on the institutional analysis and development 
framework. Policy Studies Journal, 39(1).  
 
Perrow, C. (1999). Normal accidents. Living with high risk technologies (2nd ed.). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Perrow, C. (2004). A personal note on normal accidents. Organization & 
Environment, 17(1), 9-14.  
 
Pettit, P. (1993). Consequentialism. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Pigou, A. C. (1920). The economics of welfare. London, UK: Macmillan. 
 
Pigou, A. C. (1951). Some aspects of welfare economics. The American Economic 
Review, XLI, (3), 287-302.  
 
Polanyi, K. (2001). The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our 
time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Kindle Edition.  
 
216!
!
Porter, J. R., & Wratten, S. (2014). Move on to a carbon currency standard. Nature 
Study, 506, 295.  
 
Porter, J. R., Howden, M., Smith, P., & Schiller, M. (2017). Recasting economics as 
if the climate and global ecology really mattered. Consilience: The Journal of 
Sustainable Development, 17(1), 220-229.  
 
REDD+. (2011). The UN-REDD programme strategy 2011-2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.unep.org/forests/Portals/142/docs/UN-
REDD%20Programme%20Strategy.pdf. 
  
QUNO. (2016). Climate change and the international negotiations. Areas of 
work.  Retrieved from http://www.quno.org/areas-of-work/climate-
change-and-international-negotiations 
 
Regan, C. (Producer). (2014/2017). Carbon pricing from the left. Ecofiscal. [panel 
discussion] Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CUmr1AP2G-o 
 
Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of 
planning. Policy Sciences, 4(2). doi:10.1007/BF01405730 
 
Robock, A. (2000). Volcanic eruptions and climate. Reviews of Geophysics, 38(2), 
191-219.  
 
Romer, P. (1990). Endogenous technological change. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 98(5, part 2), S71-S102.  
 
Romer, P. (1996). Why, indeed, in America? Theory, history, and the origins of 
modern economic growth. The American Economic Review, 86(2), 202-206.  
 
Romer, P. (2010). The New Kaldor Facts: Ideas, institutions, population, and 
human capital. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomic, 2(1), 224-245.  
 
Romer, P. (2011). Process, responsibility, and Myron’s Law. Paper presented at the 
IMF Macro Conference. 
 
Romer, P. (2012). Escape from the great distress: The role of rules. Issues in Science 
and Technology, 29(1), 63-68.  
 
Rorty, R. (Ed.) (1999) Dictionary of Philosophy. London, UK: Penguin. 
 
217!
!
Russell-Roy, E. T., Keeton, W. S., Pontius, J. A., & Kerchner, C. D. (2014). 
Rehabilitation forestry and carbon market access on high-graded northern 
hardwood forests. Canadian Journal of Forest Restoration, 44, 614-627. 
doi:dx.doi.org/10.1139/cjfr-2013-0437 
 
Salamon, L. (2002). The tools of government: A guide to the new governance. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sander-Staudt, M. (n.d). Care Ethics Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
 
Sanders, D. R., Irwin, S., & Merrin, R. (2008). The adequacy of speculation in 
agricultural futures markets: Too much of a good thing? Retrieved from 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/37512/2/morr_08-02.pdf 
 
Sanders, R. (2017). Global warming hiatus disproved — again.   Retrieved from 
http://news.berkeley.edu/2017/01/04/global-warming-hiatus-
disproved-again/ 
 
Sanders, S. R. (2014). The dawning of an Earth ethic. Ethics & International Affairs, 
28(3), 317-324. doi:10.1017/S0892679414000380 
 
Sandler, R. (2007). Character & environment. New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Sartor, O., Pallière, C., & Lecourt, S. (2014). Benchmark-based allocations in EU 
ETS Phase 3: An early assessment. Climate Policy, 14(4), 507-524. 
doi:10.1080/14693062.2014.872888 
 
Schmalensee, R., & Stavins, R. (2012). The So2 allowance trading system: The ironic 
history of a grand policy experiment. Retrieved from 
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-
12-44.pdf 
 
Schmidtz, D., & Willott, E. (2012). Environmental ethics: What really matters, what 
really works (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Simmel, G., & Frisby, D. (2011). The philosophy of money. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
 
 
Sinclair-Desgagne, B., & Nimubona, A.-D. (2005). The Pigouvian Tax Rule in the 
presence of an eco-industry.   Retrieved from 
218!
!
http://ssrn.com/abstract=705183 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.705183 
 
Soule, E. (2000). Assessing the precautionary principle. Public Affairs Quarterly, 
14(2), 101-105.  
 
Sovacool, B. K. (2011). The policy challenges of tradable credits: A critical review 
of eight markets Energy Policy, 39, 575-585.  
 
Sponikin, A., & van Kooten, C. (2010). Is BC a net power importer or exporter? 
Retrieved from 
http://web.uvic.ca/~kooten/documents/BCgeneratingSystem.pdf 
 
Stavins, R. N. (2009). Addressing climate change with a Comprehensive UD Cap-
and-Trade System. In D. Helm & C. Hepburn (Eds.), The Economics and 
Politics of Climate Change (pp. 198). New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
STERN, N., & Dreze, J. (1987). The theory of cost-benefit analysis. In A. J. A. a. M. 
Feldstein (Ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, (2), pp. 909. North-Holland: 
Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. 
 
Stern, N., Sir. (2006). The Stern Review on the economics of climate change. Retrieved 
from http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_
change/sternreview_summary.cfm. 
 
Stern, T. (2009). Special envoy for climate change.  Retrieved from 
http://www.state.gov/s/climate/ 
 
Stone, D. (2002). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making. New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton. 
 
Taylor, L., Rezai, A., & Foley, D. (2016). An integrated approach to climate 
change, income distribution, employment, and economic growth. 
Ecological Economics, 121, 196-205. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.05.015 
 
Thayer, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, 
wealth, and happiness (Kindle version): Penguin Publishing Group.  
Received from Amazon.com 
 
219!
!
The Globe & Mail Newspaper, f. c. (2013). Corn Commodity Stock Index. Retrieved 
from: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
investor/markets/indexes/chart/?q=ZC-FT#dashboard/follows/   
 
Thompson_Reuters. (2017). A new hope dispelled: Review of global markets in 2016. 
Retrieved from http://climateobserver.org/reports/11660/ 
 
Trostle, R. (2008). Global agricultural supply and demand: Factors contributing to the 
recent increase in food commodity prices.  Retrieved from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/wrs0801/ 
 
Trostle, R. (2014). Food commodity prices: History & prospects. Retrieved from 
http://www.usda.gov/oce/forum/2014_Speeches/Trostle.ppt 
 
UNFCCC. (2015). Paris Agreement.   Retrieved from 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php 
 
United Nations. (1997). Earth summit.   Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html 
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA]. (2013). 2003-2011 Chinese corn production 
& exports per 1000 metric tons. Retrieved from 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdHome.aspx 
 
USDA. (2005). World corn supply and use. Retrieved from 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/waob/wasde//2000s/2005/was
de-12-09-2005.pdf 
 
USDA. (2007). United States: How will the agricultural sector adjust?  Retrieved 
from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/FDS/2007/05May/FDS07D01/ 
 
USDA. (2011). Feed grains. Retrieved from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ah697/ah697.pdf. 
 
USDA. (2012). Feed grains: Yearbook tables, Table 31.  Retrieved from 
www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/feed-grains-database/feed-grains-
yearbook-tables.aspx#26761. 
 
USDA. (2013). Foreign Agricultural Service. Retrieved from 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdHome.aspx 
 
220!
!
USDA. (2014). World corn supply and use. Retrieved from 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?doc
umentID=1194 
 
USDA. (2017). Corn. Retrieved from 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn/trade/ 
 
USDA. (2017). Leading world exporters of corn. Retrieved from 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn/trade/#world. 
 
USDA. (2017). Cost and returns: Corn. Retrieved from 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commodity-costs-and-
returns.aspx. 
 
Vasa, A., & Michelowa, A. (2011). Uncertainty in climate policy – Impacts on market 
mechanisms. Berlin Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Ventriss, C. (2013). The economic crisis of 2008 and its substantive implications 
for public affairs. American Review of Public Administration, 43(6), 627-655.  
 
Victor, D., & House, J. (2004, Summer). A new currency: Climate change & 
carbon credits. Harvard Law Review, 56-59.  
 
Vig, N., & Kraft, M. (2016). Environmental policy: New directions for the Twenty-First 
century (Kindle version). Retrieved from Amazon.com 
  
Whitmore, A. (2017). Price floors and ceilings. On Climate Change 
Policy.  Retrieved from 
https://onclimatechangepolicydotorg.wordpress.com/carbon-
pricing/price-floors-and-ceilings/ 
 
Wisner, R. (2006). Iowa corn processing and ethanol plant locations. Retrieved 
from https://ncfmc.org/documents/misc/Wisner.pdf 
 
Woolman, J. (1774). Peace quotes. Retrieved from 
http://amesburypeacecenter.org/peacequotes/war.html 
 
World Bank. (2014). State & trends of carbon pricing. Retrieved from 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/505431468148506727/pdf
/882840AR0REPLA00EPI2102680Box385232.pdf  
 
World Bank. (2017). Global growth edges up to 2.7 percent despite weak 
investment [Press release]. Retrieved from 
221!
!
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2017/01/10/global-growth-edges-up-to-2-7-percent-despite-
weak-investment 
 
World Gold, & Council. (2014). Official world gold holdings. Retrieved from 
http://www.gold.org/research/latest-world-official-gold-reserves 
 
World_Watch Institute. (2015). Confronting hidden threats to sustainability. 
Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 
Wrake, M. (2009). European energy policy in transition: Critical aspects of emissions 
trading. Gothenburg, Sweden: University of Gothenburg. 
 
York, R. (2012). Asymmetric effects of economic growth and decline on CO2 
emissions. Nature Climate Change, 2(11), 762-764.  
 
Zia, a. (2013). Post-Kyoto climate governance: Confronting the politics of scale ideology 
and knowledge. London, UK and New York, NY: Routledge. 
!
  
222!
!
Appendix 1- Expert Interview Survey 
 
Interview Survey Questions 
These questions were created by Saleem Ali and Tracey McCowen. The interview 
is semi structured. The following questions are designed to guide the 
conversation rather than to dictate it. The questions here pertain to this 
dissertation; the other questions pertain to another scholar’s research, and are 
thus not relevant to using carbon as a reserve currency. 
 
A) How important is Climate Change? 
1)! Does your position change in your professional setting?  !! If yes, is your professional position more or less concerned? 
B) How important is climate change in the context of US-Canada regional 
cooperation? 
1) Economically? 
2) Environmentally? 
Do you perceive a conflict between these two goals? 
Do you have any ideas on how these can best be balanced? 
 
C) Neither the United States, nor Canada is a signatory to an international 
agreement on climate change 
1)! Do you think their respective positions are responsible?  
2)! Do you think they are wise/prudent? 
3)! Does it place them outside the rest of the global community? 
 
D) According to the Stern Report, which is the most comprehensive report so far 
on the economic impacts of climate change it is estimated that the effects of 
climate change will reduce global productivity by between 5 -20%. A regulatory 
Cap in the US, through emission permits is expected to cost energy users at least 
$100 billion by 2020 and could exceed $300 billion by 2030 -inflation-adjusted to 
2006 dollars (Beach, et al, 2008.) Given that US GDP in 2011 was $14.99 trillion, $ 
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100 billion is 0.0066% of GDP in 2011 dollars and is thus far below the Stern 
Report’s lowest estimated climate change cost of a minimum of 5% GDP. 
1)! What do you think? 
E) The US dollar is the global reserve currency, thus policy changes at the 
Federal Reserve have global reach. If the Federal Reserve adopted a policy to 
purchase emission permits it would incentivize investment in carbon sinks this 
would result in capital flows toward investments that absorb GHG out of the 
atmosphere. Just as the ethanol mandate increased investment in corn 
commodity markets, dramatically increasing the price of food world wide, so to 
a shift in monetary policy could shift the perceived value of carbon sinks. 
Although the initial impacts of increased corn were food riots in urban areas, this 
quickly reversed to increased investment in agricultural production. Do you 
think a similar strategy might work for Green House Gases, chiefly carbon 
dioxide? 
F) The Federal Reserve currently uses foreign currencies and gold as reserves. 
Given the ubiquitous nature of carbon to the industrial economy do you think it 
is feasible for the Fed to use carbon as a currency reserve? 
 
 
List of Participants to Date: 
 
Diana Carney: Canadian economist specializing in climate change, research 
director of Canada 2020.  
Stephen Anderson: Director of research at the Institute for Governance and 
Sustainable Development. He was instrumental in brokering the Montreal 
Protocol that was the international treaty to put a price on Ozone destroying 
CFCs. 
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Dr. Stephen DeCanio: Professor emeritus at the University of California, Santa 
Barbra. He was a member United Nations Environment Programme, Economic 
Options Panel, and formerly sat on the IPCC. 
Rt. Hon. Paul Martin: Former Prime Minister of Canada, Former Finance 
Minister of Canada. 
Graciela Chichilnisky: Columbia University Economist, advisor: IMF, UNEP, 
Climate Bonds Initiative. 
Christopher Ragan: McGill Economist, David Dodge Chair in Monetary Policy. 
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Appendix 2- Congressional Activity on Climate Change 
 
Congressional Act Sponsor Summary Outcome 
2003 Climate 
Stewardship Act  
 
McCain R-AZ 
Lieberman D-CN 
Cap & Trade based 
upon 2000 GHG 
levels  
Voted down in the 
Senate 
2005 Climate 
Stewardship & 
Innovation Act  
 
McCain R-AZ 
Lieberman D-CN 
Same as above & 
promote “green” 
technologies 
Voted down in the 
Senate 
2007 Climate 
Stewardship & 
Innovation Act  
 
McCain R-AZ 
Lieberman D-CN 
Cap based upon 
2004 GHG level 
gradually reduced 
to 1990 levels 
Bill died in 
committee 
2009American 
Clean Energy and 
Security Act  
 
Waxman D-CA  
Markey D- MA  
Create clean energy 
jobs, achieve 
energy 
independence, 
reduce global 
warming  
Approved by the 
House June 2009, 
defeated in the 
Senate 
2009 Clean Energy 
Jobs and American 
Power Act  
 
Kerry D-MA 
 
Proposes cap & 
trade, emissions 
curbs of 20% by 
2020 & 83 % by 
2050 
Died in committee 
2011 Energy Tax 
Prevention Act  
 
Upton R- MI Reverse Clean Air 
Act amendments 
Passed through the 
House April 2011, 
died. 
2013 Climate 
Protection Act 
Saunders I-VT 
Boxer D- CA 
Requires EPA to 
impose a carbon 
pollution fee. 
Introduced & 
referred to 
Committee. 
February, 2013 
2014 Carbon 
Pollution 
Transparency Act 
Saunders I-VT Requires 
Congressional 
Budget Office to 
account for carbon 
footprint of all bills 
and resolutions 
Referred to 
Committee 
September 2014 
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2014 Climate 
Change Health 
Protection and 
Promotion Act 
Markey D-MA Expresses the sense 
of Congress of 
impact of climate 
change on health 
systems 
Referred to 
Committee 
September 2014 
2014 Super 
Pollutants Act 
Murphy D-CN Establishes a task 
force to reduce 
short-lived climate 
pollutants 
Referred to 
Committee 
September 2014 
Updated 10/29/2014.  Govetrack.us. 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s1733 
The first bill submitted to Congress was S. 1610 (101st): Global Climate 
Change Prevention Act of 1989 sponsored by D-VT Senator Patrick Leahy. 
Although H.R. 6669 (95th): National Climate Act of 1977 submitted by D-CA 
George Brown was the first bill to establish a climate monitoring policy and was 
signed by President Jimmy Carter into law in 1978. To date this is the only bill to 
become law that has “climate” in the title. Since then 760 bills which reference 
climate change have been submitted. 
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Appendix 3 
Table 9.2 Atmospheric Green House Gas Concentrations 
GAS Pre-1750  Recent concentration 
Atmospheric lifetime 
(years) 
Parts per million    
Carbon dioxide 
(CO2) 
280 392.67 ~ 100 
Parts per billion    
Methane (CH4) 7008 18749/17589 12 
Nitrous oxide 
(N2O) 
27010 3249/3239 114 
Tropospheric 
ozone (O3) 
251 344,1 hours-days 
 
Blasing,!2013 
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Appendix 4 Effects of Closing the Gold Window 
 
 
http://www.kitco.com/scripts/hist_charts/yearly_graphs.plx 
 
Fears of inflation caused the price of gold to more than double and 
interest rates became the driving force of monetary policy. Delinking the US 
dollar’s direct peg to gold allowed the expansion of the money supply. This 
increased the power of the Federal Reserve who’s role it is to determine what 
interest rates should be. After the decoupling of gold to the US dollar, the 
correlation of interest rates to the price of gold began to separate, as the 
preceding graph demonstrates.  
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Appendix 4  
Systemic Leverage Points in Climate Change Policy Context 
Places to Intervene in a System Climate Change Examples 
 
Constants, parameters, numbers Subsidies, standards, bio-physical 
properties 
 
The size of buffers. Surpluses, welfare (Medicare), ecological 
redundancy, i.e. 250 ppm -350 ppm CO2 
 
The structure of material stocks & 
flows 
 
Transportation networks, population, 
energy inputs, money 
 
Length of delays relative to system 
change 
 
Atmospheric chemical half-life, policy 
collaboration 
 
The strength of negative feedback 
loops 
 
Ability & time needed for atmosphere, 
ecosystem, or market to correct itself  
 
The gain around driving positive 
feedback 
 
Technology, reinforcing behaviors- market 
crashes, market failures, natural inputs & 
gains, i.e. methane release due to warmer 
temperatures 
 
The structure of information flows 
 
Who has access to information, restricted 
or open source, how is information 
obtained 
 
The rules of the system 
 
International agreements, market rules, 
monetary policy, bio-physical constraints 
 
The power to add, change, or organize 
the system structure 
Lobby groups, unions, access to law 
makers, politicians, understanding & 
capacity to alter natural environment 
 
The goals of the system Economic growth, inventions, 
development, flourishing 
 
The mindset or paradigm out of 
which the system arises 
Industrialization, wealth maximization, 
cost avoidance, sustainability  
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Adapted from Meadows, 1999. 
 
  
 
The power to transcend paradigms. 
 
Enlightened state of awareness, alter 
society’s consciousness, social movements 
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Appendix 5 Global Carbon Pricing Mechanisms 
 
World Bank, 2016, p.25 
 
 
